Small-scale cocoa farmers participation in certification: an examination of enabling conditions in Indonesia by Wau, Duman
 
 
 
 
SMALL-SCALE COCOA FARMER 
PARTICIPATION IN CERTIFICATION:  
AN EXAMINATION OF ENABLING 
CONDITIONS IN INDONESIA 
 
 
by 
DUMAN WAU 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of 
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY 
  
 
 
 
International Development Department 
School of Government and Society 
College of Social Sciences 
University of Birmingham 
December 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis investigates why certification has not taken off in the Indonesian cocoa 
sector, seeking to identify factors that limit engagement with certification among 
small-scale farmers. The research is qualitative in nature, taking a case study 
approach by mapping and comparing three different value chains within the cocoa 
sector in the country. An analytical framework is developed from a review of 
literature and identifies four main types of enabling conditions for farmers to engage 
with certification: farmers being organised; having strong links to a new market; 
availability of external support; and, perceived potential benefits from participation. 
Data was collected from 43 interviews and 2 focus group discussions with internal 
and external cocoa chain actors in Indonesia. 
 
The main finding of the study is that participation of small-scale farmers in certified 
value chain is only possible and thus participating farmers benefit when the four inter-
linked conditions are in place. Proliferation of certification among small-scale farmers 
unprecedentedly aims to transform farmers from being simply peasant into ‘farmer 
plus’. It thus requires organisational capacity, business skills and external support. 
The findings suggest that there should be a reappraisal of approach to the introduction 
of certification schemes involving small-scale farmers by applying this framework 
and prioritising efforts to improve small-scale farmers’ wellbeing rather than simply 
encouraging participation into networks as they are only a means to an end.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction and Statement of the Problem 
The adoption of private, voluntary standards, certification and labels (PV-SCL), such as 
Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ, has experienced an exponential rise over the 
last ten years. This growth is illustrated by the increased market share of certified 
products such as coffee, tea, cocoa, banana and forestry products. Compared with 
conventional markets of the same commodities, the growth of certified markets has 
been much greater, reaching significant levels of market penetration which account for 
over 10 per cent of global production (Potts et al., 2010).  
 
This exponential growth of PV-SCL, particularly in the agro-food sector, is projected to 
continue as major food players in the market join the bandwagon. Many have 
committed to sourcing more of their supplies from certified sources (Welligmann et al., 
2010). In the chocolate sector, for example, four big global players, Mars, Mondelēz  
International, Hershey and Feraro, have committed to source all of their beans from 
certified supplies by 2020  (Mars, 2012; Nieburg, 2012). 
 
Response to the growth of the certified market and consequently the rise of PV-SCL 
has, however, been mixed. On the one hand, it is considered to be a positive 
development in response to critiques of corporations operating under free market 
conditions (Murray and Raynolds, 2007). The rise of PV-SCL can be viewed as a 
 2 
positive response to the inadequate returns to small-scale farmers in developing 
countries. A number of studies have demonstrated considerable benefits from voluntary 
certification which can be classified into three categories: economic, environmental and 
social. Voluntary certification has, for example, been seen to protect small-scale farmers 
from global price volatility and provides credit to farmers, which has in turn contributed 
to welfare improvements of small-scale farmers (Ronchi, 2006). In terms of 
environmental benefits, the schemes have raised awareness among small-scale farmers 
about the benefits of preserving nature by reducing or eliminating the use of the harmful 
chemicals, with benefits to their health (Arnould et al., 2009; Jaffee, 2007). Further, 
socially, it is perceived that the building of schools, roads, bridges and other community 
facilities from certification premiums has illustrated how communities have benefited 
from certification schemes (Bacon, 2010). Certification is even further considered as a 
means for poverty alleviation (Taylor, 2002).  
 
Having said that, on the other hand, a number of studies have cast doubt over benefits 
from the rise of the certified market and certification schemes. In terms of farmers’ 
income, for example, differences between participants of a certification scheme and 
non-participant farmers are relatively small and insignificant (Beuchelt and Zeller, 
2011; Barham and Weber, 2011; Valkila, et al., 2011; Calo and Wise, 2005; Robins, et 
al., 1999).  
 
Apart from the mixed results from participation, it has been found that only a small 
percentage of small-scale farmers participate in certification schemes.  In other words, 
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despite the rise of certification, scaling up participation of farmers is a major challenge 
(Paschall and Seville, 2012). Further, scrutinising the spread of the growth of 
certification globally, it has been uneven, concentrated among a small number of 
countries and for particular products (Potts et al., 2010; Reardon et al., 2009). Certified 
coffee and bananas, for example, are predominantly sourced from South American 
producers, meanwhile certified tea comes from Africa’s producers. Certified cocoa is 
dominantly from those same two continents: South America and Africa.  
 
The Asian continent, including Oceania, compared with those two continents, has 
experienced less inclusion in certification networks despite Asia being a major global 
producer of certifiable products as illustrated by Figure 1 (FAO Stats, accessed January 
2013). Asia’s small share of the global certified markets is illustrated by Hutchen 
(2011), asserting that it is 15 years behind its counterparts in South America and Africa. 
Asian production, moreover, according to Blackmore et al. (2012) is characterised by a 
dominance of small-scale production, limited economic and agricultural opportunities, 
high poverty levels and pockets of food insecurity. Despite the fact that these 
characteristics correlate well with the objectives of many certification schemes, it is not 
clear why certification is not so prevalent in Asia.  
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Figure	  1	  Global	  Production	  of	  Most	  Certified	  Commodities	  
Source: Graph compiled from FAO Stats at www.faostat.fao.org and table compiled 
from Rainforest Alliance website at http://www.sustainablefarmcert.com, Fairtrade at 
http://www.flocert.net and UTZ at https://www.utzcertified.org/index.php/404 
(accessed. January 2012) 
 
The uneven reach of certification to small-scale farmers in Asia is exemplified by the 
cocoa sector. Participating farmers in this certified commodity network are dominantly 
from South America and Africa. In Indonesia, despite being the largest producer of 
cocoa in Asia, and the third globally, engagement with certification is very limited. This 
is demonstrated in Figure 2 and Table 1, which shows that the inclusion of small-scale 
farmers in Indonesia in the cocoa certification network is very limited compared with 
their counterparts in South American and African countries. As shown in Table 1, the 
adoption rate of certification schemes in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana has shown an increase 
although Ghana’s adoption is relatively small, with only one Fairtrade certification 
scheme. However, the Fairtrade cocoa certification in the country is the first and the 
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oldest. Despite being awarded to only one cocoa farmer organisation, participant farmer 
or membership of the Fairtrade certified producer organisation, Kuapa Kokoo co-
operative, reached 65,000 farmers in 2013 (Kuapa Kokoo, accessed 11 January 2013). 
The certified cocoa beans from this certification alone account for around 5 per cent of 
total production (Fairtrade, accessed 11 January 2013). 
 
Figure	  2	  Certification	  Uptake	  among	  Cocoa	  Producing	  Countries	  
Source: Graph compiled from Rainforest Alliance website at 
http://www.sustainablefarmcert.com,  Fairtrade at http://www.flocert.net  and UTZ at 
https://www.utzcertified.org/index.php/404 accessed December 2012 
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Certification 
Schemes/Countries 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Ghana 
Other 
African 
Countries 
South 
America Indonesia 
Total 
Fairtrade 28 1 2 40 0 71 
Rainforest Alliance 148 16 12 20 24 220 
UTZ Certified 78 29 34 61 11 213 
Total Certification 
Proliferation 254 46 48 121 35 
504 
Table	  1	  Certification	  Uptake	  in	  Number	  among	  Cocoa	  Producing	  Countries	  
Source: Graph compiled from Rainforest Alliance website at 
http://www.sustainablefarmcert.com,  Fairtrade at http://www.flocert.net  and UTZ at 
https://www.utzcertified.org/index.php/404 accessed December 2012 
 
Given the importance of cocoa production to Indonesia and globally, the question arises 
as to why certification has not been significantly taken up in the Indonesian cocoa 
sector and what the factors are behind this situation. Further, the question is raised as to 
what it is about the structure of the cocoa market in the country, the characteristics of its 
farmers, the support, government policy and other aspects that impedes certification.  
 
This question is even more intriguing given the level of adoption of certification in 
Indonesia’s agricultural sector such as the coffee sector, for example. Fairtrade and 
Starbucks C.A.F.E. standards have been adopted for quite some time, around a decade. 
Meanwhile in the forestry sector, Indonesia was awarded the world’s first forest 
certification under SmartWood in 1990 (Cashore et al., 2006). In the Indonesian coffee 
sector, certification has taken off to a more advanced level as shown by Table 2. Those 
certified, however, are certified traders and only a small number of producers have been 
certified; all certified by Fairtrade.  
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CERTIFICATIONS Producer Trader Total 
Fairtrade 14 16 30 
Rainforest Alliance 0 21 21 
UTZ Certified 0 13 13 
Table	  2	  Certification	  Uptake	  in	  Indonesian	  Coffee	  Sector	  
Source: Graph compiled from Rainforest Alliance website at 
http://www.sustainablefarmcert.com,  Fairtrade at http://www.flocert.net  and UTZ at 
https://www.utzcertified.org/index.php/404 accessed December 2012 
 
Given these questions, this study investigates why there is so little certification in the 
cocoa sector in Indonesia. The study devises a conceptual framework of enabling 
conditions for certification by identifying factors that enable or impede the uptake of 
certification. There are four main variables that are seen as being essential for the 
uptake of certification.  These are: farmers being organised; link to new markets; 
external support availability; and, perceiving of potential benefits from participation. 
These are set out as enabling conditions in an analytical framework to investigate the 
potential for farmers to participate in private voluntary certification, standards and 
labelling (PV-SCL).  
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1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
Given the lack of certification in the cocoa sector in Indonesia, the main aim of this 
research is to identify the conditions that have hindered the uptake of certification and 
what might encourage adoption. The specific objectives are: 
1. To identify the enabling or impeding conditions for small-scale cocoa farmer 
participation in certification schemes 
2. To identify efforts that are needed for certification to take off.  
 
1.3 Main Research Questions and Sub-Questions 
The study investigates why certification schemes have not taken off in the Indonesian 
cocoa small-scale farmer sector. In other words, why do Indonesian cocoa farmers 
participate less in the global certified cocoa network than farmers in other parts of the 
world. The overarching research question is as follows:  
Why has certification not taken off in the Indonesian cocoa sector?  
 
Sub-questions are divided into four headings according to the variables that have been 
identified as key factors: 
A. Farmers being organized: 
1. What is the history and feasibility of forming groups or co-operatives in 
Indonesia particularly in the cocoa sector? 
2. What is government policy towards farmer organisations and co-operatives to 
enable or impede the feasibility of forming groups? 
3. Apart from policy factors, what other factors are there that impede or enable 
cooperation? 
 
B. Strong links to markets 
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1. What are the links between individual farmers and groups with different actors 
in the market chain? 
2. What challenges are experienced by farmers in reaching new markets? 
3. Do traders have a particular role to encourage farmers to participate in 
certification? 
 
C. External support availability 
1. Are there any NGOs, what kinds of NGOs and projects, working within the 
cocoa sector that could or do support farmers in linking with new markets? 
2. How do the NGOs, if available, link farmers to certification? 
3. What kinds of support have been provided by different levels of government? 
4. What agricultural extension support is available and how far does it support 
efforts that might enable farmers to engage with certification schemes? 
 
D. Potential impact to address cocoa farmer challenges 
1. What are the main challenges faced by Indonesian cocoa farmers? 
2. How are those challenges being addressed?  
3. How are these challenges linked to potential engagement with certification 
schemes? 
4. Could a new market under certification benefit farmers? 
 
1.4 Justification of the Study 
Most studies recommend the inclusion of farmers into certified networks as it is 
considered beneficial for small-scale farmers. Particularly for the cocoa commodity, the 
desire for small-scale farmers to be included in the certified network is even greater as 
the global cocoa sector has its own unique features. Compared with the coffee sector, 
for example, where supply outstrips demand, cocoa, on the contrary, is confronted by an 
unsustainable supply despite growing demand. Cocoa production is vulnerable to 
declining production due to pest and disease attacks, ageing trees, lack of human capital 
and, in some cases, unhealthy farming practices (ICCO, 2011; Oxfam, 2009; Barrientos 
et al., 2008; Saphiro and Rosenquist, 2004; Panlibuton and Meyer, 2004). Unsustainable 
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production has been a threat for global chocolate industries. This is demonstrated by 
market demand that has exceeded supply for almost a decade (ICCO, 2011). 
 
The other important fact for encouraging inclusion of small-scale farmers into certified 
value chain is due to the change in downstream (closer to end-user) chain of the sector. 
Most major players of the chocolate industry have committed to joining the 
‘bandwagon’ of PV-SCL. They have stepped into a commitment to supply all their raw 
material from certified products (Welligmann et al., 2010; Mars, 2012; Nieburg, 2012). 
This generates an important implication for absorbability of market demand.  Certified 
cocoa will be able to be absorbed by firms’ demand. In other words, certified cocoa 
farmers do not necessarily share the same challenges as faced by certified coffee 
farmers, that their certified coffee is not all sold through the certified network.  
 
In spite of this change in the downstream chain of the global cocoa sector, with higher 
demand for certified cocoa, it has not automatically resulted in a significant change at 
the level of the upstream chain (producers). The majority of cocoa farmers have not 
engaged in the certified market. This is indicated by the limited participation of farmers 
in the certified global cocoa market as illustrated by Figure 2. Further, scaling up 
farmers’ inclusion into the certified market is a serious challenge (Paschall and Seville, 
2012). This study, therefore, examines which conditions limit farmers’ participation in 
the certified market and what possible steps could be taken to encourage famers’ 
participation.  
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Further, the study of the Indonesian cocoa sector is not only deemed important due to its 
potential contribution to global studies on cocoa farmers’ participation but also its 
implications for practical uses. There have been few studies on the inclusion of cocoa 
farmers into the certified value chain. Thus, this study attempts not only to identify and 
understand the conditions for inclusion in or exclusion from the value chain per se. As 
Ponte (2008) proposed, this study, more importantly, identifies conditions that could 
make a substantial impact on inclusion in certification schemes.  
 
The case of the Indonesian cocoa sector is deemed important due to the fact that cocoa 
production in the country plays an important role for global cocoa industries as a third 
world producer. The sector also provides livelihood sources to almost a million small-
scale farmers across the country. The cocoa sector makes a significant economic 
contribution to the country’s income, with foreign exchange earnings of around 
USD701 million per 2002, the third after rubber and palm oil (KPPU, 2009). 
Furthermore, its geographic location is considered strategic to the new centre of 
economic growth, Asia, which has a high demand for raw materials. The projected 
growing market, theoretically, gives greater opportunity to farmers to benefit from the 
increasing demand. This country also has potential for expanding production as the 
country, in terms of size, is vast and has abundant population as workforce for the 
sector. However, when it comes to certified market participation, inclusion of 
Indonesian small-scale farmers into the global certified market is limited and 
understanding why this is can contribute to more effective policy and practical 
approaches in this sector.  
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1.5 Locus, Scope and Delimitation of the Study 
This study is concerned with the participation of small-scale farmers in certified 
networks. The locus of this study is Indonesia as Asia’s largest producer and the third 
global largest producer of cocoa. The main locus of the study in terms of cocoa 
producing regions is in Sulawesi. Sulawesi is an island where cocoa production 
accounts for 70 per cent of the country’s total production (see Map 1). Bali and Java 
Islands also are places where data was obtained as NGOs and certification body issuers 
reside there (see Map 2). Participants in this study are cocoa farmers who are participant 
or non-participants of PV-SCL, local traders, traders/exporters, NGOs, government 
officials and certifiers.  
 
Map	  1	  Indonesian	  Cocoa	  Producing	  Map	  Per	  2010	  
Source: Map is originally obtained from Tempo English online magazine at 
https://magz.tempo.co/konten/2012/01/18/OUT/24074/Cocoa-Island/21/12 and 
compiled with data from Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture at 
http://aplikasi.pertanian.go.id/bdsp/newkom.asp  
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Map	  2	  Data	  Collection	  Sites	  
Source: Google maps at https://map.google.com/ and compiled with map tags based on 
locations where data collected for this study 
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As this study focuses on identifying enabling conditions for small-scale cocoa farmers 
to participate in certified networks, the scope of this study is limited to chain actors at 
the meso-level in Indonesia, including cocoa farmers, local traders, exporters and 
certifiers. Indirect chain actors such as government officials, NGOs and organisations 
concerned with cocoa were also included as participants of this study. Given the scope 
of the study, the results are limited in terms of generalisability to other countries 
although some particular inferences can be made to wider areas and context. It also does 
not include a systematic or exhaustive impact examination of certifications although it 
covers, to some extent, farmers’ perceptions on benefits during their participation in the 
schemes.  
 
As illustrated in Map 1, Sumatra accounts for more than 20 per cent of total production 
in the country. Sumatra is where the researcher comes from in the country. However, 
due to the limitation of certification implementation in the region, the researcher opted 
to focus on Sulawesi Island. Further, in order to minimise any bias in the process of data 
collection, the researcher deliberately opted for Sulawesi Island as a locus of the study. 
Given that the researcher’s mother and relatives are small-scale cocoa farmers 
themselves, obtaining data from them would be quite risky in terms of objectivity. 
Nevertheless, the researcher’s interest in cocoa derives from engagement with those 
cocoa farmers when the researcher worked as an NGO worker. In order to fully 
understand the challenges they are confronted with and how to address the issues, the 
researcher set out an intention to carry out research on this topic in his proposal prior to 
commencing the study. This is one of the researcher’s main motives in carrying out this 
study.     
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is composed of seven Chapters. Each chapter addresses a particular aspect of 
the study. It is designed in a logical sequence towards answering the research questions. 
Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, aims and objectives, research questions, 
justification and the scope, limitation of the study and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 examines literature on voluntary certification. Its purpose is to identify the 
extent of the problem as discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter examines literature to 
identify factors that have enabled or constrained farmers’ participation in certification 
schemes in other parts of the world. From the examination of the literature, an analytical 
framework is developed that informs the design of the data collection and the process of 
analysis. Chapter 3 presents methodology, fieldwork accounts and the analytical 
framework. The analytical framework and methodological constructs are devised to 
address the research problem. The Enabling Conditions Analytical Framework is used 
as a guide to the formulation of research questions and analysis, meanwhile the 
methodological strategy is set out to collect data to answer the research question. 
Interpretive and pragmatic approaches are introduced as guidance for the fieldwork and 
analysis of data. The Qualitative Case Study approach is deemed to be the most 
appropriate approach for the data collection and how it is employed in this study is 
explained. This Chapter also recounts the activities in gaining access to respondents, the 
process of data collection and its administration. The data was collected through in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions. The Chapter ends with a discussion of the 
approach used to analyse the data to answer the research questions. 
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Chapter 4 sets out the background of this study in the Indonesian cocoa sector. The 
focus of this Chapter is to present the input, output structure of the commodity within 
the country, the dynamics of production over time, cocoa boom and bust driving factors 
in the country, and challenges faced by small-scale farmers. This chapter also highlights 
the approach of Indonesian government to this sector. Chapter 5 presents the findings 
which are structured according to the main themes of enabling conditions for 
participation into PV-SCL, revealing new insights which contribute to private 
certification literature. Chapter 6 answers the main research questions concerning small-
scale farmer participation in the certification network and how the certification network 
addresses challenges faced by the Indonesian cocoa sector. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes 
the study, setting out its contribution to knowledge, theory and literature. This chapter 
also presents an account of how far the research has answered the research question. 
Finally, the chapter identifies further research areas that could be pursued.   
CHAPTER 2 
ENABLING SMALL-SCALE FARMER PARTICIPATION 
IN CERTIFICATION SCHEMES  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 reviews literature in two key areas. Firstly, literature on what certifications 
are, their characteristics in terms of their objectives, codes and standards, adoption 
approach, rate of adoption and the nature of their markets is reviewed. Secondly, it 
discusses how farmers are involved in the schemes as this reveals the types of 
challenges that are experienced and what enabling conditions are needed for effective 
participation. This section identifies and establishes variables to develop an enabling 
conditions framework for farmers’ inclusion in certification schemes. The chapter 
concludes with the development of this analytical framework, which was used in the 
development of the data collection approach and tools and to guide the subsequent 
analysis. 
  
2.2 Defining PV-SCL 
In literature, depending on the discipline, multiple terms are used to describe the PV-
SCL (Private and Voluntary Standard, Certification and Labelling) such as private 
regulatory system (Bush and Bain, 2004), Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) 
(Bernstein and Cashore, 2007), market-based private regulatory action (Jaffee, 2012), 
transnational private governance (Gereffi et al., 2001), private governance or 
certification network (Gandenberger et al., 2011), voluntary certification and labelling 
initiatives (Raynolds et a., 2007; Roberts, 2012), private standards initiatives (PSIs) 
(Tallontire, 2007), environmental and social standards, certification and labelling 
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(Lawrence, 2003) or simply voluntary sustainability standards (Sexsmith and Potts, 
2009). In addition, further terms such as eco-labelling, eco-certification, ethical labels 
and sustainable certifications are used. These various terms are drawn from multi-
disciplinary angles: from political science, environmental to management studies 
referring to the same subject. The various terms come from different theoretical 
explanations of multi-disciplinary studies (Prakash and Potoski, 2007; Bartley, 2007; 
Reardon et al., 2009). Given the various terms used, however, this study will use the 
term of Private and Voluntary Standards, Certification and Labelling (PV-SCL), which 
is explained after reviewing its basic concepts, in order to avoid confusion from the 
myriad terms. 
 
In spite of being different but related entities, standards, certification and labels have 
different meanings and mechanisms which do not always go together. In this context of 
PV-SCL, standards are defined as a set of requirements to be followed covering both 
characteristics of a product and particular processes carried out in creating the products 
(Renard and Loconto, 2013). In other words, the standards do not only set particular 
technical characteristics or quality of the product but also set specific social, 
environmental and economic features in the process of making or manufacturing a 
product (Bartley, 2007).   
 
A further concept of this system is that of certification. According to the International 
Standards Organisation (ISO), certification is defined as: 
“the provision by an independent body of written assurance (a certificate) that 
the product, service or system in question meets specific requirements” 
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(Accessed in December 2014 at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/certification.htm) 
 
In the process of ensuring conformity with the standards, participants’ conformity is 
based on third party audits. Fairtrade, for example, works with FLO-Cert GmbH, an 
independent organisation that certifies the whole chain from producers to retailers. In 
the case of the Rainforest Alliance, its decision to issue a certification to an applicant is 
based on audits conducted by Sustainable Farm Certification International (SFC) 
against the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN). Based on the third party audits, the 
certification bodies issue certification as an assurance that the participants have met the 
standards they set. In other words, compliance with standards is followed by obtaining a 
certification.  
 
Obtaining a certification comes along with a given right to use a mark, label or seal 
attached to a product. This label is usually in simple sign form to communicate with 
consumers that the products have met certain standards regulated by certification 
setters. 
 
Given the basic features of the standards, certification and labelling, there are two 
distinguishing characteristics associated with such schemes: private and voluntary. 
These two distinctive characteristics reflect how the system is created and implemented. 
The term “private” refers to a non-state regulatory system contrasting with state 
regulations and institutions particularly under government or inter-governmental 
institutions (Bush and Bain, 2004). Further, the private characteristic refers to the origin 
of the regulation itself which is mostly driven by the private sector. The regulations of 
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PV-SCL are generally initiated, developed and set as rules or standards by civil society 
organisations, firms and other private actors. Hence, in terms of its operationalisation, it 
is administered by private institutions rather than government bodies. Bernstein and 
Cashore (2007) emphasise the nature of its non-governmental origin by coining these 
initiatives as Non-State Market-Driven global governance (NSMD) indicating the 
strong involvement and engagement of private institutions. They define NSMD as 
“deliberate and adaptive governance institutions designed to embed social and 
environmental norms in the global marketplace that derive authority directly 
from interested audiences, including those they seek to regulate, not from 
sovereign states” (p. 3).  
 
Meanwhile the voluntary attribute here refers to the nature of the engagement with the 
system which is based on voluntary engagement. Actors can participate or withdraw 
from the PV-SCL scheme whenever they want to do so. It differentiates itself from 
mandatory and coercive forces of government regulations.  
 
The PV-SCL is set by diverse actors and has diverse characteristics, goals and 
principles. The private actor is not a single player but rather a myriad of players, 
including firms, engaging and defining the system. The system covers aspects of 
trading, social, economic, environmental sustainability, labour conditions, human rights, 
traceability or a combination of these. It sets the standards along the global supply 
chain. The PV-SCL covers a range of commodities and services from apparel, footwear 
to natural resources (Bartley, 2007; Gereffi et al., 2001; Cashore et al., 2004; Hughes, 
2001; Raynolds et al., 2004). Given the account of the basic concepts and characteristics 
of the system, this study uses the term of Private and Voluntary Standards, 
Certifications and Labels (PV-SCL) to refer to the system.  
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2.3 Characteristics of Certification Schemes and Farmers Participation  
Given the basic concept of PV-SCL discussed earlier, it shows that certification 
schemes and, more specifically as discussed in this thesis, Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance 
and UTZ, have different objectives and emphases depending on what they want to 
achieve. This is due to the fact that each certification emerged from a particular 
historical background and different types of actors have shaped the schemes. Fairtrade, 
for example, aims to achieve fair trading relationships between producers and traders 
(Raynolds et al., 2007). Meanwhile, Rainforest Alliance is primarily concerned about 
the disappearance of the world’s rainforests and aims to halt deforestation and preserve 
biodiversity (Wille, 2004; Tallontire et al., 2012; Blackmore et al., 2012). UTZ, which 
was initiated mostly by private companies, aims to ensure that good agricultural 
practices are undertaken by producers and that the supply of commodities can be 
sustained (UTZ, 2008). But in short, all these schemes aim to improve social, 
environmental and economic conditions of producers. 
 
The different objectives and background of each certification have implications for the 
schemes in practice: first of all Fairtrade and UTZ emphasise their codes and standards 
in meeting social, economic and economic criteria while the Rainforest Alliance 
emphasises mainly environmental and social measurements. Secondly, approaches to 
the inclusion of small scale farmers into the networks differ from one to another in 
which Fairtrade, for example, puts emphasis on small scale farmers inclusion into the 
network, meanwhile the other two are more open to work with large scale producers 
such as plantations. Having said this, this does not mean that Fairtrade does not work 
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with plantations nor the other two schemes do not work with small-scale farmers. 
Fairtrade has worked with plantations, which termed its system as a hired labour model, 
for some commodities such as banana, tea, coffee but the hired labour model does not 
operate in cocoa.  
 
Despite those differences, the different approaches to enabling the participation of 
small-scale farmers in certification networks is the focus of this thesis. The different 
approaches taken by schemes raises questions about how effective the approaches are 
for enabling participation by small-scale farmers and what challenges small-scale 
farmers face in entering and staying in certification schemes. The term ‘small-scale 
farmers’ here is a combination of the International Federation of Agricultural 
Producers’ definition which is based on size of landholding which is usually two 
hectares or less (Dixon et al., 2004; Vorley et al., 2012) and the definition of Murphy’s 
(2012) referring to the nature of production which is lack access to inputs, land, 
technologies, seeds, capital, market, credit and information. The question of how the 
small-scale farmers become and stay involved in the schemes is discussed in the next 
section.  
 
2.4 How Farmers are Involved in Certification Schemes; Challenges 
and Enabling Factors 
Existing literature describing accounts of how farmers are involved in certification 
schemes is very limited with the exception of literature on Fairtrade certification. 
However, exploring and examining available accounts on Fairtrade and other 
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certification schemes enables the identification of challenges and conditions that can 
hinder or assist the participation of farmers in certification networks.  
 
The first question that emerges when it comes to farmers’ involvement in certification is 
how hundreds if not thousands of individual farmers actually participate in a 
certification scheme? Either certification attempts to reach them or they approach the 
certification; how is it possible for thousands of farmers to apply for a certification as it 
is not possible for one individual farmer to do so? Literature shows that farmers have to 
unite into many forms of groups, with different terms used: farmer groups, farmer 
organisation, producer organisation, producer groups, associations, partnerships and co-
operatives (Lyon, 2011; Vasquez-Leon, 2010; Paschall and Seville, 2012; Beal, 2012; 
Tiffen, 2002; Liu, 2009; Vorley et al., 2012; Kuit and Waarts, 2014). This is a 
requirement in order to be able to participate in a certification scheme. The Fairtrade 
scheme, for example, explicitly requires small-scale farmers to be organised into an 
independent and democratic organisation. For buyers, they are required to buy directly 
from small-scale farmers who are organised in democratic associations (Lyon, 2009). 
This is set through the standard of the scheme. This stringency is still applied 
particularly for two commodities, coffee and tea.   
 
The Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified require farmers to form groups as well, 
although with slightly different levels of stringency. The Rainforest Alliance through 
the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN) sets standards for the establishment of an 
Internal Management System as part of group farmer management system (SAN Group 
Certification Standard March 2011 v2.doc, 2012). Similarly, UTZ Certified requires the 
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establishment of an Internal Control System (ICS) as part of the farmer group (UTZ 
Code of Conduct, 2012). In sum, in spite of varying degrees of stringency, all the 
certification schemes require farmers to form a group or organisation in order to 
participate in these schemes.   
 
With regard to certification and farmer group establishment, the question is what the 
challenges are. In literature, organising themselves into a formal structure is identified 
as one of the challenges (Torgerson et al., 1997; Vasquez-Leon, 2010) and very often 
this process is considered as the most significant barrier to small-scale farmers’ 
participation (Paschall and Seville, 2012; Beal, 2012). The challenge starts from setting 
up a group or organisation, running it and maintaining it as a business unit.  
 
The degree of this challenge varies from one group to another, however. Taylor’s 
(2003) study on seven South America co-operatives linked to Fairtrade shows that 
farmer groups were initially assisted by either religious missionary team or government. 
Accounts on group formation in South America are strongly related to government 
initiation as suggested by other authors (Murray et al., 2003; Lyon, 2011; Vasquez-
Leon, 2010).  
 
Having said that, accounts on African farmer group context is slightly different from 
South America’s. The farmer group formation, in form of co-operatives, under Fairtrade 
in Ghana, for example, was initiated by private sector or individuals when opportunity 
became available in which the Ghanaian government partly liberalised its cocoa sector 
market (Tiffen, 2002; Ronchi, 2002; Doherty and Tranchell, 2005).  
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Despite the feasibility of forming a group, as many governments’ policies allow to do 
so, a further challenge lies in running the group or organisation to function as a social 
and economic agent (Vasques-Leon, 2010, Lyon, 2011). Exploring literature on other 
schemes and literature on co-operatives, it can be seen that farmers face huge challenges 
in terms of managerial skills and investment. Santacoloma (2007), on organic 
certification, observes that in order to function as a business agent, a farmer group under 
a certification scheme has to obtain managerial skills on planning, marketing strategies, 
logistics, ICS (internal control system), preparation of documents, post-production 
management and many related documentations as required by the certification. 
 
The importance of strong farmer organisation establishment is associated with many 
aspects of certification such as ensuring standard compliance, reducing costs, increasing 
bargaining position with buyers, access to credits, collective marketing and economies 
of scale (Liu, 2009; Vorley et al., 2012; Beal, 2012; Kuit and Waarts, 2014). Given the 
importance of farmer organisations to the participation of small-scale farmers in 
certification, therefore, farmer group formation is one of the variables that is essential 
for enabling farmers to participate in certification.  
 
Having identified the challenge for farmer group establishment, a further question is 
raised regarding how farmers access the certified market and engage with certified 
buyers. Assuming that most small-scale farmers are limited in terms of access to 
information, to find a right buyer who is under a certification scheme must be a 
challenge. Conventional buyers or intermediaries might be in place but a certified buyer 
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with advantages to offer a better deal is a challenge. Intermediaries in the literature on 
South America, known as coyotes, are often associated with exacerbation of the low 
price received by farmers (Jaffee, 2007; Milford, 2014). Therefore, getting direct access 
and trading with certified buyers is an advantage. Examining literature on accounts of 
how farmers were linked to direct buyers shows that the certification body often assists 
producer organisations to learn about markets, permits, legal procedure, export and 
import (Taylor, 2003). In the case of Ghanaian cocoa farmers Kuapa Kokoo (Tiffen, 
2002), farmers were bridged to a buyer, Twin Trading, or now called Day Chocolate 
Company, to bypass local buyers who were accused of cheating them.  
 
Having a direct link to a buyer seems not only to benefit farmers for all legal or business 
procedures to be taken care of but also assists them in addressing capital limitations. 
Committed buyers can co-invest with farmers in the whole process of participating in 
certification as certification is quite costly (Seville et al., 2011). In cases of Fairtrade 
certification, farmers can also ask for payment upfront from buyers. The other schemes, 
Rainforest Alliance and UTZ, also allow to do so albeit it is not regulated by their 
standards (Blackmore et al., 2012; Kuit and Waarts, 2015).  
 
A further area of importance in having a direct link to a certified buyer is the fact that 
being certified does not mean guaranteed sales. In other words, a certification body does 
not guarantee that the certified commodities will be purchased by certified buyers 
(Blackmore et al., 2012).  Given the importance of being linked to a new market or new 
buyer, this factor is considered as an important variable to link farmers into a successful 
engagement with certification scheme.  
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As mentioned earlier that farmers face those two important factors to engage with 
certification, with so many limitations a further question is raised: how is it possible for 
small-scale farmers to get going and participate in certification? In other words, who 
helps farmers to engage with certification? Participation requires capacity to run a group 
or organisation and technical knowledge to meet certification standards, substantial 
investments which all need expertise and time. Given this fact, these challenges could 
prevent farmers from participating. Many cases discussed in the literature suggest that 
the presence of external agents is needed to support farmers to participate in 
certification networks (Barret et al., 2002; Liu, 2009; Blackmore et al., 2012, Basso et 
al., 2012; Kuit and Waarts, 2015). Liu (2009 p.95) even argues that small-scale farmers 
are “unlikely to obtain certification without external assistance”. In other words, 
availability of external support is an important factor in enabling farmers to participate. 
Therefore, this external support variable is treated as an enabling condition for 
participation. This is illustrated by the case of Mexican peasant farmer co-operative 
UCIRI, for example, which was supported by Max Havelaar Foundation (Audebrand 
and Pauchant, 2009). Similarly, in a study conducted by Taylor (2003), seven co-
operatives in Mexico, Guatemala and El Salvador were supported by NGOs to enable 
them to participate in the Fair Trade network.  
 
External support is deemed pivotal. Depending on the primary constraints faced by a 
group of farmers, various sources of external support can play roles. The case of Kuapa 
Kokoo, which is often discussed in the literature on cacao certification, was supported 
by two external actors: an NGO, SNV, and a commercial actor, TWIN, a company 
based in the UK, with different scopes of interventions. TWIN offered a commercial 
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framework and SNV supported Kuapa Kokoo with organisational development. TWIN 
offered the farmers’ co-operative operational and financial advice and provided a start-
up loan and a loan guarantee to cover working capital and funds for the first of 22 
villages to buy 'tools of the trade' (sacks, scales, tarpaulins and wooden pallets). The 
commercial framework was set, not as a grant, so the farmers had to pay back to TWIN 
within four years after the soft launch with interest charged at a rate of 12 per cent. 
Meanwhile, SNV offered village-level development and participatory training of 
committees, bookkeepers and workers (Tiffen, 2002).  
 
Having said that, the availability of external support such as from NGOs does not 
necessarily guarantee participation of farmers. Inappropriate approaches of NGOs or 
donors could lead to the opposite effect: failure of farmer groups or co-operatives. The 
challenge is finding an appropriate approach between ‘giving fish or a fishing rod’. 
Coulter et al.’s (2009) study on agricultural co-operatives in Sub-Saharan Africa 
illustrate a case when farmers were simply given donated equipment  which undermined 
self-help initiatives expected from the farmers, required to run their groups (Smith, 
2011; Nelson et al., 2012). 
 
A final key factor in encouraging farmers to participate in certification is the perception 
of benefits from a scheme. Exploring literature on benefits of certification, it appears 
that the reward of participation in a certification scheme is not clear-cut in the sense that 
it is hard to make farmers believe that they would get benefits from participation, 
particularly economic benefits, which is often the main motive of farmers to participate 
(Giovanucci and Koekoek, 2003; Jena et al., 2012). Therefore, in order to find out why 
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farmer participate less or more in a certification, the potential for, and perceptions of, 
benefits from participation should be examined. Potential benefits offered by the 
scheme itself is an equally important variable for examining level and the nature of 
participation of small-scale farmers.  
 
Reviewing the challenges faced by farmers in this thesis, these challenges are turned 
into enabling condition variables that need to be present to help farmers participate and 
benefit. In other words, the challenges identified in the literature can equally be 
considered as enabling conditions which are further examined in the next section. The 
challenges are grouped into four enabling condition variables: farmers being organised; 
links to new markets; external support availability; and, perceived potential benefits 
from participation. 
 
2.5 Enabling Conditions for Small-scale Farmers Inclusion into 
Certification 
2.5.1 Farmers being Organised 
As identified in section 2.3.1, one of variables for participation in certification is that 
farmers are organised in groups. Having identified one of the enabling conditions 
variables, a further question is what exactly the issues are concerning group formation 
and its operation by looking in-depth at the challenges and how they are overcome as 
discussed in literature on certified groups and literature associated with the issue.   
 
The importance of establishing farmer groups is suggested for many reasons. Firstly, to 
ensure compliance with the standards. It is not only a requirement for applying a 
certification, but group formation aims to build capacity of farmers to comply with 
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standards. A farmer group or co-operative can ensure the monitoring of standards 
compliance over time. Audits can be carried out efficiently (Blackmore et al., 2012). 
Further, benefits from certifications can be shared transparently within a group (Lyon, 
2011). 
 
Secondly, economies of scale.  The idea behind this is that farmers within a group can 
benefit from cost decreasing due to bigger volume of their product. Running collective 
marketing, farmers in a group will be able to collect a high volume of a commodity, 
which is more viable to trade and deliver, as required by a big buyer, with lower costs 
compared to an individual marketing their commodity. The cost of delivering 1 ton of 
cacao beans from an individual farmer to market, for example, can be minimised if 
many farmers under a group are able to organise delivery of the products in large 
quantity and the cost of delivery can be a lot cheaper (Kuit and Waarts, 2014). A big 
buyer is willing to trade with a group with high volumes of products. Due to a high 
volume it collects from many members, a co-operative can further improve its 
bargaining position over prices from buyers in the value chain. Farmers groups can also 
bulk buy inputs in which prices are often discounted or reduced. This contributes to 
greater cost-effectiveness of production (Liu, 2008). 
 
Thirdly, farmers as members of a farmer group can access credit, technical and financial 
assistance from external support, capacity building, networking with other farmer 
groups or external assistance. With regard to inclusion of farmers in a certified value 
chain, membership of a co-operative is deemed to be a key determinant to engage with 
markets and manage a certification scheme (Beal, 2012).  
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Apart from those reasons for having a strong farmer group, as a social and economic 
instrument, farmer organisations can empower their farmer members to improve their 
lives and reduce socio-economic risk at the grassroots level (Vasquez-Leon, 2010; 
Torgerson et al., 1997). Farmers through their organisation would be able to pull 
together a variety of assets to be collectively used for improving their lives and gain 
socioeconomic benefits. Farmer groups can facilitate the voice of farmers to be heard by 
stakeholders and act as a medium for sharing ideas and learning (Vasquez-Leon, 2010; 
Elder et al., 2012).  
 
Given the ideal proposition of having farmers’ organisations, the intention to organise 
farmers into a better organisation and link them to voluntary certification, however, 
poses profound challenges. Drawing from the literature, four main challenges are 
identified (See Table 3 List of Challenges Faced by small-scale farmers on building and 
running organisation): inadequate organisational/institutional building capacity, 
business capacity, technical know-how and financial barriers (Tiffen, 2002; Taylor, 
2003; Harris et al., 2003; Milford, 2004; World Bank, 2003; Doherty and Meehan, 
2006; Santacoloma, 2007; Ferrigno and Lizarraga, 2008; Lyon, 2009; Liu, 2009; 
Coulter et al., 2009; Poole and de Frece, 2010; Vasquez-Leon, 2010; Beal, 2012; 
Blackmore et al., 2012; Elder et al., 2012; Vorley et al., 2012; Kuit and Waarts, 2014). 
This table is drawn by process of listing challenges faced by farmers in the literature 
and then grouping them thematically.  
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Organisational or 
Institutional Capacity 
Business Capacity Technical Know How Financial Barriers 
Feasibility of group 
formation 
Carrying out 
collective marketing 
Setting and running 
ICS/IMS (Internal 
Control 
System/Internal 
Management System) 
Setting up co-op 
and running cost 
Co-op/group mechanism Running business 
side such as micro-
credit program 
Inspection of standards 
compliance 
Cost for 
certification, audits 
and any cost 
associated with 
standards 
compliance 
Daily management and 
staffing 
Capacity for 
negotiation price, 
contract, improving 
trading relationship 
Storage, raw data 
management, forecast 
production, product 
quality control 
Tool of trade 
Participation of members Running co-operative 
profitably 
Good farming 
practices  in general 
Professional staff 
expenses 
Capacity to organise 
training 
Business and 
financial 
management 
Soil management Operational costs 
Capacity to comply and 
monitoring standards 
Good pre and post-
harvesting agricultural 
practices 
Capital fund 
Producing documentation 
and reports 
Improving quality 
Linking to farmer group 
associations 
Pest and disease 
control 
Linking with other 
stakeholders 
Table	  3	  List	  of	  Challenges	  Faced	  by	  Small-­‐scale	  Farmers	  	  
 
Firstly, organisational capacity refers to the feasibility of group formation among 
farmers, setting mechanisms to run the group, managing a co-operative in terms of 
staffing, maintaining an active level of member participation, building cohesion among 
members and wider community, having capacity to organise training, complying with 
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and monitoring standards, documenting activities and engaging with other farmer 
groups or associations. These are all identified as challenges when it comes to building 
organisational capacity among farmers and the list provides a set of indicators to 
measure how a farmer organisation is run and developed. Further, to develop and 
maintain democratic values, and being transparent, participation is yet a further 
challenge (Harris et al., 2003; Poole and de Frece, 2010; Blackmore and Keley, 2012).  
 
Secondly, as a farmer group functions as an economic agent, in terms of business 
capacity, participating in a certification scheme demands capacity to engage with 
business. In practical terms, the farmers need to be entrepreneurs themselves through 
co-operatives. This requires significant business skills: carrying out collective 
marketing, running other side businesses such as micro-credit programmes, capability 
for negotiating prices and contracts with buyers, engaging with other actors either in the 
value chain or outside the chain, planning and financial management and in many cases 
requires capacity to undertake international communication (Santacoloma, 2007; 
Vasques-Leon, 2010).    
 
Thirdly, in order to run a farmer group, it requires capacity on technical know-how in 
which several issues present challenges. Setting up and running an Internal 
Management System (IMS) or Internal Control System (ICS) according to the 
standards, for example, presents serious challenges. This is mainly because farmers will 
not be familiar with the new requirements. Obtaining data from farmers, filling in 
forms, making and storing documentation as part of the IMS or ICS work requires skills 
that farmers may not have as they are not familiar with these activities in their daily 
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lives. In this category of technical know-how, good farming practices such as  opening 
new land for cultivation, improving quality of their products, managing soil, 
understanding permissible inputs, controlling pest and diseases, handling post-
harvesting and carrying out inspection requires much training (Basso et al., 2012; 
Blackmore et al., 2012; Beal, 2012; Kuit and Waarts, 2015).  
 
Finally, running a farmer group requires capital. The lack of financial resources also 
constitutes a challenge, even more so when the farmer group is intended to be linked 
with certification (Liu, 2009). Financial resources are needed, for example, to cover 
certification costs and standard compliance and expenses in running the co-operative as 
a business entity (Lyon, 2009; Santacoloma, 2007). 
 
Those are challenges faced when it comes to empower farmers to build a farmer 
organisation so it functions well and successfully engages with a certification scheme. 
Although literature identifies a myriad challenges confronting small-scale farmers and 
the failure of many co-operatives, it is equally fair to acknowledge that there are many 
successful small-scale organisations that have addressed such obstacles. Coupled with 
the right support, policy and approaches, co-operatives can work for farmers (Poole and 
de Frece, 2010; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2012; Fischer and Qaim, 2014).  
 
2.5.2 Linking to New Markets 
Establishing strong links to new markets is a second important enabling condition for 
the inclusion of small-scale farmers into certified networks. There is a range of markets: 
local, traditional export market and ‘modern’ markets (Smith, 2011), but a new market 
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here refers to certified market which is mostly export-oriented or termed as a formal 
market. Seville et al. (2011:3) characterise formal markets as those that “…have 
requirements including quality, consistency, traceability, food safety and third-party 
certified standards that necessitate direct communication and coordination along the 
supply chain” which is in line with the type of market in this thesis. 
 
As identified in section 2.4, one of the challenges for small-scale farmers to access new 
markets is to find a certified buyer. The need for building links to certified buyers is 
derived from the fact that being certified does not guarantee sales (Blackmore et al., 
2012). This means that assuming a group of farmers successfully manages to obtain a 
certification, it is not a guarantee that their certified products would be sold 
automatically under certified market. Certified farmers have to find their own certified 
buyers in order to get the benefits from the scheme. Understanding this circumstance, 
the thesis argues here that building links to a new market is essential for successful 
participation in certification.  
 
Examining literature, building strong links to new markets can buffer farmers from 
financial loss. Participation in certification is not free but expensive (Blackmore et al., 
2012; Basso et al., 2012; Kuit and Waarts, 2014). It is an investment. Having a good 
partnership with buyers through co-investment, in which buyers partly finance some 
associated expenses, can minimise financial risk. Blackmore et al. (2012) advocate to 
have strategic partnerships with buyers when farmers want to participate in certification. 
This partnership can be translated into co-investment, for example, in which certified 
buyers, who have much better financial resources, can pay some expenses in advance or 
 36 
pre-financing farmers’ business activities. In terms of certificate ownership, buyers can 
pay the cost, such as certification fee and audit fee, in which buyers pay for it in 
advance as a certificate-holder on behalf of the farmer groups (Kuit and Waarts, 2014). 
 
Building strong links with certified buyers can also benefit farmers in receiving product 
information or technical advice on quality and quantity of product market required. 
Certified farmers can also negotiate a good price, business contracts and other business 
related matters with buyers and building a more sustainable business. Therefore, finding 
the right buyers with a commitment to work together becomes important. Engaging with 
the right buyers contributes to achieving benefits from certification and sustainable 
business and this enables successful participation with certification.  
 
2.5.3 External Support Availability 
It has been discussed in the previous sections that there are two variables as enabling 
conditions for farmer to participate for certification: farmers being organised and strong 
links to new markets. Given the challenges faced by farmers, the question now is how 
those challenges are addressed by farmers with their embedded limitations. The 
common pattern reviewed in the literature is the presence of external agents supporting 
the farmers to engage with certification. External support is identified as an equally 
important factor to make certification take off for small-scale farmers. Liu (2009) and 
Blackmore et al. (2012) even argue that it is only possible for farmers to obtain 
certification with external assistance. External support can come from external value 
chain actors, NGOs and government, or from the actors at higher levels in the chain, 
that is buyers.   
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Looking in-depth at the role of NGOs in the literature, NGOs can help to build and 
strengthen farmer groups and facilitate collaboration with actors along the chains, 
including international partners (Smith, 2011; Doherty and Tranchell, 2005). These 
roles are both business-oriented and development-motivated. Collaboration is not only 
with the private sector but also with government bodies such as agricultural advisory 
services. In the wider context, collaboration with local and national government can 
encourage policies that support small-scale farmers (Nelson et al., 2012; Smith, 2011; 
Beuchelt and Zeller, 2012; Borda-Rodriquez et al., 2015). 
 
Government can also play an important role in assisting farmers’ participation in 
certification such as providing policies that encourage farmers to form strong 
organisations, provide technical support or equipment, tools for trading or production, 
yield improvement and other support needed (Vasquez-Leon, 2010; Milford, 2004). In 
practical terms, Liu (2009) proposed that local government can train local inspectors to 
assist certification audits to lower the cost associated with obtaining and maintaining 
certification. 
 
Having said that, external support has to have the right approach in terms of duration of 
support and avoiding dependency (Coulter et al., 2009; Smith, 2011; Nelson et al., 
2012). The support that can make a significant change for small-scale farmers requires 
building strong and profitable organisations, linked with government policies, and this 
requires substantial time and resources. Support should be a long-term effort but at the 
same time the long-term support should avoid dependency of farmers on assistance. 
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Simply giving donated equipment and meeting other group needs can undermine self-
help initiatives expected from farmers (Coulter et al., 2009). Therefore, a clear exit 
strategy to ensure sustainability is required when supporting farmer groups (Nelson et 
al., 2012). Reflecting on the literature, it shows that despite the extreme need for 
external support, inappropriate approaches of NGOs or donors could lead to the 
opposite effect, failure of farmer groups or co-operatives (Coulter et al., 2009; Smith, 
2011; Nelson et al., 2012).  
 
2.5.4 Potential Benefits from Participation 
Three enabling conditions for small-scale farmers’ participation in PV-SCL have been 
discussed in the previous section. Examining literature more deeply, the researcher 
found that awareness of benefits gained from participation in PV-SCL is also an equally 
important factor to encourage participation in certification. The main reason for 
considering potential benefits as an important enabling condition in this study is the fact 
that economic motive is a driving factor for participation (Giovanucci and Koekoek, 
2003; Fischer and Qaim, 2014). It is about what certification offers to farmers so that 
farmers would like to, and willingly, participate. Arguably, if farmers can see potential 
benefits can be received from participation, they would participate, albeit they should 
consider other enabling conditions as well. In other words, if certification can bring 
significant change to the livelihoods of participants, it would therefore attract farmers to 
participate. There are at least three kinds of benefits that are discussed in the literature: 
economic, environmental and empowerment benefits. Reviewing literature about 
benefits or impacts of certifications, Fairtrade is the scheme that has been the most 
discussed and therefore the discussion about the scheme’s impact is dominant. 
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Nevertheless, the points discussed concerning economic, environmental and 
empowerment benefits are equally applicable to other schemes.  
 
2.5.4.1 Economic Benefits 
This section examines evidence from literature concerning economic benefits from 
participation in certified schemes in terms of price, premiums, stable income, access to 
credit and access to a new export market. The potential economic benefit is fundamental 
as it is found that economic motives are the main driving factor for the participation of 
small-scale farmers, who are mostly poor (Giovanucci and Koekoek, 2003; Jena et al., 
2012).  
 
In order for small-scale farmers to earn a fair price, the Fairtrade scheme offers a 
“guaranteed minimum price” (GMP) in its scheme. The other two certifications, 
Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified, do not offer the GMP. GMP or “minimum 
price”, “fair price”, “higher price”, used interchangeably in the literature, is a set of 
prices which is defined as the lowest possible price paid by traders to producers 
covering the cost of sustainable production. 
 
Evidence from some studies examining the GMP has shown that farmers benefit from a 
higher price through participating in a Fairtrade network. Drawing on seven case 
studies, with 5 carried out in Mexico, 1 in Guatemala and 1 in El Salvador, Murray et al. 
(2003) concluded that farmers earn twice the street price of conventional coffee. Citing 
Perezgrovas and Cervantes (2009), they provide an example of Majomut co-operative 
members who earn USD 1,700 for their 1,500 pounds (680,3 kg) organic certified 
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Fairtrade coffee which is much higher than the local price of only USD 550 for the 
same amount of coffee. This higher price is considered a dramatic increase for those 
who joined Fairtrade.  
 
A similar conclusion was drawn by Bacon (2010) studying small-scale coffee in 
Northern Nicaragua and, exploring figures, he reveals that the price earned by Fairtrade 
producers is 22.4 per cent higher than farmers selling to the conventional market in 
which Fairtrade farmers earn USD0.56/lb, while non-Fairtrade farmers earn only 
USD0.40/lb. A comparative impact study conducted by Ruben, Fort, and Zuniga (2011) 
in Peru, Costa Rica and Ghana concluded that Fairtrade brings positive average net 
household income effects to the farmers. Revenues derived from Fairtrade activities 
contribute 70 to 90 per cent to participants’ income component studied. 
 
The economic benefit from the GMP or “higher price” offered by the Fairtrade scheme, 
however, is contested as other empirical evidence suggests otherwise. The “higher 
price” earned by coffee small-scale farmers in Nicaragua comes along with higher 
production costs as well. Due to the high production costs, therefore, higher earning is 
less significant in contributing to a decent income for the small-scale farmers (Jaffee, 
2007; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011). Further, making an income comparison between 
participant and non-participant farmers results in differences that are relatively small. 
Fairtrade farmer’s net cash income is somewhat higher than non-participant farmers’ 
(Barham and Weber, 2012). This difference, albeit relatively small, does not come from 
‘higher price’ but in yield differences. Fairtrade farmers’ yields are slightly higher than 
non-participant farmers’.  
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Theoretically, if farmers earn a high price for their produce, subsequently they will earn 
above the poverty level income which is not the case as revealed by the studies. 
Scrutinising Fairtrade’s ‘higher price’ policy further reveals that the ‘higher price’ set 
by FLO, particularly for coffee commodity, has not been raised significantly since 1989 
despite inflation (Bacon, 2010; Valkila et al., 2010). That means the base price or 
“guaranteed minimum price’ of FLO has stagnated, meanwhile, at the same time, the 
cost of living has increased. This thus explains the perpetual low income of small-scale 
farmers and “it does not bring the majority of participants out of poverty” (Jaffee, 2007 
p.27).  
 
Along with higher price, literature also highlights the benefits of the premium, a certain 
amount of money set aside for the producer organisation. Fairtrade obliges the trader or 
manufacturer to pay this premium, meanwhile UTZ Certified only recommends buyers 
to pay for the producers. Rainforest Alliance puts it as optional in its scheme. 
 
The premium is intended to be invested in social, environmental and economic 
development projects. The premium is found not only to be beneficial to the producers 
and their organisations, but also for their communities, although literature suggests that 
how these benefits are allocated varies from one co-operative to another. Milford 
(2004), for example, studying two co-operatives in Chiapas, Mexico, found that one of 
the co-operatives, ISMAM, successfully allocated Fairtrade premiums to investment in 
a large and modern roasting machine worth USD 1.5 million. In addition, this co-
operative was able to create an arm company, Mam Maple, to market its members’ 
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ready-toasted, ground and packaged coffee. Murray et al. (2003) reveal that the 
premiums are used by co-operatives not only for supporting the co-operatives’ technical 
knowledge of its members but also financing social projects within communities. 
UCIRI co-operative in Oaxaca, for example, funded the construction of latrines in the 
community and purchased fuel-efficient household stoves to reduce smoke-related 
respiratory problems faced by its members and the local community. Furthermore, this 
premium was allocated to build an education centre with training for young people from 
the region to be equipped with skills for community development, composting, 
intercropping between coffee and legumes, animal husbandry and other income 
generating activities.  
 
In West Africa, Ronchi (2002) records that Kuapa Kokoo, a cocoa co-operative in 
Ghana, earned premiums of more than USD 1.5 million from 1994 to 2001 alone. The 
premiums were used for capitalisation funds, building infrastructure for its arm trading 
company, KKL, and 53 community projects: building a school, sanitation services, 31 
water projects, provision of 7 corn mills for income generation and provision of a 
mobile ambulance. The rest of the premium was distributed to its members. Indeed, 
according to FLO (2011), during 2009-2010 alone, 869 to 906 producer organisations 
with 938,000 members under Fairtrade scheme receive around £43 million as 
premiums. 
 
Having said that, evidence on premium figures suggests different interpretations, 
particularly in terms of the use of premiums and its contribution to livelihood 
improvements. Utting-Chamorro (2005), exploring the price premiums distribution 
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directly to small coffee farmers in Nicaragua, found that only 30 to 60 per cent of the 
premiums are received by farmers and the rest is deducted for community fund, export 
costs, processing costs, capitalisation fund and debt repayments. Similarly, Robins et al. 
(1999), in their empirical studies of coffee producers of the Quebrada Azul Cooperative 
in Venezuela, found that farmers earn only 20 per cent directly from the premiums 
offered by Fairtrade to each member, 36 families. This means that each family earns 
only 0.55 per cent of the total premium. Meanwhile, the rest of the premiums, 80 per 
cent, go to common or community sectors: construction fund, cooperative’s capital base 
and roasting unit cost.  
 
Furthermore, several studies identify that the Fairtrade co-operatives continuously 
spend a huge amount of their income on administration matters, certification and 
inspection costs, rather than on increasing productivity. The exploration of the 
premiums’ spending on certification, monitoring fee from FLO and re-certification are 
revealed by studies. Berndt (2007), in his empirical study conducted in Costa Rica and 
Guatemala, finds that in order to receive FLO certification, cooperatives are charged 
between USD 2,000 and 4,000. The co-operatives pay an annual inspection fee in order 
to maintain the certification, which is contributing to the burden of cooperatives and 
farmers for sufficient earning. Hence, the small amount of the premium itself is not 
considerably effective to boost producer’s income. Similarly, Valkila et. al (2010) 
support this finding as they found that a large amount of the premiums goes to pay for 
certification fees and inspection fees. It turns out that the co-operative is not able to 
maximise the use of the premium it earns. Premiums are used to pay certification and 
annual re-certification and this is in line with an earlier finding of Rice (2001), who 
suggests that obtaining certification is very costly.  
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In addition to those two important aspects of economic benefits examined, higher price 
and premiums, there are more benefits identified under this economic impact category 
which are more intangible but substantial. They are stable income, access to credit and 
access to new export markets. Utting-Chamorro (2005), studying small-producer coffee 
in Nicaragua, asserts that Fairtrade has contributed to income stability of the producers 
as one of the considerable impacts of joining Fairtrade, particularly after the fall of the 
international coffee price which had devastated their lives. This finding is an affirmation 
of previous findings by Murray et al. (2003) and Milford (2004). The international price 
which is characterised by unpredictable fluctuation and yet directly affects small-
producers has increased the vulnerability of poor farmers. Being part of Fairtrade 
scheme has increased the security of producers by being able to have stable incomes 
and they can count on a set price they would receive for their crops and do not 
necessarily have to wait to know how much money they will earn until the sales of their 
coffee, which is characteristic of conventional trade. Murray et al. (2003) further argue 
that Fairtrade price guarantee and access to credit, a part of Fairtrade standards, have 
given a positive impact on greater economic and social stability for coffee farmers. As 
access to credit is substantially important in making further plans, small-scale producers 
have benefited from this Fairtrade scheme. 
 
Examining the results of economic potential benefit from participation in certification, it 
is only the stable income, access to credit and access to a new export market, that are 
less disputed. Economic benefits particularly earning higher price and premiums are 
however contested. Thus, the question remains on how “better price” and premiums 
offered by certification schemes can improve participation of farmers in certification. 
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As mentioned earlier, economic motives are the main driving factor for the participation 
of small-scale farmers, who are mostly poor (Giovanucci and Koekoek, 2003), therefore 
these two elements, price and premiums, would be key considerations in terms of their 
linkages to certification participation.  
 
2.5.4.2 Social and Environmental Benefits 
Other potential benefits from the inclusion of small-scale farmers are their 
empowerment and environmental improvements in their farms. Reviewing literature of 
PV-SCL, particularly Fairtrade impacts on co-operatives, studies suggest that 
participating in PV-SCL empowers the participants to run their co-operatives. 
According to Murray et al. (2003), the impact of Fairtrade has improved Latin 
America’s coffee co-operatives in shaping a new culture of co-operatives in decision-
making by involving their members through participatory processes. In other words, 
Fairtrade has encouraged members of co-operatives to foster democratic processes in 
running their co-operatives. Las Colinas, an El Salvador’s co-operative, for instance, 
worked more closely with its members when they participated in Fairtrade organic 
market. As this new market requires rigorous technical and administrative demands, the 
co-operative has involved its members to meet the market demand.  
 
A further example of benefits is highlighted by VanderHoff Boersma (2002) of 
increasing marketing knowledge. UCIRI co-operative has capacity to build their own 
marketing channel as Fairtrade constantly provided access to information about the list 
of importers, buyers and market information. The benefits received by this co-operative 
created snowball effects in which other co-operatives also attempted to participate in the 
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PV-SCL. The entry of the other groups into Fairtrade networks was experienced by La 
Selva, a Mexico co-operative, assisted by UCIRI in 1990. In turn, La Selva facilitated 
Majomut co-operative to enter the network in 1993-1994. In 2001, Majomut assisted 
Tzotzilotic to sell its products in the Fairtrade network. This snowball effect was 
encouraged by the fact that the various co-operatives have to collaborate to meet the 
amount of coffee demanded by buyers. Hence, the solidarity among producer groups 
strengthens their capacity and fosters a better inter-group relationship.  
 
A similar study conducted by OPM (2000) on Kuapa Kokoo in Ghana and KNCU in 
Tanzania identifies that the capacity of the co-operatives goes even further, beyond 
business aspects as the co-operatives move to promote greater participation and build a 
strong civil society structure in the region where they exist. 
 
Benefits from participating in PV-SCL on environmental aspects are less contested in 
the literature. PV-SCL schemes such as Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance, UTZ Certified, 
set standards for environmental performance with emphasis on different environmental 
aspects. However, by and large, the standards encourage ecologically sound production 
processes. Impact studies on this issue have indicated positive impacts in this regard. 
Co-operatives under PV-SCL have been found to use agrochemicals wisely. Members 
of co-operatives participating in certification are more knowledgeable than farmers who 
are not part of any scheme as found by Arnould et al. (2009). A similar study conducted 
by Jaffee (2008) highlights that Fairtrade co-operative farmers are willing to adopt 
organic practices for their coffee cultivation rather than using agrochemicals. Farmers 
also increasingly improve their environmentally friendly coffee processing practices to 
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reduce pollution in the river as a result of capacity building provided by the Fairtrade 
network. Farmers manage to maintain the erosion-control of their coffee plots, conserve 
soil fertility, increase water filtration, enhance bird and bio-diversity, and, importantly, 
keep acidic coffee pulp and water out of local streams. As a positive practice, despite 
Fairtrade farmers being only a small group in the Rincon community, in Mexico, this 
practice is spreading and copied by the majority conventional farmers, who are 85 to 90 
per cent of the local communities (Jaffee, 2007). 
 
Having discussed the potential benefits from participation in PV-SCL, it is fair to 
acknowledge that studies on schemes such as Rainforest and UTZ Certified are quite 
few if not scarce. However, a study by Barham and Weber (2012) in Mexico and Peru 
comparing potential benefits between Fairtrade/organic and the Rainforest Alliance 
found that it is the improvement of the yield rather than merely price premium which 
makes an important impact on improving the well-being of coffee growers in the areas 
studied.   
 
Examining these potential benefits received by farmers participating in PV-SVL is 
crucially important in understanding the level of participation and thus is considered as 
one aspect of enabling conditions of the PV-SCL implementation. This study highlights 
the importance of this aspect in its enabling conditions framework.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Having examined the literature, it shows there are many challenges faced by small-scale 
farmers to participating in certification networks. Examining literature, essential 
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conditions required to enable the participation of small-scale farmers in certified 
networks have been identified. The enabling conditions drawn from the literature are 
farmer group formation and operation, engaging or linking with new markets, external 
support availability and the perception of potential benefits from participation. The form 
of the Enabling Condition Framework is designed as illustrated in Figure 3. These 
enabling conditions emerged from the literature review and, therefore, are used to frame 
the analysis of this study’s main research question: why, despite being the world's third 
largest producer of cocoa, have certification schemes not been widely sought by 
Indonesian small-scale cocoa farmers? This study, in examining the Indonesian cocoa 
sector case, is believed to contribute to literature particularly about PV-SCL, cocoa 
commodity and Indonesian cocoa sector in particular.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FIELDWORK  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed and examined relevant literature on key issues concerning private 
voluntary certification and small-scale farmers, shaping the formulation of the research 
questions, informing the approach for this study and providing the basis for the 
selection of the methodology of this study. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the 
methodology analytical framework employed and how the fieldwork was undertaken. 
The methodology explains how this research was undertaken and how the analytical 
framework is used as a guide to answer the research question and interpret the findings 
of this study.  
 
After the methodology is discussed, this chapter presents how the methodological 
approach was applied in terms of how data was collected. This section begins with the 
fieldwork approach in terms of the selection of the study area, how entry was 
negotiated, how the data was collected and the analysis techniques employed. The most 
important part of this data collection activity is to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the data. The last section provides an account of how findings were analysed and 
interpreted. 
 
 51 
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the plans or guidance for data collection, analysis and 
interpretation of the findings. This study applied a case study approach. Following 
Yin’s (2003) advice, this study applies a systematic procedure for carrying out a 
rigorous case study. The discussion on research design begins with a discussion on the 
formulation of the research question as providing the basis for selection of appropriate 
study design along with its methodological approach. 
 
3.2.2 Research Question Formulation 
There are some requirements for formulating research questions so that they are clear, 
focused, researchable, relevant and useful, informed by and connected to existing 
research or theory, feasible and of interest of the researcher (Pole and Lampard, 2002; 
Bryman, 2001; Holloway, 1997). As this study was generated by the researcher, 
systematic review of existing research and theory was conducted before formulating the 
specific questions. This study does not use a deductive model but inductive, therefore 
this study built on existing knowledge or ideas, theory or conceptual frameworks, to aid 
the design (Maxwell, 2005; Huberman and Miles, 2002). 
 
Chapter 1.3 presented the research questions but it is important to note that the final 
formulation of the research questions took place after reviewing the state of knowledge 
on voluntary certification as discussed in Chapter 2. It is evident that there is no 
comprehensive study looking at what enabling conditions are needed for small-scale 
farmers, particularly for Indonesian cocoa farmers, to be included in certified networks. 
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The main research question of this study is thus formulated as “Why has certification 
not taken off in the Indonesian cocoa sector?” In other words, why do Indonesian small-
scale cocoa farmers participate less in certification schemes as compared to cocoa 
farmers in other parts of the world and farmers in other commodity sectors.  Meanwhile 
the sub-questions are divided into four headings: 
 
1. Farmers being Organized: 
• What is the history and feasibility of forming groups or co-operatives in 
Indonesia, particularly in the cocoa sector? 
• What is government policy towards farmer organisation and co-
operatives to enable or to impede the feasibility of forming groups? 
• Apart from the policy factor, what other factors impede or enable 
cooperation? 
2. Link to New Markets 
• What are the links between individual farmers and groups with different 
chain actors or players in the market? 
• What are the challenges experienced by farmers in reaching new 
markets? 
• Do traders have a particular role in encouraging farmers to participate in 
certification? 
3. External support availability 
• Are there any NGOs, what kind of NGOs and projects, working within 
the cocoa sector that support farmers in becoming linked with new 
markets? 
• How do the NGOs, if available, link farmers to certification? 
• What kind of support has been provided by different levels of 
government? 
• What agricultural extension support is available and how far does it 
support efforts that might enable farmers to engage with certification 
schemes? 
4. Potential impact to address cocoa farmer challenges 
• What are the main challenges faced by Indonesian cocoa farmers? 
• How are those challenges being addressed?  
• How are these challenges linked to potential engagement with 
certification schemes? 
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• Could the new market under certification benefit farmers? 
 
Although this set of questions has been carefully formulated, the study is designed to be 
open to relevant information that is gathered in the field as the study progresses. After 
this formulation, the next stage is to consider how to answer this set of questions and so 
the next section sets out the methodology used to generate data to answer the questions. 
 
3.2.3 Qualitative Case Study Design 
Clarifying concepts and research questions can lead to a better development of research 
design (de Vaus, 2001). Research design is the logic that links questions of a study to 
data collection and thus conclusions to be drawn (Yin, 2003). This study follows this 
view and so the process of selecting a research design is based on the nature of the 
research question (Bryman, 2001; Yin, 2003; de Vaus, 2001). As discussed earlier, the 
questions entail the explanatory nature of “why” and “how”. The study aims to 
investigate and understand the issues concerning why participation in certification 
schemes is limited in the Indonesian cocoa sector. In addition, this study focuses on 
more contemporary phenomena in their natural settings. Therefore, a qualitative case 
study approach is considered suitable to address the question of this study.  
 
The decision to undertake a qualitative case study is based on certain particular 
philosophical assumptions and paradigms in social science inquiry. This relates to 
ontology, the nature of reality and its characteristics, and epistemology, how it is 
possible to find out about the world. This study embraces the view that the social world 
exists independently of individual subjective understanding and is accessible through 
 54 
representations; that is, respondents’ interpretations which are further interpreted by the 
researcher. In terms of its epistemology, it applies interpretivism with emphasis on 
understanding people’s perspectives in the context of the conditions and circumstances 
of their lives (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003) and pragmatism as this study tends to be 
problem-centred. Further, the choice of qualitative data collection in this study also 
relates to the purpose and goals of the study, characteristics, context of the study area, 
availability of the resources for conducting the study and the academic background of 
the researcher (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003; Creswell, 2007).  
 
In order to have a rigorous case study, Yin (2003) advocates that it has to follow 
systematic procedures of a case study design. This covers the logic of design, data 
collection techniques and approaches to data analysis. There are four main concerns in 
delivering on quality in a case study: construct validity, internal and external validity 
and reliability. Construct validity refers to establishing correct operational measures 
taken particularly in the data collection process and reporting the findings. The 
researcher ought to report if any changes were made between the original objectives and 
actual data collection so that validity is maintained. In order to increase construct 
validity of a case design, Yin proposes three steps, firstly to use multiple sources of 
evidence. This refers to data triangulation in which information is based on several 
different sources to ensure confirmation or corroboration of evidence. Secondly this can 
be done by building a chain of evidence, managing different sources of evidence and 
maintaining linkages between particular research questions, specific data, tools 
deployed and conclusion drawn. As a case study involves a back and forth process, 
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building a chain of evidence is essential. The third step is by having the draft report 
reviewed to get more insight.  
 
Internal and external validity are concerned with making correct conclusions regarding 
whether a particular event leads to another event or whether it is caused by a third 
factor. Further, internal validity is concerned with making inferences in terms of 
whether the inferences are based on evidence, correct and rival explanation and 
possibilities have been considered. Yin (2003) suggests applying pattern matching, a 
method that enables data to be examined to look for similar patterns of evidence in 
cases. Meanwhile external validity refers to ensuring that findings are generalizable 
beyond the cases studied. Generalisability here refers to analytical generalisation, a 
particular set of results referring not to a wider population, but to a broader theory. This 
generalised theory can be tested to other cases whether or not findings can be replicated.  
 
Reliability refers to ensuring that procedures undertaken in a case study would result in 
the same findings and conclusions when it is undertaken by another investigator. The 
goal of reliability is to minimise errors and biases in a study. Therefore, procedures and 
operational steps undertaken in a case study ought to be well documented.  
 
In designing a case study, in terms of how many cases, single or multiple cases can be 
used (Yin, 2003; de Vaus, 2001; Creswell, 2007). In line with this idea, this study 
purposefully selected three different cocoa value chain cases to generate different 
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perspectives and enrich findings on the issues in the Indonesian cocoa sector. The three 
different value chain cases are: conventional, fermented, certified cocoa beans chains.   
 
3.3 Fieldwork and Analysis 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Having drawn the design of the study in the earlier section, this section discusses 
methodology, fieldwork and how the data was analysed. This section begins with the 
fieldwork approach in terms of selection of study areas, negotiating entry, how the data 
was collected and finally presents analysis techniques. The most important part of this 
data collection activity is to ensure the validity and reliability of the data.  
 
3.3.2 Research Setting, Population and Sampling 
As this study entails elements of comparative and qualitative data, when it comes to 
research setting and population, it embeds processes of identification and comparison 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The identification process is required to identify those who 
are able to provide the most relevant, comprehensive and rich information. The 
comparison is aimed at understanding the absence or presence of a particular 
phenomenon in the accounts of different groups rather than to measure differences. A 
similar view by de Vaus (2001) asserts that in case design study, selection of cases for 
the study has to be on theoretical and targeted grounds.  
 
Following this logic, the initial stage of the research set two different categorical 
groups: conventional (uncertified) and certified chain groups. Further, examining the 
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conventional chain, it was found that there were different value chains. Therefore, sub-
categories were needed to classify the groups based on the value chains to which they 
were attached. Table 4 shows the broad category and sub-category groups along with 
their different value chains. 
Features Type of Value Chains Group 
Uncertified Conventional cocoa value chain Unorganised 
Fermented cocoa value chain LEMS Co-operative 
Certified Certified cocoa value chain Amanah Co-operative 
Table	  4	  Groups	  Category	  and	  Types	  of	  Value	  Chains	  
 
The justification for this selection of the different chain groups is the fact that they have 
different value chains with the absence or presence of a particular phenomenon. 
Particularly under certified cocoa value chain, there are more variances identified: 
certified cocoa value chain with or without the support of an external agency such as 
NGOs or Government. Further, the chain variances can be also found in conventional 
cocoa value chain with different types of farmer’s organisation: one in the form of co-
operative carrying out collective marketing or simply a farmer group without collective 
marketing activity. However, due to time and financial resources limitation, this study 
cannot cover all these chains.  
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As this study aims to find out what elements are present or absent in conventional and 
certified value chains, this study selected two co-operatives: Amanah Co-operative 
under certified chain and LEMS Co-operative under fermented chain. Data was also 
collected from farmers who were under conventional cocoa value chain and not under 
any co-operative or farmer groups. In sum, it is believed that the data from the different 
chain groups would be sufficient to provide information to answer the research 
question. Data was also collected from local buyers and exporters, certification issuers 
representative offices in Indonesia, NGOs, government agencies, cocoa research 
institutes and cocoa farmer association. 
 
3.3.3 Sampling and Participants of the Study 
After identification of the cases needed for the study, the next stage involved selecting 
participants falling into those categories. This case sampling is termed as theoretical 
sampling (Charmaz, 2006), focused sampling (Hakim, 2000) or purposive sampling 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The selection of the cases was based on the belief that the 
cases would illuminate examples of different enabling conditions as per the focus of this 
study.  
 
For purposive sampling, this initially involved identification or mapping the actors in 
each value chain in the cocoa sector. As identified, there were three main cocoa value 
chains: conventional, fermented and certified cocoa beans value chains. These chains 
have different chain actors. Particularly for certified and fermented cocoa value chains, 
their actors are already naturally set. For the certified chain, the sample was selected 
among certified cocoa farmers, co-operative board under the chain, certified buyer, 
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NGOs working with the farmers and certifiers. Similarly for the fermented cocoa value 
chain, the sample was selected among fermented farmers, fermented buyers and 
government officials who initiated the chain.  
 
Of particular conventional cocoa value chain, mainly conventional cocoa farmers, 
different sampling technique was applied. This is partly because the group illustrates the 
majority of the cocoa farmers in the country. Selecting wide population and minimising 
bias requires random sampling and snowball technique. Before applying these 
techniques, the first stage carried out was to determine central and non-central 
production areas. Central production area refers to the areas where the region or place 
produces cocoa in large quantities and most farmers who reside in the area have their 
main income from cocoa. Non-central production refers to areas with less production 
and farmers’ main income is not always from cocoa farming. Determination of central 
and non-central production sites was derived from both statistics data and key 
informants: sub-district agricultural office and farmers. Having obtained statistics data, 
the next stage was to select farmers as participants of the study randomly both in central 
and non-central production areas.  
 
Further, snowballing technique was applied when there was information that a 
particular farmer or area had a particular information to be obtained such as large farm 
land, better production or source of seedlings of their cocoa. This snowballing technique 
was further applied to track the flow of their cocoa under the chain, from a farmer to a 
village collector, then to sub-district or district buyer and a final big buyer who then 
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sells to an exporter. It has to be noted, however, that this snowballing technique is not 
exclusively applied to conventional chain as this technique was also applied for 
fermented and certified chains to track the flow of those types of beans. 
 
The participants or source of information of this study consisted of farmers with 
different value chains, local collectors, intermediaries, big buyers, exporters and 
manufacturers, certification body issuers or certifiers, NGOs, government officials, 
cocoa farmer association and research institute. Overall, 92 people were interviewed, 
though two people dropped out, and two focus group discussions (FGDs) were held. 
The list of participants can be seen in  Appendix 1. 
 
3.3.4 Fieldwork Time Frame and Data Collection Methods  
The data collection took place over a period of 6 months between July to December 
2012. The aim of the fieldwork was to gather the data needed to answer the research 
questions. Fieldwork provides opportunities to gain intimate knowledge of people 
(Oliver, 2007). Fieldwork, where social order lays, is considered as an interactive and 
negotiated reality (Bechhofer and Patterson, 2001). This view thus requires technical 
and an appropriate attitude: preparation, negotiation, tact, patience, endurance and 
flexibility (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). With regard to this research, the justification 
for conducting fieldwork is the fact that little data is available to answer the entailed 
questions. Therefore, it is imperative to collect the data from cocoa value chain actors in 
Indonesia. 
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3.3.5 Negotiating Entry into the Field 
According to Maxwell (2005), a research relationship is conceptualised in terms of 
access and rapport. The entry negotiation involves approaching individuals and 
institutions. Thus effective engagement with research settings can assist a study in a 
number of ways (Bryman, 2004; Patton, 1990). This requires sensitivity to the hierarchy 
or organisational structures, provision of clear information about the purpose of the 
study, being clear on how the findings will be used, having a single contact with the 
organisation and consideration of how findings can be shared. Ritchie and Lewis (2003) 
argue that sharing some aspects of cultural background or experience between 
researchers and participants of the study is helpful in enriching researchers’ 
understanding of participants’ accounts, of the language they use, nuances and subtexts.  
 
Following the advice, the researcher, in the middle of searching and reviewing 
literature, came across an international research organisation, ICRAF/World 
Agroforestry Centre, working with cocoa farmers in Sulawesi, Indonesia. The 
researcher assumed that the organisation had established a good relationship with their 
target groups whom it was intended to be among participants of this study as well. The 
researcher aimed to connect to this organisation as the researcher considered it was 
essential to include Sulawesi into the study and be coordinated with ICRAF. Apart from 
that, the researcher also aimed to get greater insights about the organisation’s existing 
research on cocoa farming and its experience of conducting research on the field. 
Another motive was to be assisted financially, since this study required quite large 
financial resources due to transportation and operational costs. Given the motives, the 
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researcher applied for a research intern position within the organisation. It took six 
weeks to be granted an offer as a research student intern.  
 
On starting the internship with ICRAF/World Agroforestry Centre Southeast Asian 
Office in Bogor, West Java, Indonesia, the researcher worked on negotiating entry to 
the field. The activities included the researcher contacting potential participants, 
particularly fixed participants, such as certification body issuers and NGOs. Secondly, 
the researcher delivered a seminar within the organisation about the study to receive 
feedback. This was a fruitful activity as participants at the meeting contributed inputs to 
the research in terms of providing background information about the farmers, locations 
and a baseline study they had just completed. Thirdly, the researcher conducted a 
preliminary interview with the Fairtrade Liaison Officer in the country to get field 
insight about implementation of the certification in the country and the cocoa sector as 
well.  
 
After a month of working in the ICRAF/World Agroforestry Centre in Bogor, the 
researcher departed to the organisation’s Field Office in Kendari, Sulawesi Tenggara 
Province. In this field office, it took another one week to get more detailed information 
from field staff about the villages from where data could be collected. The time was 
also used to study more about particular characteristics of the villagers. The researcher 
also managed to have a preliminary interview with Cocoa Sub-Station Research staff in 
the city and hired an assistant to help the researcher with transportation to the sites.  
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The researcher, with assistance from ICRAF office, spent around two months in the 
Province of Southeast Sulawesi for data collection. Completing data collection in the 
region, the researcher continued to collect data in other places: Makassar, Bali, Flores 
and West Sulawesi due to participants of this study being located in those places. The 
data collection in the later locations was conducted by the researcher alone. Tables of 
participants and tools for the data collection can be found in Appendix 1 and 2, 
meanwhile the sites where the data collected is shown by Map 2. By and large, the 
fieldwork lasted for 6 months.  
 
3.3.6 In-depth Interviews 
This study employed qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews, Focus Group 
Discussions (FGD), observation and field visits to collect the data. Mason (2002) asserts 
that these methods, particularly in-depth interviews and FDGs, are considered as 
generative techniques and involve interactions between interviewer and interviewees. 
Talk and texts are central to the way of knowing the social world. Further Kvale (1996) 
and McNamara (1996) consider these techniques as useful methods for knowing 
participants’ experiences and getting insights into the meaning of what interviewees 
say.  
 
In terms of form, this study employed a semi-structured interview as this particular 
interview allows focus and two-way communication. A copy of a set of questions of the 
semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix 2.  The advantages of using this 
technique are first of all that it allows inclusion of additional questions during the 
interview for probing details and secondly, the researcher can still control the interview 
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process (FAO, 1990). Probing is used to get more detail or to cross-check particular 
information obtained from the interviewees. The researcher also used ‘interpreting 
questions’, that is formulated questions asked as interpretations of what the respondents 
conveyed. These interpreting questions were used to ascertain that the researcher’s 
understanding of an interviewee’s information was what the interviewee intended to 
deliver. For instance, when a participant said “other than income from cocoa, we also 
earned from “forest”. The researcher probed by asking questions “Do you mean by 
logging in the forest or collecting products from forest or, other activities?” 
 
Following Yin (2003) advocating for a pilot study before conducting an actual case 
study, preliminary interviews were conducted to gain an initial understanding of 
certification in Indonesia and challenges in the cocoa sector of the country. Interviews 
were carried out with a Fairtrade Liaison Officer and two staff of Cacao Sub-Station 
Research of Sulawesi Tenggara Province. The Fairtrade Liaison Officer was asked 
about the current progress of Fairtrade in Indonesia, how it was introduced in the 
country and its implementation in the cocoa sector. Further, the questions also dealt 
with what were considered to be the main problems of Fairtrade adoption in the cocoa 
sector in the country and problems faced by farmers.  
 
Meanwhile, questions asked to the Sub-Station Cocoa Research staff were more 
concerned with technical and social aspects they have been encountering during their 
engagement with cacao farmers. This included information about pests and diseases of 
cocoa and government interventions in the sector. The findings from these two 
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exploratory investigations provided field-experience insights and familiarisation with 
the subject and were taken into account in planning for further interviews with other 
participants through in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussions. 
 
In-depth interviews were carried out according to value chain cases including direct and 
indirect actors of the each chain. The total number of in-depth interviews carried out, 
43, can be seen in the Appendix 1. During the interviews, light conversation outside of 
the topics was conducted to make the interview process enjoyable and not stressful to 
the respondents. This small humorous talk during the interview either was prompted by 
the interviewees or interviewer as ice-breakers to the process. The advantage of using 
this technique was that interviewees felt more relaxed and more open to convey what 
they intended to say. In this situation, however, the researcher ensured that control was 
in place so that interviewing process did not stray too much from the research topic 
which was an advantage of the use of semi-structured interview technique. 
 
3.3.7 Focus Group Discussion 
Two Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were carried out among farmers: certified farmers 
and conventional farmers. Data was generated through the interaction among the 
participants. Interaction among the participants was smooth, as they knew each other 
and the discussion went very well. Participants also took turns to ask questions to each 
other and the researcher had the advantage of conducting probing, both of the group as a 
whole and individuals. The researcher ensured that everyone had their say, the issues 
were covered and discussion did not stray from the topics. The group size of the FGDs 
was 7 and 12 persons each.  
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A disadvantage of this technique was domination of one or two persons taking over the 
flow of discussion. However, as the researcher identified the persons, they were asked 
in a very polite way to give a chance to others. It was a careful approach so that the 
dominant persons did not feel abandoned and still felt important within the groups. 
 
3.3.8 Ethical Issues 
In terms of ethics, informed consent for participation from participants must be obtained 
before proceeding with the study. A researcher provides participants with information 
about the researcher, the purpose of the study, how data will be used, what kind of 
participation is required from them, how much time will be needed and assurance that 
participation in the study is voluntary as advised by Holloway (1997).  
 
Anonymity means the identity of those taking part not being known beyond the 
researcher, meanwhile confidentiality refers to the avoidance of attribution of comments 
in reports or presentations to identified participants. Both direct and indirect attribution 
must be avoided. This study also ensured that the principles of protecting participants 
and researcher from harm were in place and in line with the University Ethics 
guidelines. 
 
As social science research, particularly when it involves fieldwork, engaging with 
participants’ private lives, ethical consideration becomes an important element of a 
study. A researcher is responsible to protect participants from harm or risk and 
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herself/himself during the data collection according to ethical guidelines and rules 
(Holloway, 1997; Oliver, 1997). In this particular study, an Ethical Guide from the 
University of Birmingham was used as a guideline to ensure the study was carried out 
ethically. 
 
Ethics also concern ensuring that the participants of the study take part in the study on a 
voluntary basis and are fully aware of their right to withdraw at any stage of the process. 
Participants were assured about providing information requested by the researcher 
without being accompanied by any threat or inducement. Securing informed consent 
before beginning the extraction of the data ensures that participants are aware of the 
benefits of the research and risk they might face during the data collection (Holloway, 
1997). 
  
Bearing in mind the guidelines, before any interviews and FGDs were carried out, the 
researcher explained the nature of the study to participants. This process ensured that 
the participants gave out information willingly and voluntarily. The approvals were 
provided in the form of their signatures or verbal approval in case participants were 
illiterate or having difficulties in writing signature. This process also ensured that the 
participants had the right not to answer any question asked by the researcher and 
withdraw from the interview or FGDs without hesitation for whatever reasons they had.  
 
Further, it was also ensured that participants gave permission for the information to be 
used in the study. Usually, when it came to this consent question, some participants 
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paused before answering directly. They were between wanting to explicitly agree and 
thinking, particularly about what materials or information to provide to the researcher. 
This is understandable as they did not know exactly what the information they would 
like to share. To address this, the researcher offered the participants to postpone 
agreement on this matter and explained that we could come to this discussion again 
after the completion of the interview or FGD. The researcher did not want them to make 
any decision without clarity. Although it was pending, at the end of the interviews or 
FGDs, when asked again about this, participants agreed on giving permission that the 
information shared could be used in this study.  
 
As Creswell (2007) points out, confidentiality and anonymity of the participants must 
be maintained. In this fieldwork, participants were informed about how the information 
would be disclosed and stored, with measures taken to ensure there is no unauthorised 
access. In this study, participants were ensured anonymity so that participants could not 
be identified in any publication and dissemination of the researcher’s work. The 
researcher used pseudonyms as suggested by Holloway (1997) and ensured that there is 
no resemblance to the real name and other identities that would be easily identified to 
the participants. Although this study is considered to be low risk with regard to the 
potential harm it could cause to participants, anonymity is maintained.  
 
Culturally, however, the researcher encountered that the participants enjoyed giving 
information and often interspersed the conversation with humorous conversation. In 
many cases it took more than one hour to complete an interview. In many cases even, 
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despite that the researcher politely refused to be offered any drink, participants insisted 
on serving at least a glass of tea or drinking water. In sum, participants, particularly 
farmers, were generally enthusiastic to contribute to the study. 
 
3.3.9 Risks and Opportunities 
The specific risks and opportunities encountered by the researcher during the fieldwork 
are discussed here. According to Lee-Treweek & Linkogle (2000) risks in research refer 
to any potential harm, hazard or exposure to danger of both researcher and the 
researched, the risks present when fieldwork is being carried out. Meanwhile, 
opportunities refer to the positive factors enabling the data collection process to go 
smoothly. 
 
Participants of this study were located in different places and half were in remote areas, 
not easily accessible as the roads were not paved. The researcher was assisted by an 
assistant with his motorbike to transport the researcher to the participants’ sites. The 
hardest part was reaching places where roads were not asphalted and when it was 
raining. This caused the roads to be slippery and only in few seconds a careless drive 
could have led to the researcher and the assistant to a serious accident. Although there 
was an accident where the bike fell down due to the road being slippery, it was still 
minor and bearable. On rainy days, rain could fall the whole day, bridges could be 
swept away and it was impossible to cross rivers. This also occurred once on our trip 
but as the villagers worked together fixing the bridge, we could pass the river and 
continue the work. In order to minimise such risks, the researcher and the assistant 
agreed to ride slowly and put safety first. 
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3.3.10 Hostility 
Most participants, particularly cocoa farmers and government officials, were very 
cooperative in being interviewed. Local collectors and traders, however, showed a 
reluctant response to being interviewed as presumably there was an existing assumption 
from outsiders that they were bad people as intermediaries, they profited at the expense 
of poor farmers. This was shown and expressed by two local collectors and two traders. 
Although at the beginning they showed a hostile attitude, after the researcher convinced 
them that the interview was purely part of a study, they continued. This caused an 
awkward and uneasy starting up. However, as the researcher tried to be on their side, 
eventually they engaged in friendly conversation. Further, there was also an assumption 
that the researcher might come from business competitors and be trying to dig for 
information about their business. This taught the researcher to reiterate the aim of the 
study and embrace the points from their perspectives. 
 
3.3.11 Being Indonesian and Empathetic 
The advantage of carrying out the fieldwork in Indonesia, for the researcher, is the fact 
that the researcher is Indonesian too. This provided many advantages to the process of 
data collection. First of all is the advantage of language. Indonesians are mostly bi-
lingual or even speak more than two languages. Their main language is usually the 
mother or native language where they come from, then Indonesian Language or Bahasa 
Indonesia as the national language and the other mostly depends on the surrounding 
neighbour’s language where they live. All the participants spoke Bahasa Indonesian 
although with different dialects. As the researcher is used to being exposed to different 
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dialects, it was found that understanding the dialect and implicit meanings from the 
conversation was quite possible. The researcher used probing or rephrasing questions 
technique in case the point conveyed was not clear to the researcher.  
 
The other advantage was that there was no interruption, in contrast to using a translator, 
so that the interviews mostly went smoothly and flowed naturally. The only interruption 
was the explanation or detailing of particular abbreviation or specific terms which were 
so familiar to the interviewees but not to the researcher. But overall, due to the sharing 
of a common language, the interviews mostly went smoothly.  
 
The other advantage was that as we shared a common national history, the researcher 
quickly grasped the points when the participants referred to a particular period of a time. 
Further, most Indonesians are fond of sharing their stories and even sometimes are 
considered talkative. But the enjoyable conversations took place when it was 
interspersed with humorous talk, making the participants relaxed and the conversations 
flowing. 
 
3.4 Analysis and Interpretation 
Having given accounts of how data was collected for the study, the plan or guide for 
analysis and interpretation of the data is discussed. In order to have a robust analysis 
and interpretation of case study data, the following steps were undertaken. Raw data in 
the form of interview and FGD records and notes, was gathered and transcribed, and 
then sorted in date and type of participants order. Initial themes or concepts were then 
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identified. This included labelling and tagging, summarising or synthesising the data, 
identifying elements and dimensions, refining categories and classifying data. For 
example, the variable of ‘farmers being organised’ in the Enabling Condition Analytical 
Framework is broken down into four variables of feasibility to form a group: setting up 
and running the group/co-operative, linkage to certified market, availability of support 
and potential benefits from participation. These main themes can be broken down into 
small sub-themes as shown in Table 3 in Section 2.5.1 Farmer being Organised: List of 
Challenges Faced by Small-scale Farmers in line with the Enabling Conditions 
Analytical Framework (Figure 3).  
 
Further, this study establishes typology, detects patterns, (associative analysis and 
identification of clustering answering what questions), develops explanations 
(answering how and why questions) and seeks applications to wider theory or policy 
strategies was carried out. 
 
3.5 Data Preparation and Analytical Technique 
Data preparation and analytical technique are two crucial stages in this research. Data 
from the interviews and FGDs were recorded in audio format files and notes were taken 
as well during the interviews. Transcribing the data was found to be a slow and tedious 
task. While listening to the recorded interviews, the researcher wrote up the transcripts 
and also compared these to the notes and ensured that the messages were what 
interviewees intended to convey. In this data management stage, raw data was reviewed, 
labelled, sorted and synthesised. Meanwhile, during the stage of the descriptive account, 
the researcher made use of the synthesised data to identify key dimensions and develop 
 73 
classification and typologies. The classifications are those identified as the enabling 
conditions/variables as charted in Figure 3 (the analytical framework).  
 
The analysis approach used in this study applied pattern matching, explanation building 
and cross-case analysis as proposed by Yin (2003) for case study design. Pattern 
matching is a strategy to compare patterns among findings in terms of what salient and 
absent variables there are within the cases studied. Meanwhile explanation building is a 
method to analyse the cases by building the case from the data obtained. After 
examination of patterns among the cases and building the cases, cross-analysis was 
applied to build up themes that have emerged from the cases. The enabling conditions 
were used as variables to examine the differences among the cases. 
 
3.6  Summary of Research Logics 
This chapter presents justification for the need to undertake fieldwork and described the 
process of the data collection. It was evident that the process required particular 
attitudes and skills in order to manage the data collection successfully. Being an 
Indonesian who shared common language and culture positively contributed to the data 
collection process. Although the process was exhausting, it also led the researcher to 
unexpected but interesting findings which contributed to the comparative nature of the 
study. Overall, the study interviewed 92 persons with 2 dropouts and 2 FGDs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INDONESIAN COCOA SECTOR 
  
4.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the context of the Indonesian cocoa sector, from the  introduction 
of cocoa into the country to the cocoa boom and bust. The chapter also identifies and 
reviews perceived challenges of small-scale farmers in the country and how policies and 
private sector interventions have shaped the sector. 
 
4.2. Indonesian Cocoa Brief Overview 
Cocoa (Theobroma cacao L.) was introduced in Celebes, now called Sulawesi, 
Indonesia, in 1560 and it was recorded that it was one of the earliest centres of cocoa 
cultivation in the world. The success of the cocoa cultivation in the region extended to 
other regions in Java with a high yielding flavour type in the 18th century and it was 
managed mainly by plantations owned by Dutch companies. In the 1880s cocoa had 
become an extremely profitable crop in Java. Following this success, in 1888 there were 
early attempts to develop hybrids in central Java by the private plantations and the 
efforts bore success in 1892 when the hybrids started to produce pods which further 
made the cocoa plantation in the region flourish. The further development of the cocoa 
sector in the region was marked by the first privately funded cocoa research initiative to 
control cacao pest infestation in Salatiga, Central Java in 1900 (Bloomfield and Lass, 
1992).  
 
 75 
The cocoa industry in the country, however, gradually declined from 1920s due to the 
vast and uncontrollable spread of the pest, cocoa pod-borer (Acrocercops cramerella 
L.), affecting the crop severely (Bloomfield and Lass, 1992). The consequence was that 
cocoa plantations in the East Java region were abandoned in 1936. Other plantations in 
West Java, however, were either attacked by the pest or not seriously managed.  Even 
after Indonesia’s independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945, the estates which were 
nationalised remained marginal so that the production was quite small. It was recorded 
that in 1930, Indonesian cocoa production only reached 1,500 tons and, due to the pest 
infestation and lack of serious management, the total cocoa production of the country 
gradually decreased and in 1980 it only produced 1,058 tons (Akiyama and Nishio, 
1996). 
 
4.3 Cocoa Boom Driving Factors  
There is a small literature about the Indonesian cocoa sector and most literature suggests 
that the new cornerstone of Indonesian cocoa boom production to date began in the 
1980s particularly in the region of Sulawesi (Li, 2002). It underwent several stages with 
different driving factors although almost all literature does not classify clearly the stages 
but characteristics and driving factors of each stage are distinctive. In this section, the 
expansion is classified into three stages: early stage from 1980 to 1989, developing 
stage from 1990 to 2000 and transition into industrialisation stage from 2000 onwards. 
 
The first stage of Indonesian cocoa expansion occurred from 1980 to 1990 which was 
characterised by new massive area opening for cultivation and sharp increase in 
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production. According to the data of Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
(Accessed, Dec. 2012), during 1980 to 1990 the expansion of cocoa cultivation areas 
reached almost 800 per cent from only 40,000 ha to 350,000 ha. This expansion was 
mainly driven by small-scale farmers. The driving factors behind this expansion, Jamal 
and Pomp (1993) speculate, were Indonesian migrant workers’ initiatives who had good 
experience working in Malaysian cocoa estates. When they returned home to Sulawesi 
in the 1980s and 1990s, they practised their skills in their own farms and developed 
their own cocoa farming. Bloomfield and Lass (1992) and Akiyama and Nishio (2006) 
argue that the macro-economics of the country at that time significantly contributed to 
this expansion. Indonesia undertook its first major currency devaluation in 1983, around 
28 per cent, and this was followed by a further devaluation of around 31 per cent in 
1986. This encouraged the cultivation of export crops, particularly cocoa as the price 
earned increased. In addition, according to Akiyama and Nishio (2006) from the World 
Bank, the contributing factors were also the availability of suitable land, low production 
costs and a competitive market or free market. The market of this commodity, unlike 
other commodities in other cocoa producing countries, was not regulated by the 
Indonesian government. In other words, government intervention in this early stage was 
quite limited.  
 
Some also suggest that the Indonesian cocoa boom was spurred by the increasing world 
price in the 1970s (Haque, 2004). Haque (2004) further points out that from 1980 to 
1989 the world market price was quite stable and even higher than previous decade. The 
early 1980s was also characterised by the sharp decrease in output from West Africa, 
 77 
which in terms of supply and demand, when the supply was low, the cocoa price 
increased. 
 
4.4 Further Expansion 
The second stage of Indonesian cocoa expansion took place from 1990 to 2000. 
According to Nielson (2007), citing Ruf and Yoddang (2001), the Asian financial crisis 
in 1998 followed by devaluation of Indonesian rupiah currency is one of the important 
factors. The financial crisis made the rupiah devalue against the US dollar from Rp 
2.400 in July 1997 to average and even more of Rp 8.300 in September 1997 onwards. 
Despite this unfortunate crisis devastating the national economy, the price of 
agricultural commodities in local currency soared, particularly cocoa, the price of which 
rose from an average of Rp 8,000/kg to Rp 25,000/kg. Furthermore, Sunderlin et al. 
(2001) assert that during the crisis, farmers discovered that export crops were more 
valuable than food crops and since the cocoa price was much higher, farmers were 
encouraged to expand cocoa growing.  
 
In addition, Sunderlin et al. (2001) found that the windfall gains increased new opening 
up of land for cocoa cultivation. Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) data (MoA, 
accessed December 2012) confirms this argument as prior to the financial crisis, 5 years 
before, the average opening up of land for cocoa cultivation was only 9,600 ha per year 
meanwhile after the financial crisis the new opening up of land increased significantly 
into 31,800 ha per year. This made another important milestone for cocoa cultivation in 
Indonesia and made production steadily high. The new vast opening up of land for 
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cocoa, however, was not mainly due to economic factors. It was considered as a 
political gesture of the local community for land acquisition of the forest nearby. As the 
financial crisis was followed by the collapse of the repressive Suharto regime, the new 
clearing of land was motivated by the desire to lay claim to available land around the 
forest which was more possible after the collapse of the regime (Nielson, 2007). 
 
Since 2000s Indonesia has maintained its position as the third world cocoa producer 
after Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. In 2009, Indonesia produced 809,582 metric tons cocoa 
beans or about 13 per cent of the world cocoa, around 2 per cent below Ghana, which is 
a second world producer. Cocoa is cultivated throughout the archipelagos with two 
large production regions: Sulawesi and Sumatera (See Map 1). This tremendous growth 
has made cocoa the fourth most important agricultural export of the country after palm 
oil, rubber, and coconut (Indonesian Statistics Board, 2012). This stage is characterised 
by the intervention of the Government of Indonesia through introducing a tax on the 
cocoa sector which is further discussed in Section 4.5. Indonesia aims to be a cocoa 
process-based industry rather than mainly a raw cocoa bean export-based country and 
has opened itself for an investment on processing-plants establishment in the country 
(Syadullah, 2012). 
 
4.5 Hand-offs Policy and Current Government Intervention 
In the early stages of new development of the Indonesian cocoa sector, around 1970s to 
early 1990s, government undertook little and insignificant interventions in the cocoa 
sector with respect to production and marketing. This circumstance is described as 
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“hands-off” policy (Akiyama and Nishio, 1996; Bloomfield and Lass 1992). With 
regards to production, the early expansion was mostly driven by small-holder producers 
without any assistance from the government. Similarly, with regard to marketing, unlike 
other countries such as Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, the Indonesian Government did not 
have a marketing board for exporting and importing cocoa, there was no price control, 
export quotas or exclusive trade licensing. Compared with Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and 
Cameroon, the Indonesian Government did not earn revenue from cocoa taxes until 
1995. This circumstance made Indonesian producers earn more than producers from 
other producing countries and spurred the development of cocoa sector. Akiyama and 
Nishio (1996) praise this “hands-off” policy as a success story of unregulated or free 
market. The hands-off policy has characterised this sector although the Indonesian 
Government began to undertake intervention in this sector through Value Added Tax 
(VAT), introduced on 1st April 1995, and various ‘retribution’ charges levied by local 
government in some places. Further, cocoa export tax was applied in April 2010 to all 
raw Indonesian cocoa (BMI, 2011). 
 
Given the intervention through tax policy, the Indonesian Government has attempted to 
support this sector although it has been accused of being inefficient and ineffective. 
Citing Indranada (1993), Akiyama and Nishio (1996) provide examples of two 
government interventions through programs of Rehabilitation and Expansion of Export 
Crops (PRPTE) in 1980 and Plantation Development in Special Areas (P2WK) in 1990. 
The first program provided cocoa seeds to small-scale farmers through state and 
private-own plantations and the second program provided modest grants in the form of 
reimbursement of land preparation, planting costs and provision of seedlings in ‘special 
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areas’, areas that were difficult to reach by government service. These programs were 
criticised for their effectiveness, as in 1994 the total new area for cocoa cultivation only 
reached 62,767 ha out of its 205,296 goal. 
 
4.6 Farmers’ Typology, Challenges and Opportunity  
Indonesian cocoa growers, like most farmers of producing countries, are dominated by 
small-scale farmers. Akiyama and Nishio (2006) point out that the engine of the cocoa 
boom in Indonesia is mainly due to the small-scale farmers. This view is supported by 
Panlibuton and Meyer (2004) in their report, estimating that in 2003, 400,000 small-
scale producers accounted for 80 per cent of national production, around 460,000 metric 
tons (MT) cocoa beans with value approximately of $600-700 million per year. The rest 
of the production was derived from state and private-owned estates. The small-scale 
farmers cultivate cocoa on a small plot ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 hectares with bean yields 
ranging from 400 to 800 kg/hectare. This is still higher than cocoa yields in West Africa 
and other producing countries which are only harvesting on average 300 kg/ha or less. 
 
The type of beans produced is mostly unfermented or conventional bulk beans although 
a small quantity of fermented beans is produced as well. Unfermented beans, beans go 
through fermenting process before sun-drying, are mostly produced by farmers in 
Sulawesi, the central source of Indonesian production, and are mostly exported.  
Meanwhile the fermented beans are produced in other regions, in small quantity and 
usually used for domestic demand. As Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of 
unfermented bulk beans, it occupies a strong position in a global market with few 
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competitors such as Dominican Republic. The world demand for unfermented beans is 
relatively stable and price fluctuation is also rather low.  
 
In addition, according to Panlibuton and Meyer (2004), cocoa beans are primarily used 
for their flavour and fat content. The flavour is used to produce cocoa powder 
meanwhile the fat content is used for producing cocoa butter. The Indonesian and 
Malaysian bean typically have little flavour and therefore the beans are used primarily 
for their fat content. This is particularly suitable to US large chocolate manufacturers 
such as Hershey’s, Masterfoods or Mars. Compared with other cocoa beans from other 
region particularly West Africa, the beans from that region are both fat and flavour 
content and therefore the beans from West Africa region earn world premium price. 
 
The main challenge faced by Indonesian cocoa beans is low quality and productivity. In 
2004, Indonesian cocoa productivity reached 1.189kg/ha and it declined over time to 
only 820kg/ha in 2009 as shown by Figure 4 (MoA, accessed 2012). Literature suggests 
that the low quality has been caused by many factors: cocoa pod borer (CPB), low 
knowledge of farming practice and external circumstances affecting the quality. Reports 
identify one of the devastating challenge to farmers in Sulawesi is the infestation from 
the CPB causing the pods to ripen prematurely with small and flat beans therefore beans 
produced are low quality and inconsistent. This pest has been a significant factor in 
declining production in many parts of South East Asian producing countries 
(Bloomfield and Lass, 1992). The decline of Indonesian cocoa farmers’ productivity is 
illustrated by Figure 4. Efforts to control CPB have met with limited success due to low 
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knowledge in applying the right insecticide and lack of adoption of new technology 
(Badcock et al., 2007; Bloomfield and Lass, 1992). According to Djajusman (2007), 
CPB alone has reduced total production of the country by 30 to 40 per cent.  
 
Figure	  4	  Declining	  Indonesian	  Cocoa	  Productivity	  
Source: Compiled from Indonesian Agriculture Department at 
http://aplikasi.pertanian.go.id/bdsp/newkom.asp  
 
Limited post harvesting processing is identified as one of the challenges as well. Unlike 
cocoa beans from other countries which are conventionally fermented for up to five 
days to develop desirable flavour, according to Panlibuton and Meyer (2004) and 
Neilson (2007), Sulawesi beans in particular are not fermented well and have not been 
able to meet consistently Free Air/Fair Average Quality (FAQ) standards, a standard for 
unfermented beans. This issue has been exacerbated by the continuation of global 
buyers sourcing the beans although it is discounted for the poor quality (Neilson, 2007). 
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A further issue is that it is common to find that the cocoa beans are mixed with waste 
material to maximise volume or else good beans are mixed with poor beans by 
intermediaries buying the beans from farmers. The purchasing of the cocoa from 
farmers is usually conducted on a “cash and carry” basis in which farmers sell their 
beans to a large number of local collectors soon after harvest, without being adequately 
dried, for immediate cash (Panlibuton and Meyer, 2004). Some argue that this issue has 
endured due to the characteristics of the country’s production which is very much 
volume or quantity-based rather than quality. Another reason is that there are few 
incentives for farmers to improve their bean quality and this has meant that the issue 
remains unresolved. 
 
In spite of the challenges facing the Indonesian cocoa sector, there have been 
opportunities that have made the development of the cocoa sector in the country 
possible. The opportunities include the global demand that has been steadily high and 
the new opening up of markets and grinding industries in Asia and domestically. In 
2000 the U.S. was a main destination of Indonesian cocoa export, exporting 136 MT 
followed by Malaysia 82 MT, Singapore 38 MT, Brazil 17 MT, China 15MT, Germany 
10 MT, and others 28 MT. However, in 2009 as Asian chocolate industries grew, 
particularly Malaysia and Singapore grinding industries, this has altered the main 
destination of Indonesia cocoa export from USA as the first top destination to Malaysia 
(Panlibuton and Meyer, 2004). Furthermore, Indonesia has opened up a new investment 
for cocoa processing in the country and has plans to emerge from export-oriented to 
process-oriented in the long term. The cocoa processing plants have been built by 
Nestle, Archer Daniels Midland and Guan Chong Bhd. By the end of 2010, according to 
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BMI (2011), the composition of exported cocoa was 50:50 in which 50 per cent of 
production is allocated for the demand of the domestic processing plants and another 50 
per cent is used for export purpose. This bean allocation has been supported by the new 
cocoa beans export tax policy which came into effect in April 2010 favouring domestic 
grinding industries. Before the introduction of this tax, 70 per cent of the cocoa 
production was channelled to export and 30 per cent for local cocoa processing 
industry. 
 
4.7 Public and Private Interventions 
The Indonesian Government’s most recent intervention in the cocoa sector was the 
National Program on Cocoa Improvement of Production and Quality or Gerakan 
Peningkatan Produksi dan Mutu Kakao Nasional (GERNAS), under coordination of 
Agriculture Ministry and local governments in provincial and district levels. Research 
institutes, NGOs, Universities and private groups were also involved in this scheme. 
This program was carried out for 3 years from 2009 to 2012 with objectives of 
rehabilitating farms and planting new cocoa trees for around 450.000 ha, empowering 
450,000 farmers, controlling pests and diseases and improving quality through national 
certification of Indonesia (SNI) (Ditjenbun, 2011). 
  
Prior to this Indonesian Government initiative, the Cocoa Sustainability Partnership 
(CSP), a similar initiative aimed at the sustainability of the cocoa industry, aiming to 
make it more profitable and competitive. CSP was created in 2005 involving private and 
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public organisations for co-ordination and information sharing among stakeholders 
involved in the cocoa sector (Neilson, 2008).  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
Having given the background of the Indonesian cocoa sector, it is evident that unlike the 
West African countries, the Government of Indonesia’s (GoI) intervention in the cocoa 
sector has been characterised by “hands-off” policies and only in 1990s did the GoI start 
to intervene in the sector for further expansion. A national program through GERNAS 
program to improve productivity and quality of cocoa ran from 2009 to 2012. 
Meanwhile, the characteristics of cocoa cultivation are similar to other producing 
countries which are dominated by small-scale farmers. In the next chapter, findings of 
the study are discussed in terms of how the policy intervention affects the cocoa sector 
in the country and which factors impede or hinder participation of small-scale cocoa 
farmers in the country in certified global value chains.
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CHAPTER 5 
ENABLING CONDITIONS FOR PV-SCL ADOPTION IN 
INDONESIAN COCOA SECTOR 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds descriptive accounts of findings as the basis for analysis to answer 
the main research question of this study: “Why has certification within the cocoa 
sector in Indonesia not taken off?” Or, in other words, why do so few Indonesian 
small-scale cocoa farmers participate in voluntary certification schemes.  
 
This chapter is structured into two main topics: first of all, findings are presented 
related to the cocoa sector in Indonesian context. This covers mapping of different 
cocoa value chains existing in the study areas, typology of cocoa farming, the extent 
of farmers’ dependency on cocoa commodity, declining productivity and quality as 
key challenges, monoculture farming characteristics and vulnerability.  
  
The second main topic of this chapter covers findings framed into enabling condition 
variables as set by the Enabling Conditions Analytical Framework (Figure 3). It 
discusses the nature of group formation and co-operative establishment as a main 
requirement for participating in a certification scheme. Here, emphasis is put on the 
feasibility of organising farmers through co-operatives and the dynamics of co-
operative operation. Challenges confronted by farmers in forming and running groups 
or co-operatives are discussed. Further, it analyses the experience of external support 
from NGOs and government, their roles in strengthening farmers’ groups and how 
they linked the groups to particular market chains. Under this variable, government 
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policies influencing the cocoa sector in the country are reviewed, particularly in terms 
of how they affect cocoa farmers. In addition, findings on existing markets and the 
emergence of new markets are set out. Potential benefits from participating in 
certification schemes are also considered. This includes farmers’ perceptions toward 
price and premiums. Finally, conclusions are drawn from this chapter. These findings 
set a basis to answer the research question of this study, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2 Indonesian Small-scale Cocoa Farmers 
5.2.1 Cocoa Value Chain Maps 
A first step to understand cocoa sector in Indonesia is by mapping the existing value 
chain in the country. Investigating the cocoa chain in Indonesia, it was found that 
there are three different cocoa value chains. These are the conventional cocoa value 
chain, fermented cocoa value chain and certified cocoa value chain.  
 
The first chain identified by this study is Conventional Cocoa Value Chain which is 
depicted by Figure 5. This figure is derived from tracking the chain. When farmers in 
villages mentioned to whom they sell their beans, the researcher followed up by 
interviewing the village collectors.  After the interview with village collectors, they 
referred to big buyers or middle traders along with contacts. Following this chain, the 
researcher interviewed big buyers or middle traders who supplied exporters. The 
researcher interviewed exporters who further provided information about either 
domestic grinder or foreign grinder. As resources were limited, the researcher only 
managed to interview a domestic grinder along this chain. From this flow of 
information, the figure wass drawn. The further chain of the beans flowing from 
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grinder/processor to beverage or chocolate manufacturer and finally to supermarket 
and consumer is secondary information obtained from the interviews.  
 
Conventional cocoa beans refer to particular beans which are directly dried under the 
sun without the process of fermenting. The Conventional Cocoa Value Chain shows 
that the chain involves many actors, particularly intermediaries, in the chain. In terms 
of selling their produce, farmers act individually rather than as a group and 
intermediaries exist at different levels such as village, sub-district, district to exporter. 
The farmers in this chain are defined as non-participants as they have never engaged 
with certification schemes. This chain illustrates the situation of most Indonesian 
cocoa small-scale farmers. 
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Figure	  5	  Conventional	  Cocoa	  Value	  Chain	  
 
The second chain identified in this study is the Fermented Cocoa Value Chain, as 
depicted by Figure 6. Similar to Figure 5, this chain is depicted from interviews with 
 90 
fermented farmers, three co-operative boards and a big buyer who supplied to a 
domestic grinder. 
 
Fermented bean is referred to beans which have undergone a fermenting process, 
normally taking 5 to 6 days, before the beans are sun dried. This fermented bean chain 
was initiated by the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Government in the province in 
2009. As part of the program, LEMS (Lembaga Ekonomi Masyarakat Sejahtera - 
Welfare Community Economy) co-operatives are set up in villages. These LEMS co-
operatives act on behalf of the farmers to engage with a trader. Unlike the previous 
chain, this chain involves fewer actors, particularly intermediaries, and farmers are 
directly linked to a main buyer. Further, the difference between the farmer in this 
chain and the previous chain is that the farmers have to ferment their beans as a 
requirement to join the chain.  Fermented cocoa bean is only traded in this chain.  
 
The external actor involved in the chain is the government agency both from 
Government of Indonesia (GoI) or national government and the Southeast Sulawesi 
Provincial government. The farmers under this chain received support from both 
programs of GoI through GERNAS (National Program on Cocoa Improvement of 
Production and Quality) and provincial government such as fermenting box, beans 
drier, computer and training for setting up and running the co-operatives. The farmers 
in this chain receive more services than the farmers under the conventional cocoa 
value chain.  
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Figure	  6	  Fermented	  Cocoa	  Value	  Chain	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The third chain studied is the Certified Cocoa Value Chain as depicted by Figure 7. 
Like other two figures, this chain is depicted based on interviews with certified 
farmers, a member of the co-operative board and an NGO working with the certified 
farmers. 
 
This reveals that the length of the chain is the shortest in which farmers under co-
operatives are directly linked with an exporter. Similar to the Fermented Cocoa Beans 
chain, the farmers act as a group and there is no single intermediary in the chain. They 
are defined as a participant of the certification. The farmers consist of many smaller 
groups but are unified into a single co-operative. The co-operative under this chain, 
Amanah Co-operative, has a single certified buyer, Armajaro. The certification of this 
chain is UTZ Certified. 
 
Compared with the two previous chains, the certified farmers receive more services 
from government, traders and NGOs which will be discussed further in Section 5.5 
External Support Availability. The three cocoa value chains are summarised in Table 
5. 
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Figure	  7	  Certified	  Cocoa	  Value	  Chain	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Features Conventional 
Cocoa Value Chain 
Fermented Cocoa 
Value Chain 
Certified Cocoa 
Value Chain 
Description Most Indonesian farmers 
fall into this category 
Around 100 to 400 
members in each 
villages in the 
Southeast Sulawesi 
Province  
Around 1,600 
certified farmers 
participate in this 
chain 
Organisation Unorganised LEMS Co-operative Amanah Co-operative 
Chain Long Short Shortest 
Chain actors Unorganised farmers, 
village level collector, 
sub-district/district 
collector, big buyer, 
exporter 
Organised farmers, 
LEMS Co-op as a 
collector, buyer and 
processor 
Certified farmers and 
exporter 
Actors support National Government 
through GERNAS 
Program. 
National Government 
through GERNAS 
Program, Provincial 
Government Programs, 
Private sector 
(Indonesian Bank) 
National Government 
through GERNAS 
Program, NGOs 
(Veco Indonesia and 
ACDI/VOCA) 
Organisational 
Capacity 
Not available Capacity to run co-
operatives, 
organisational 
mechanism set up, all 
staff are voluntary 
base 
Capacity to run co-
operative, 
organisation 
mechanism set up, 
staffing on voluntary 
base with a paid staff 
Business capacity Acting individually to 
engage with buyer 
Acting as a group to 
engage with buyer, 
carrying out collective 
marketing, income 
from collective 
marketing, providing 
inputs and micro-
credit, understanding 
market and products 
required 
Acting as a group to 
engage with buyer, 
carrying out 
collective marketing, 
income mainly from 
premiums, providing 
inputs and micro-
credit service still on 
plan, understanding 
market and product 
required 
Technical knowledge Low High High 
Financial barriers Depends on 
intermediaries 
Pooling members’ 
fund through 
membership fee, 
support from 
government 
Assisted by NGO and 
in partnership with 
buyer in form of pre-
financing for 
certification expenses 
Table	  5	  Different	  Features	  of	  Each	  Cocoa	  Value	  Chain	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5.2.2 Cocoa Farmer Typology 
All cocoa farming studied is carried out by small-scale farmers. Small-scale farmers 
are here referred to as a combination of Dixon et al’s. (2004) and Vorley et al.’s 
(2012) definition as farmers with limited resources and relatively small-size of land 
cultivation, varying from minimally 2 ha to 5 ha and Murphy’s (2012), which refers 
to the nature of production, including lack of access to inputs, land, technologies, 
seeds, capital, market, credit and information. 
 
Most farmers studied here expressed that their size of farms for cocoa ranges from 0,5 
to 5 ha. Expansion of cultivated areas is usually conducted near the forest zone. In the 
Southeast Sulawesi Province, cocoa cultivation and its expansion has been driven by 
non-native tribes such as Bugis people, Balinese and Javanese who migrated to the 
areas. The Bugis group migration to that area was an initiative of themselves to open 
up new farming land, particularly cocoa cash crop. They bought land near the forest 
area from native settlers in the 1980s. This was exemplified by a group, Bugis, who 
migrated to the areas: 
 
I was from other region, South Sulawesi. We began to open the areas in 1986 
in Lembah Subur (neighbour village) and we started here in 1992. We have 
been here for 20 years. This used to be a wild jungle and I with my son opened 
this land. This used to be wetland and I bought this land from Tolaki. It used 
to be a lot wild boar here and hundreds of them, monkey as well. We did not 
sleep night and day to protect our seedlings or otherwise would be eaten by 
the wild boar and monkey. Overtime we managed to handle them and this 
village has developed since (Cocoa farmer 01, 12/07/2012).  
 
The benefits of buying land near the forest are mainly because of its vast availability, 
inexpensive and fertile. In many cases, the cost of buying new land comes from 
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income they receive from selling their beans. In the last few years, the expansion to 
open new land, however, has halted as a result of declining income from cocoa 
farming.  
 
Most of the Bugis group has its own particular characteristics as the farmers live in 
farming sites. They built their own houses in the sites and this has created new 
settlements which become villages after certain official processes. This circumstance, 
living within the farming land, is one of the driving factors for the creation of new 
villages.  
 
A native tribe, Tolaki, also cultivate cocoa farming and in terms of cultivation size 
area, they have larger land holdings. In terms of number of cocoa farmers, migrants 
outnumbered the locals. Meanwhile, the other group such as Balinese or Javanese 
from other islands, who are under migration program, land is provided by the host 
Provincial Government, in this case the Southeast Provincial Government. The 
migration program is an over-populated Provincial program to facilitate its residents 
to migrate to less populated Provincial areas. Provincial government of East Java and 
Bali, for example, have been migrating their residents to less populated regions such 
as in the Southeast Sulawesi Province under a Provincial Agreement. The host 
Province decides where to locate the migrants in its less populated areas and hence 
provides 2 ha to be cultivated to each household. Compared with the Bugis group, 
Balinese and Javanese are usually knowledgeable on paddy cultivation as they were 
mostly paddy farmers in their origins. Having said that, despite their own different 
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skills in different crops, cocoa farming is common among different ethnic groups in 
the provincial region.  
 
Farming knowledge is diverse from one farmer to another but farmers who lived in 
the central production area such as Lembah Subur and Iwoiminggura have more 
advanced knowledge. Central production area here refers to sub-districts in which 
cocoa is dominantly cultivated and hence the area has become a large producer in the 
provincial region. The fairly advanced knowledge is indicated by relatively advanced 
treatment of their cocoa farming than those who are not in the central production area. 
This is revealed by the interview: 
In order to tackle the diseases such as zeuzera (penggerek batang) and 
phytophthora palmivora butl (penyakit kanker batang), we applied side 
grafting. We also once organised all villagers to spray the whole cocoa 
landscape here every Wednesday from 4 a.m. every week. Unfortunately that 
did not work very much and we were quite frustrated actually particularly 
since the poison of the insecticides and other inputs was quite dangerous 
actually. Nevertheless, after the side grafting, praise the Lord, it worked albeit 
the fruits were not that reaching maximal expectation as it was kind of 
learning how to grow but at least we didn’t see zeuzera attacks. For 
phytophthora palmivora butl (penyakit kanker batang), what we often did was 
we open the skin of the trees, we removed black spots in there. Often we used 
also fungicides but because it was very strong, the fungi couldn’t be solved. 
We also simply just cut the branch. We were aware that healing process took 
time after treatment (Cocoa farmer 01, 12/07/2012)  
 
The advanced knowledge and treatment of their cocoa crops, particularly by the Bugis 
group, is partly because they received many technical projects either from 
government or from private agencies which are shown by many demo-plots in the 
areas. Another explanation is knowledge sharing among them is quite intense, which 
is indicated by common practices from one farmer to another. The ethnic bond among 
them is quite strong and is used as a medium of knowledge sharing. In addition, Bugis 
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ethnic group has long cultivated cocoa in their place of origin and when they migrated 
to the new place, they carried with them their knowledge. In many interviews, they 
implied that they come from the South meaning that despite coming from different 
sub-district or villages, being Southern in this new place is considered as part of a big 
family. 
 
In general, although pests and diseases are contagious, continuous common actions to 
control pests and diseases happen infrequently among farmers. A group of leading 
farmers once mobilised all farmers to tackle the pests and diseases but after months 
they stopped as it was not successful, the pests and diseases remained prevalent. In 
spite of the unsuccessful attempt, it shows that farmers are willing to cooperate when 
it comes to common interests. This study also revealed that there is a rising awareness 
among farmers that cocoa farming cannot be as it used to be but intense care should 
be in place in order to harvest better yields as one of the interviewee said: 
It used to be quite easy growing cocoa. We simply cleared the land and plant 
them. We wait for three to four years and we started to harvest the fruits. But 
these days, it is getting hard and hard to maintain the health of the trees and 
yields. It is very expensive and yields have been declining (Cocoa farmer 02, 
12/07/2012). 
 
This intense care, however, comes with high cost and is time-consuming. Intense care 
required here includes, for instance, regular fertiliser applications, controlling pests 
and diseases, regular cutting of protective trees and other healthy farming practices.  
 
The other characteristic of the cocoa farmers in the study is the level of formal 
education they have: they have mostly graduated Junior High School and only a few 
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have graduated from Senior High School. The farmers have ability to read and write. 
The younger generation have mostly obtained a better formal education than the older 
generation. It was the older generation who mostly opened new cocoa farming land 
meanwhile the younger generation are mostly care cocoa farming.   
 
5.2.3 Economic Dependency on Cocoa 
In Sulawesi, cocoa farming has been rapidly developing in the last 25 years and the 
production accounts for around 80 per cent of the whole country production (See Map 
1). It has been a main source of livelihood for the farmers and the main economic 
sector in this region. In the past 5 to 7 years, however, the perception of cocoa as a 
promising source of livelihood has changed. Interviews with farmers revealed this 
change in perception and field visits to farming areas also demonstrate that some 
farmers have abandoned their farms.  
This is my farm. Its bit quite abandoned now. I don’t come here often as used 
to. The other farmers also very much like that. Many years ago, when it was 
good days, we came here everyday. We even slept here. It’s like guarding 
money on the trees but as you know it is not like that anymore (Cocoa farmer 
03, 13/07/2012). 
 
Although it is hard to reveal a precise figure of percentage of farmers abandoning 
their farms and shift to other sources of livelihood, the phenomenon is in place. This 
finding is in line with the decline in productivity during these 5 years (See Figure 4).  
 
Cocoa farming in this region, like in many countries, is characterised as boom and 
bust (Ruf and Yoddang, 2001). The boom in this region, which is indicated by rapid 
expansion of cultivation areas and increasing production, occurred after 1998. In 
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1998, Indonesia experienced severe currency devaluation, in which the value of the 
country’s currency, Rupiah, against US dollar dropped. As cocoa earned foreign 
currency, this created a sudden hike in the price of cocoa earned by farmers in 
Rupiah. This high earning made farmers enjoy significant economic welfare from 
cocoa. The interviews with most farmers described this time as a golden era of cocoa. 
A high level of economic capacity was indicated by ability of farmers to build better 
houses, purchasing more land for cocoa cultivation, purchasing vehicles, sending their 
children to school and being able to afford pilgrimage (naik haji) to Mecca as an 
interviewee said: 
It was a golden age. People buying whatever they like, building houses, 
motorbikes, cars, making their houses fancy. They also sent their children to 
school in Makassar or Java. Almost all people here go to Mecca for 
pilgrimage. Even children, they took for pilgrimage. As quota here already 
full, they enlist themselves in other provinces to be able on list and go for 
pilgrimage. But even now it is not as good as old days, we keep maintaining it 
who knows someday it will come back the good days (Cocoa farmer 04, 
13/07/2014). 
 
In this society, pilgrimage had at least three dimensions: religious, socio-cultural and 
a mark of economic success or welfare. The level of pilgrimage in these communities 
was very high. In some villages where this data was obtained, the head of the villages 
acknowledged that almost villagers could afford to do the pilgrimage. The peak of 
this golden era of cacao was known as “Jaman Habibie” among farmers. B. J. Habibie 
was a short-term president replacing President of Suharto. It was at the time when the 
Asian financial crisis around 1998 hit the region.  
 
Over these 5 to 7 years, however, cocoa production has gradually declined along with 
the decreasing quality and price. The decline in productivity is mainly due to the pest 
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and disease attacks and ageing of the trees. From the interviews and FGDs, cocoa 
farmers revealed that pests and diseases started to hit their crops in 2005. The 
common pests found include helopeltis (Penggerek Buah Kakao) and zeuzera 
(penggerek batang). Meanwhile the diseases attacking the cocoa farmers are mostly 
phytophthora palmivora butl., (penyakit busuk buah), phytophthora palmivora butl. 
(penyakit kanker batang), VSD (Vascular Streak Dieback-Oncobasidium 
theobromae), and Cherelle Wilt (penyakit akar, kelayuan pentil). Further, tree ageing 
is also one of the factors that leads to lower production of fruits. In line with this 
finding, the pests and diseases attacks alone have caused a decrease of 30 to 40 per 
cent of total production in the country (Djajusman, 2007).  
 
This study found various efforts to overcome and control the pests and diseases by 
cocoa farmers. The common practice found is the use of chemical inputs or pesticides. 
These efforts, however, cannot tackle the persistence of the pest and disease attacks. 
Nevertheless, this study also found that there was lack of knowledge of the right 
inputs to apply and how to practise comprehensive treatment and manage healthy 
farming among farmers. The lack of knowledge is indicated by frequent questions 
arising during interviews to the researcher about what inputs should be applied. A 
farmer said: 
It has been frustrating to use many chemical inputs but still the disease still 
there. Is there any good input do you know? (asking interviewer and 
interviewer replied could not answer right now). Either we spray in small 
quantity or  big quantity, it didn’t work. Shall you know good inputs, please let 
us know. We feel decreasing yields over the years (Cocoa farmer 10, 
1/8/2012).  
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Field visits to cocoa farms also demonstrated that healthy farming is not practised, for 
example, to bury attacked pods under ground, carry out regular cutting, maintain 
sanitation and harvest regularly. The pest and disease attacks along with ageing trees 
and unhealthy farming management by and large are the main causes of the decline of 
productivity and quality of cocoa.  
 
Responding to the decline of production and quality, the Government of Indonesia 
along with Provincial Governments across the country, launched a program called 
GERNAS (Gerakan Nasional Peningkatan Produksi dan Mutu Kakao - National 
Movement to Improve Cacao Productivity and Quality) (Ditjenbun, 2011). In its 
implementation, this study revealed that impacts of GERNAS varied from one place 
to another, from no significance to significant improvement. In some areas, the 
implementation of GERNAS has not contributed to anything meanwhile in other 
places, farmers who conducted grafting as a part of the program found it has started to 
work.  A farmer who feels that GERNAS program worked said: 
Thanks God, the grafting program from GERNAS for my cocoa worked very 
well. It starts to learn to yield and there are a lot fruits. You can see later. I 
applied the grafting into my big garden as well but step by step (the 
interviewee showed the interviewer after the interview his cocoa grafted in 
which it bear fruits a lot) (Cocoa farmer 8, 28/7/2012). 
 
Different and slightly conflicting account expressed by another farmer: 
Well, actually let me tell you the truth. I am a farmer group leader and I have 
been also being active in village. The GERNAS Program most of the time is 
fake. They (government officials) said this works but in fact, it didn’t. I was 
always disliked when I said this out loudly in many meetings. But I can not 
hide the fact. It didn’t work. Well, maybe it worked here and there but it was 
not because of the GERNAS program. The contractors (GERNAS Program 
contractors) applied the program in one or two farms but they report as if all 
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the entire village have been supported. A lot corruption there. But this is our 
life, we have to work on it (Cocoa farmer 12, 1/08/2012). 
 
In line with this dissatisfaction, a trader expressed similar tone, 
I have to admit that the government program is helpful but it does not solve 
the problem. If GERNAS only helps to provide inputs, seeds, scion for 
grafting, it’s good but the most important is continuous mentoring, 
empowering farmers to the level the farmers able to be successful. And by the 
way, the current program a lot corruption issues there (Buyer 11, 
25/07/2012).  
 
It is evident that impact of the program varies from one farmer to another. The 
ultimate goal of the program is to boost productivity from 500 − 600 kg/ha to 1,500 
kg/ha. The implementation of GERNAS had just finished at the time this data was 
collected. In terms of increasing productivity, this study found varied yield from 500 
kg/ha to 700 kg/ha and there is no any single farmer who reports to have yield 1,500 
kg/ha. 
 
In sum, economic dependency on cocoa is relatively high as it is still the main source 
of livelihood of most farmers despite the gradual decline in yields and persistence of 
pests and diseases. The implementation of GERNAS program, to some extent, has 
helped farmers to address some challenges they faced, that is tree ageing by 
conducting grafting. However, most of the farmers where this data was collected 
found that the program is insignificant in addressing the challenges they faced. This is 
demonstrated by expressing demands for shifting into new cash crops such as palm oil 
which is being introduced in the region by private firms at the time this study was 
carried out.  
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5.2.4 Monoculture Farming and Vulnerability 
This study discovered that cocoa farmers generally depend on cocoa farming for their 
main income albeit they have experienced a decline in production due to pests and 
diseases over the last 5 years. This is also coupled with the falling of price over time 
during the last 3 or 4 years. As most cocoa farming in the region is monoculture, other 
crops are not introduced and thus this circumstance has made the cocoa farmers in the 
region vulnerable. This study also found that the main consideration among cocoa 
farmers to plan for new cash crops is the potential income gain. The choice of Piper 
nigrum L. (black pepper), by farmers interviewed, for example, is mainly because it 
always has a high economic value. However, the cash crop has been attacked with 
disease for the last two or three years and the lack of knowledge to address it means 
that it is not an option. Another cash crop that could be cultivated within the cocoa 
trees was patchouli (nilam). At the time of this study, most of the patchouli trees had 
been abandoned as the price dropped from IDR5,000 to 2,000/kg (GBP0.35 to 0.14). 
This price barely covered the cost of transportation to a buyer. A farmer said: 
As you see, I plant patchouli here when last year the price was very good. This 
is also an additional income as cocoa yields has been decreasing and price 
also was not quite good. I plant it among the cocoa trees. I was happy when 
the patchouli grew very well but by the time I want to harvest the price 
dropped to 2.000/kg. It is very sad and I just abandoned there. I have been 
thinking to grow palm oil but I have no idea how to do so but at the other 
place they have started to grow (Cocoa farmer 07, 28/7/2012). 
 
Recently, palm oil plantation attracted cocoa farmers to make a shift but by the time 
of the research, it was still at the introduction stage. 
 
Cocoa farming in the province is characterised by monoculture in which farming 
areas are dominantly planted by cocoa and only very few other crops integrated. In 
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the areas where other crops are cultivated, simple agroforestry, farmers planted 
coconut, bananas and piper nigrum (black pepper). These crops despite are not 
significant in terms of number and their contribution to income gains, this 
agroforestry system assisted farmer to earn alternative income. This is illustrated by 
an interview with a cocoa farmer: 
Income from cacao is used for buying rice and other daily needs. We don’t 
plant rice here. Other source of income is black pepper. However, recently a 
disease attacked the crop. Almost by harvesting time, all of a sudden, it 
withered to yellowish. Once it dies, it couldn’t be helped. And all die. It 
started from its root and then to top and that it is. I used to plant 300 trees. It 
was around 1/4 ha. Surprisingly, the pepper now is IDR50.000/kg which is 
fantastic. But what can I do? Due to the disease, it’s all gone (Cocoa Farmer 
0302/07/2012). 
 
This circumstance, monoculture, has increased vulnerability of livelihoods 
particularly when cocoa bean prices are declining.  
 
5.3 Farmers being Organised  
One of important variables of enabling conditions to participate into PV-SCL as 
charted in Figure 3 is the establishment of farmer groups or co-operatives. As 
identified in the literature (Lyon, 2011; Blackmore et al., 2012), there are at least two 
purposes why farmer organisations or co-operatives are needed. First of all, with 
regard to certification, farmer group establishment is required to comply with 
standard. Thus, a group or co-operative can ensure implementation, monitoring of 
standards, audits can be carried out efficiently and benefits from certification can be 
shared transparently within a group. Secondly, in term of economies of scale, farmers 
can reduce costs by collecting high volume commodity to be viably traded and 
purchase inputs in bulk which can be a lot cheaper. As a group, farmers can access 
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credit, technical and financial assistance, receive capacity building, build networks 
with other groups or external assistance. A farmer group is aimed to be a socio-
economic agent (Vasquez-Leon, 2010; Torgenson et al., 1997; Poole and de Frece, 
2010). 
 
Under this ‘Farmer being Organised’ enabling condition variable, there are a number 
of themes which fall into this category, such as organisational capacity, business 
capacity, technical knowledge and financial barrier. These themes are explored 
among the three different cocoa value chains. Table 5 summarised findings according 
to the themes of each cocoa value chain as discussed in the next section.  
 
5.3.1 Farmers’ Organisation under the Conventional Cocoa Value Chain.  
This study examines feasibility of forming groups among famers under the 
conventional cocoa value chain which represents most Indonesian cocoa farmers. It is 
found that organising farmers under this chain is quite feasible as demonstrated by the 
fact that in one village, there were various farmer groups established, either sponsored 
by government or private sectors such as Kelompok GERNAS, KOPTAN, 
GAPOKTAN, Agfor Farmer Group and so on. As an interviewee said: 
We have many groups here actually. Some created by government agency, 
AgFor project et cetera.  But when GERNAS was about to be implemented, we 
set up a new group too as it was required to do so. In this village there were 
like 2 to 4 GERNAS groups. In a group usually the members were around 10 
to 15 farmers (Farmer 03, 2/8/2012) 
 
These groups, under various projects, usually had simple structures such as 
chairperson, secretary, treasurer and members. Chairperson was often in charge with 
the whole group formation and running the group. The group runs an activity 
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according to project need such as gathering members to carry out training or attending 
meetings. However, as these groups were mostly project-based, they dissolved or 
were not active at all after project completion.  
 
The characteristic of this chain is that there was no group or co-operative functioning 
as an economic agent for the cocoa farmers.  Farmers act individually rather than as a 
group to engage with buyers. Forming a group in villages is found not to be that 
difficult. The pattern of forming groups is quite common even in informal forms. 
Gathering is part of life. This was expressed by interviewees and exemplified by one 
of this farmer below: 
We do have groups here like GERNAS. But very often, we have a group for 
particular project but it dismissed due to no longer activity of the project, we 
also have other groups but less formal such as Mejelis Taklim (group based 
on religious activities) or arisan (a group of societal members which was 
formed informally, met often monthly, pool certain amount of money which 
usually fixed amount, and  lend to a member. This cycle stopped when each of 
member get his/her chance to receive the pool) (Farmer 04, 2/8/2012).  
 
As there is no group functioning as an economic agent, in form of co-operative for 
example, as identified in the literature (Blackmore et al., 2012; Vasquez-Leon, 2010; 
Torgenson, Reynolds and Gray, 1997) to market their cocoa, manage information, 
have capacity to comply standards, produce documents, report and so on, the 
information is not available. In other words, this chain is characterised by the lack of 
farmer group or co-operative that engages with the market.   
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5.3.2 Farmers’ Organisation under the Fermented Cocoa Value Chain 
In this section, this study reveals its findings on the dynamics and process of group 
formation at the level of farmers under the fermented cocoa value chain to assess 
group formation feasibility and its capacity. The type of farmer group this study 
examines is in the form of co-operative. This type of group can function with regards 
to PV-SCL and as a socio-economic agent (Blackmore et al., 2012; Vasquez-Leon, 
2010; Torgenson, Reynolds and Gray, 1997).  
 
The co-operative under this fermented cocoa value chain is LEMS (Lembaga 
Ekonomi Masyarakat Sejahtera - Welfare Community Economy Agency) Co-
operative. It was initiated by the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Government. The 
concept of this co-operative establishment, according to the official who initiated this 
program: 
…is to pool the village potentials through a co-operative to foster development 
progress in the level of village. It lies on the assumption that if villagers are 
gathered and organised, they can awaken their potentials for better 
development (Government official 03, 30/07/2012). 
 
LEMS Co-operative is expected to be an economic force from farmers to take 
advantage of economies of scales. This initiative to establish LEMS Co-operative is a 
part of efforts creating a chain for cocoa fermented beans commodity. Unlike 
conventional beans, fermented beans are considered to be high quality beans.  
 
These co-operatives were set up in 45 villages under the provincial territory. Although 
it is expected to be established in every village in the province, only some villages 
have managed to establish the co-operatives. Others villages were at the introduction 
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stage. With regard to this study, 4 out of 35 LEMS co-operatives dealing with cocoa 
trading were investigated. They are LEMS co-operative of Lembah Subur, Wande, 
Iwoimenggura and Andomesinggo. The selection of these four LEMS Co-operatives 
was mainly because their focus commodity was cocoa and they had been carrying out 
collective marketing. The selection of the four was also based on resource availability 
of the researcher to only reach the four LEMS Co-operatives.  
 
With regard to group formation, all the LEMS co-operatives were developed from 
many existing farmer groups or Kelompok Tani (Farmer Groups at the level of the 
village) or Farmer Group Association of sub-district level (Gabungan Kelompok 
Tani). The establishment of Farmer Groups and Association of Farmer Groups is an 
earlier program of the Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture. In other words, the 
Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Government used the existing groups to encourage the 
villagers or farmers to set up co-operatives in their villages.  It was explained by the 
Government official:  
LEMS Co-operatives have been established in 45 villages in 7 districts. 
Around 35 LEMS Co-operative mainly focus on cocoa commodity as mostly 
the dominant products in the villages. We expect that each LEMS Co-
operative build network with their pair co-operatives. This year we have 
target to establish 50 co-operatives (Government official 03, 30/07/2012).   
 
Exploring mechanisms on how to run and manage the LEMS co-operatives, it was 
found that the mechanism was set through Article of Incorporation/Association 
(AD/ART). The article covers mechanisms on how to elect the board of the co-
operatives, staff job descriptions, how to carry out meetings, membership, profits 
sharing mechanism and so on. These AD/ART are guidelines to manage the co-
operative. This is explained by one of the co-operative board member, 
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The LEMS Co-operative here was formed from existing groups, farmer 
groups. The Provincial Government assisted us to form the groups along with 
paper works such as Article of Incorporation/Association (AD/ART). In this 
AD/ART as you can see (the interviewee handed the documents to 
interviewer), everything already regulated there, how to be members, electing 
boards, financial report and so on (Farmer 28, 13/07/2012).  
 
The article of incorporation also functions as one of requirements to obtain legal 
status as a co-operative. In the Indonesian context, a group of farmers or producers 
can function as a business entity when it obtains legal status as a co-operative.  
 
In terms of day-to-day administrative work, all the co-operatives’ work was carried 
out by a chairman, financial staff and other staff who were on voluntary basis as they 
were not paid. In the most active co-operative, such as LEMS Co-operative 
Iwoimenggura, for example, administrative work was carried out by many members 
voluntarily. None of the staff were paid and the most active was the chairperson of the 
co-operative. Each co-operative managed to produce simple reports, charts, data on 
members and other administrative tasks. Although electricity was an issue in the 
villages, they managed to do administrative work manually or sometimes with 
charged laptops.  The most advanced co-operative had its own office which was built 
near the co-operative’s warehouse, meanwhile other co-operatives operated through 
the house of the chairpersons.   
 
Participation of members was quite high.  This is indicated by members’ participation 
in activities of the co-operatives: trading fermented beans, buying inputs from co-
operative and micro credits. As one of the board chairperson of the co-operative said: 
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The LEMS Co-operative here established in 2009. Members were 109 
persons. We have 3 mainly activities here: trading fermented cacao from the 
members, providing inputs and micro-credit. Thanks God, as you can see, we 
booked profit around 45 millions rupiah (GBP 3,810) last year (He showed 
the interviewer the article of incorporation/association, financial report and 
documents of the co-operative) (Farmer 27, 25/07/2012). 
 
Participant members of LEMS co-operatives were recruited from the village where 
they were established. Although they did not limit the number of its membership, the 
numbers of the members varied widely from one village to another, from 100 to 400 
members. This suggested that a large number of farmers in a village, around 40 to 70 
per cent, were participating in the co-operatives. In terms of member involvement in 
decision making, regular meetings with members were held in the co-operative office 
or chairperson’s house. Through this program, the farmers were linked with other co-
operatives’ members in the other villages or district and stakeholders. The co-
operative leaders affirmed their new relationship with other co-operatives’ board as 
they regularly communicate through mobile phones by sharing cocoa price 
information. 
 
Examining business capacity, it is found that they all have capacity to run collective 
marketing. Collective marketing was carried out with a buyer, PT. Core Exhibit 
Indonesia (CEI), which further supplied to a processor, PT. Bumi Tangerang, a 
domestic grinder producing chocolate powder or paste for domestic needs or export. 
All the co-operatives collected fermented beans from their members and delivered to 
PT. CEI warehouse which was located in the capital of the Province. As a main 
income source came from the collective marketing, however, the collective marketing 
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did not provide significant income to the co-operatives. This is because of the low 
profit margin and expensive transport cost, as one of the board said: 
We had a contract of 15 tons this year to supply the buyer. Actually we can 
provide more than that. However, the problem is that the margins between 
conventional and fermented beans only IDR 1.000 (GBP 0,07). It used to be 
IDR 3.000 to 5.000 (GBP 0,21 to 0,35). If the margin ranges between those, 
we can provide them, but as you know, the margins are very low. Adding with 
transportation cost, it doesn’t profit much (Farmer 27, 25/07/2012).    
 
Meanwhile for the side business, the co-operatives run micro-credit. The co-
operatives lend money to their members with modest interest rates of around 2 per 
cent. Micro-credit runs very well in one co-operative but did not work well for others 
as demonstrated by the fact that the fund was not revolving as members could not pay 
back the loan. The reason behind this is that the members’ income was seasonal, 
mostly in May and June. The members pay back mostly by harvesting time, once a 
year, so the fund did not revolve as expected as a member of the board said: 
Most of our members get loans from here (The interviewee showed the 
interviewer a book listing all loan list). However, we run out of cash. The 
problem is most of the members don’t pay the loans back because they don’t 
earn the money yet. The money for their beans is still with the buyer. The 
buyer hasn’t paid us yet. It’s already July now and things stuck. Last year, 
when sale was good, most members paid back the loans but we are still 
waiting now. The need for paying this and there quite a lot now and price of 
things are also getting higher (Farmer 28, 28/07/2012). 
 
In the successful LEMS Co-operative, which was indicated by the flow of the fund, it 
was found that this side business activity had been running for quite some time even 
before the co-operative was established. This activity then was inserted into the co-
operative as one of its business activities. In other words, the successful co-operative 
was able to run the micro credit very well because of the fact that it had long 
experience in running that type of business. The board member explained: 
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If you see this report (the interviewee showed the interviewer a financial 
report of 2011), we booked profit IDR 45 millions (GBP 3,180) last year. This 
comes from 3 unit of our business: cacao sales, micro-credit and input sales. 
However, most of this profits comes from micro-credit which runs very well 
here actually (Farmer 27, 25/07/2012). 
 
With regard to other side business offered by these co-operatives, they also provide 
agricultural inputs to their members which also had various degrees of success from 
one to another. Like the micro-credit program, one co-operative runs very well but 
others did not because of the inability of the members to pay back in time. The co-
operative members said: 
We bought fertiliser to our members. You know some time fertiliser rare in 
market or some tricky seller holding back to wait for increasing price to profit 
a lot. Our members cannot do anything, that is why we agree to buy fertiliser 
in bulk and then sell to members or otherwise if there is no fertiliser 
application this year, you cannot expect good yield next year (Farmer 27, 
25/07/2012).  
 
In terms of technical know-how, capacity of the co-operatives’ members to shift post-
harvesting processing from simply drying the beans after harvesting to fermented 
beans is possible as the members are willing to learn the new knowledge. Further, in 
terms of production, the co-operative boards were knowledgeable about good farming 
practices and post harvesting management including pest and diseases control.   
 
With regard to financial barriers, as one of the main challenges in setting up and 
running a co-operative, LEMS co-operatives were assisted by the Southeast Sulawesi 
Government and central Indonesian Bank. Indonesian Bank, through their CSR 
program, built warehouses for the co-operatives as a collection point before delivering 
to buyer’s warehouse. The Provincial government supported these co-operatives by 
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providing assistance such as tools for trading, including scales, acidity tester and 
fermenting boxes. Other than governmental support, however, no support was 
received from NGOs by the time of this interview was carried out.   
 
One interesting finding, of how the co-operatives source their capital fund, was by 
collecting membership fees from their members. In order to be a member, cocoa 
farmers had to pay a membership fee of IDR 1,000,000 (GBP 70) as a common 
capital fund which was a relatively huge amount of money among farmers. Many of 
them, however, were not able to pay it at once, at the time of registration. The 
members were allowed to pay it in instalments as long as they made a first payment as 
a sign of commitment to join the co-operatives. Further instalments were paid at 
harvest time which occurred once a year or whenever they had money. The 
membership fee could also be paid by beans rather than cash. This capital fund was 
used for micro-credit and capital for providing agricultural inputs to members.  
 
LEMS co-operatives’ strategy to collect capital fund from members to some extent 
addresses the lack of capital as identified in literature (Santacoloma, 2007; Liu, 2009; 
Blackmore et al., 2012). In addition, pooling financial resources from members 
generates at least two implications. First of all, it builds ownership from members to 
the co-operatives and secondly it demonstrates that funding can be obtained from the 
members themselves instead of depending on credit from commercial bank. The use 
of this capital from members, however, varies from one to another co-operative. It did 
not work well in LEMS Co-operative Iwoimenggura but runs well in LEMS Co-
operative Andomesinggo. The plausible explanation of this is that the revolving fund 
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has been running for LEMS Andomesinggo for some time. It had the experience of 
how to manage micro-credit program.  Meanwhile in case of LEMS Co-operative 
Iwoimenggura, it was their first time to run the revolving fund.  
 
Presenting the case of LEMS co-operatives, it is discovered that building co-
operatives among small-scale cocoa farmers is feasible in this chain. Organisational 
capacity on how to set up and run the co-operative as set through Article of 
Incorporation/Association (AD/ART) such as conducting regular meetings, carrying 
out daily management, staffing, managing bookkeeping, producing reports, collecting 
data of its members is considered sufficient to run the co-operatives. Business 
capacity varies from one LEMS Co-operative to another, however, but they all have 
capacity to run collective marketing. The main indicator can be used to measure the 
rate of business success is whether the co-operative is profitable. As shown in this 
study, only one out of four of the co-operatives booked quite significant profits. 
Further, to address capital limitation, the way all co-operatives source their capital 
funds suggests that despite the financial limitation of farmers, pooling financial 
resources from a large number of farmers can be significant as basic capital fund to 
run the co-operative business. The co-operatives also show that technical know-how 
capacity on how to ferment beans was also considered sufficient. It successfully shifts 
cocoa farmers’ old practice from producing ordinary or conventional beans to 
fermented beans which are much better in terms of quality. 
 
5.3.3 Farmers’ Organisation under the Certified Cocoa Value Chain 
The co-operative examined is Amanah Co-operative. Unlike the LEMS Co-operatives 
as discussed in earlier section which was very much supported by government, 
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Amanah Co-operative had been receiving support from NGOs. Farmer members of 
Amanah Co-operative were certified farmers under UTZ certification. This co-
operative has a unique setting up process and history. Amanah Co-operative is a 
business wing of Wasiat, an NGO.  
 
Wasiat is a local NGO set up by ex-staff member of ACDI/VOCA (Agricultural 
Cooperative Development International-Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative 
Assistance). The ACDI/VOCA project commenced in 2000 and completed in 2006, 
supporting local farmers through farmer field school approach. As the project ended, 
some staff initiated the formation of a local NGO, Wasiat, the abbreviation for 
Wahana Sukses Pertanian Terpandang (Centre of Agricultural Excellence), as one of 
the founders and also a cocoa farmer said, 
I and some of my friends were recruited to be staff of ACDI/VOCA. We were 
all locals. Each of us also have cocoa farms either inherited from parents or 
planting by ourselves. As the project ended, some of us applied another job 
and some being civil servants. But some of us, me for example, formed a local 
NGO called Wasiat. We were lucky because ACDI/VOCA left some of their 
equipment to us and we used that to run the NGO. As we received intensive 
technical training from the project, after the project, some agencies or private 
companies often used our service and paid. No very much but it can sustained 
our activity  (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012).  
 
Although Wasiat did not receive any sustained funding, the NGO kept running and 
training cocoa farmers as a continuation of the previous project. Later, this local NGO 
decided to set up a business unit wing, Amanah Co-operative, to tap business 
opportunities as an independent financial source to maintain its core role as an NGO. 
Its initial step was approaching 11 farmer groups to join forces to establish the 
Amanah Co-operative.  
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Amanah Co-operative’s experience in group formation presented few difficulties 
given the existing trust in place between the NGO staff and the farmers who were 
once their target groups under ACDI/VOCA project. In other words, a good 
relationship had been existing among them. The participation of farmers to join the 
groups was driven by a motive to receive an improvement of the yield and better price 
for their cocoa beans. Amanah Co-operative had a large number of around 1,600 
farmers in 124 small farmer groups in 6 sub-districts of Polewali Mandar, West 
Sulawesi. The co-operative itself is a tertiary co-operative, meaning that it was an 
umbrella of 4 secondary farmer groups and 124 primary small farmer groups, as 
explained: 
We’ve got 1.600 members in 6 sub-districts which is quite large in terms of 
numbers and areas coverage. We did have SoP (Standard of Procedures) to 
run the groups. I have to admit that there were very well running groups but 
some still need to catch up. We keep working on having the same level of 
speed among groups. Actually, it’s bit an achievement to gather thousand 
farmers and counting. But we are aware of managing members are still done 
manually and sometimes it takes time for gather all administrative and reports 
from villages but ensuring that basic administration in place, yes we are 
confident we are doing so (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012).  
 
The widespread area covered and large number of members are the significant 
differences between Amanah and LEMS Co-operative. LEMS Co-operative members 
tended to live in the same village as the location of the co-operative, meanwhile 
Amanah Co-operative members lived in many and distant villages. 
  
 118 
Amanah Co-operative engagement with certification was initiated when an NGO, 
BWI, introduced certification to the co-operative. As a member of the board 
explained: 
In 2009, Amanah Co-operative was introduced about cacao certification by 
BWI and we found it an interesting concept, in 2010 we started to do data 
collection and other preparation. Thanks God, in April 2011 we were audited 
and stated we complied certification standards. However, due to financial 
consideration, certification holder is still on buyer but we have been working 
as internal control to the implementation of certification standards (Farmer 
45, 07/09/2012).  
 
Mechanism on how to run and manage co-operatives is set by Article of Incorporation 
and Standard of Procedures (SoP) of the organisation. Amanah managed to obtain its 
co-operative status and is entitled to be legally acknowledged as a business entity in 
Indonesian law system.  
 
The co-operative is managed by 7 staff. Investigating staffing of the co-operative, it 
was revealed that none of them were paid except one who was part of the VECO 
implementing project staff. VECO run a project in which one staff was recruited from 
the co-operative’s staff so that the person got paid while working both for the co-
operative and VECO’s project. 
 
Given the approach by VECO Indonesia working with this co-operative staff, this also 
shows that costs associated with staffing, salaries and other expenses and organising 
members can be partly solved. As others were still on voluntary basis, the remaining 
challenge is how to make this co-operative profitable so it would be able to pay its 
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staff expenses to run the co-operative full time. The Co-operative was dynamic as a 
member of the board said, 
It’s not all smooth. I have to admit that organisation dynamics is quite 
challenging and time-consuming sometimes. Gap among team do exists. Some 
are speedy with business matters, but some needs to be constantly slow on 
their uptake and need continuous consolidation among team members 
(Farmer 45, 07/09/2012).   
 
Participation of members was demonstrated by their involvement in the co-operative 
collective marketing and regular meetings of members. The large amount of beans 
collected from members also can be seen as a token of participation. 
 
In terms of business capacity, the co-operative managed to carry out collective 
marketing which was quite successful at the level of farmers. In 2011, Amanah Co-
operative supplied 1,300 metric tons certified beans to a buyer which passed level of 
feasible to trade. It also has capacity to do negotiation with traders as one of the staff 
said: 
We carry out intensive meetings with farmers. It was very intensive to meet 
them. We had to be one voice when it came to table negotiating with trader. 
We also gather information including price from other places so that we can 
have a better negotiation. But again, building good relation with trader also a 
key part to do this partnership (Farmer 46, 08/09/2012).    
 
At the time this data was collected, Amanah co-operative did not run a side business 
like LEMS Co-operative. The co-operative, however, was on the stage of developing 
a side-business to provide rice to members. The formation of a Credit Union was also 
being planned. In terms of co-operative income, it was only the premiums as source 
of income received from Nestle.  One of its board members said: 
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Our core business is surely certified cacao trading. However, we were aware 
that almost all our members were cocoa farmers and don’t have rice fields. 
Therefore, we plan to provide our members rice or otherwise they can go to 
intermediaries again which will give bad impact to co-operative. We also plan 
to provide them agricultural inputs (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012). 
 
Given the efforts involved in managing the large quantity of beans collected, this 
group was considered quite successful in this collective marketing. Unifying a large 
number of farmers as its members was also quite successful. At the time this data was 
obtained, Amanah Co-operative capital was mainly from cocoa premium and support 
from VECO. Compared with LEMS Co-operative, Amanah Co-operative did not yet 
maximise its member’s potential as source of its own capital by collecting a 
membership fee.  
 
In terms of technical know-how relating to standards, passing the audit for its 
compliance demonstrated that the co-operative has capacity to do so. As the co-
operative staff said “We received a lot training from buyer and the buyer paid the 
expenses actually” (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012). In addition, capacity also obtained from 
previous ACDI/VOCA project for good agricultural practices and improving quality 
of beans.  
 
With regard to participating in certification, a challenge is to ensure farmers keep 
everything recorded as an NGO staff said, 
Keeping receipts or sales notes is not easy among farmers. This is important 
as this is the basis for premium distribution but you know we have to keep 
reminding our members about this. So it goes with notes for fertiliser 
purchasing and usage. We keep finding what the best way to maintain that and 
sometimes we used simple ways the way they are familiar with like sticking the 
notes on their wall or any way to make marks to count doses of fertiliser or 
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any inputs they applied in their farms. It’s a mind-set changing and that is a 
lot harder than how to better harvest their cocoa fruits. That, once trained, 
they know how to carry on but administrative or any paper work is the most 
challenging. It’s hard but I think we do it step by step cannot be overnight 
(NGO 03, 07/09/2012.  
 
As certification requires rigid documentation, it was found that it was one of the 
challenges when it comes to working with small-scale farmers who were not familiar 
with paper work.    
 
Apart from that, financial barrier was addressed by the assistance of VECO and 
buyer’s pre-financing as explained by a member of the board, 
In terms of preparation we had calculation over the expenses and reached 
IDR 200,000,000 (GBP 14,137). It’s quite a lot money actually. We also 
invited auditors to audit our farms and all documents required. But as we 
have partnership with buyer, at the time being, the buyer who paid and would 
deducted on premiums we would receive later (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012). 
 
This case demonstrates that it is feasible to establish a co-operative among Indonesian 
cocoa farmers. This co-operative managed to build its co-operative capacity to 
participate in a certification scheme, UTZ Certified. However, the process of setting 
up was quite time-consuming, it took four years, and empowering the co-operative 
proved challenging.  
 
To address financial barriers, the co-operatives received external support, mainly 
from NGOs and buyer’s pre-financing. As this co-operative was at the stage of initial 
running, the strategy of partnership with a buyer is considered as a working approach 
before becoming a certification holder.  
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5.4 Link to New Market 
This second variable under the Enabling Condition Analytical Framework is ‘Link to 
New Market’. This section reveals findings on linking to new markets, focusing on 
examining existing markets, access to new markets, certified buyers, information 
about products required, degree of understanding about the market, access to credit or 
pre-financing, ability to negotiate price and contract, and permits and legal procedures 
for trading. Different characteristics of the markets and their implications are 
discussed here.  
 
5.4.1 Market under the conventional cocoa value chain 
This section examines the market system under conventional cocoa value chain. The 
existing conventional cocoa market system was quite complicated in terms of its 
chain, which is quite long.  As depicted by Figure 5, the market under conventional 
cocoa value chain, in which farmers act individually rather than as a group, involved 
many players in the chain starting from local collectors, sub-district collectors, big 
traders and finally an exporter. In other words, there were a lot intermediaries 
involved to move the product from farm gate to an exporter.   
 
Despite that long chain, it was found however that access to intermediaries faced no 
challenge. Intermediaries existed in all villages growing cocoa in the areas which 
were relatively accessible. Even in remote areas, where part of this data was obtained, 
buyers or intermediaries were always in place. They bought whatever quality bean 
there were, as expressed by one of the farmers:   
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There are a lot buyers here, either from here or from anywhere else. No 
problem at all. Not only the dried beans, even the fresh ones just picking up 
from trees, they buy them. It all depends on the farmers, if they want to sell it 
full dried, it’s okay, if they want to sell it half dry, like only 2 or 3 full sun dry, 
it’s okay too. The prices however varies depending on how dry the beans are 
(Cocoa farmer 09, 02/07/2012.  
 
Revealing the chain and network in this market, local buyers or intermediaries or as in 
South America known as coyotes, do exist in the village level. As identified in the 
literature (Taylor, 2003; Bacon, 2005; Jaffee, 2007; Lyon, 2009; Vaquez-Leon, 2010; 
Milford, 2014), the role of intermediaries is associated with a low price received by 
farmers and it exacerbates the poor condition of farmers. Investigating the role of the 
intermediaries here, the finding of this study, however, revealed mixed results. To 
some extent, it is in line with the perception as the literature suggests so. For instance, 
if the price of one kg beans was IDR15,000 (GBP 1,06) intermediaries would pay 
only IDR10,000 (GBP 0,70) to farmers. Intermediaries also bought whatever the 
quality of the beans there were, which discourages farmers to produce high quality 
beans. 
 
Investigating deeper, however, it was found that the relationship between farmers and 
intermediaries was perceived as “symbiotic” by farmers despite the lower price they 
received. A farmer could borrow money from intermediaries, get farm inputs or any 
daily needs on loan. This was not merely a social relation, however, but considered as 
a part of business. Farmers would pay back at harvesting time with their beans. There 
was a consensus or oral agreement that farmers who borrowed from the 
intermediaries would sell their beans to the local collector with interest. For instance, 
if the price of the week of one kg beans was IDR15,000, the local buyer would pay 
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only IDR10,000. The IDR5,000 difference was considered as interest on the loans, as 
revealed by one of the local intermediaries: 
I bought whatever farmers sell me, full dry, half dry, wet et cetera or 
otherwise I will not be able to collect as many as I can. Usually, November 
and December most farmers came to me to have some loans. They usually 
desperate for some cash. Surely I lend them. I also provide them rice, inputs 
or whatever they need. But fairly, they would pay it back in harvest season in 
April, May or June with their beans. So yes, if the price of 1 kg IDR 15,000 
(GBP 1,06), I pay IDR 10,000 (GBP 0,70) (Intermediary 01, 02/07/2012.   
 
In line with the account of this intermediary, the other intermediary also expressed,  
This business is bit tricky. You can win much or you lost much too. We paid 
them yes only IDR 10,000 (GBP 0,70) instead of IDR 15,000 (GBP 1,06) 
because actually when they asked for loan, the money we give them should 
work. They don’t pay interest. Can you imagine if it takes months and months 
and the money doesn’t work? Well, this is business somehow. Yes, we do help 
each other but still this is business (Intermediary 02, 02/07/2012). 
 
Despite farmers being aware that they paid a lot for the interest, this circumstance was 
perpetuated due to unavailability of credit or loans from formal institution. In other 
words, farmers had no option but to go with intermediaries for cash or daily needs or 
inputs. 
 
Investigating further characteristics of the market in this chain, it was found that all 
levels of quality of beans were traded in this market. The Government of Indonesia 
(GoI) in order to standardise bean quality sets 5 classification of bean quality as 
follows: 
Quality AA: 85 beans/100 gram  
Quality A: 86-100 beans/100 gram 
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Quality B: 101 − 110 beans/100 gram 
Quality C: 111-120 beans/100 gram 
Quality S: More than 120 beans/100 gram 
 
This quality classification is using method of counting beans, by how many beans are 
needed to reach 100 grams.  For example, if it takes 85 beans, to weigh 100 gram, the 
beans are classified as AA. But if takes 86 to 100 beans to weight 100 grams it falls to 
category Quality A and so on. This method is also called ‘Bean Count’. 
 
With regard to the Government of Indonesia regulation on bean quality standards, it 
also sets standards for various testing such as water content, insect contamination, 
waste mixed with the beans, form of beans: smoky or abnormal, broken or any 
infected beans in the bulk. These standards aim to ensure that Indonesian export 
quality is improved. This standardisation was issued in 2008 and implemented in mid 
2010. In its implementation, however, at the level of farmers, particularly in this 
chain, what was mostly tested for was only water content by determining how many 
days the beans were dried as discussed earlier. The local collector did not carry any 
Bean Count measurement albeit it is light weight and affordable to carry out as a basis 
to set the price paid to farmers. At the level of farmers, quality was determined by 
how many days beans were dried under sun rather than using a reliable tool to 
measure the quality of beans exactly. Most farmers under this chain experienced 
selling beans that had been dried for between 1 to 4 days.  
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When asked what factor led them to sell after 1 day rather than 4 days drying, farmers 
based their decisions on the need for cash, as a cocoa farmer explained, 
If my wife really needs money to buy rice and I don’t have any cash, I just sell 
the beans despite it’s been there 1 or 2 full dry sun. Or otherwise, I will go to 
intermediary here which is much better to sell what I’ve just got.  I also just 
sell it despite the beans don’t reach 4 or 5 full dry sun. It depends on price 
offered by collector. Ideally, 5 full dry sun will be good as the price can be 
IDR 15,000 (GBP 1,06) per kilo this time. But like yesterday, I just sold my 
beans 2 days dry for IDR 12,000 (GBP 0,85) per kilo. My wife want to buy 
rice   (Cocoa farmer 15, 04/07/2012).  
 
Information about product quality was rare among cocoa farmers under this chain. 
Price negotiation was carried out on the basis of how many days the beans dried 
rather than using bean count method. Therefore, in many cases, the price received by 
farmers was lower than their peer farmers under different value chains.  
 
Compared to the other two chains, fermented and certified chains, however, price of 
their beans was the lowest around IDR 15,000 to 17,500 (GBP 1,06 to 1,24) per kg, 
meanwhile fermented beans was IDR 20,500 (GBP 1,45) per kg and certified beans 
ranged from IDR 22,850 to 24,000 (GBP 1,62 to 1,70) per kg. Moreover, as the 
quality standards were based on full-sun dry rather than bean count, the price went 
lower. When farmers got loan from an intermediary, the price was even lower, the 
low of the lowest as revealed in this study which rewarded only IDR 10,000 (GBP 
0,71) per kg. It is evident that farmers under this chain did not receive better price of 
their products. The dissatisfaction is expressed by a farmer under the conventional 
chain, 
The rise in the costs of daily needs does not match the rise in price of our 
products. For instance, last year the cocoa beans reached IDR 22,000 (GBP 
1,56) per kg. But this year the highest is only IDR 17,500 (GBP 1,24) 
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meanwhile at the same time the price of daily needs are rocketing. I give you 
an example. Last year, one kg sugar was only IDR 12,000 (GBP 0,84). This 
year is IDR 15,000 (GBP 1,06). Now, what happened is the food prices have 
risen but our cocoa price does not rise, it even goes lower (Farmer 
02/07/2012).  
 
As farmers under this chain did not act as a group, compared with their peers under 
fermented and certified chains, they have less knowledge about market, organisation, 
business and good farming practices. 
 
Given the characteristics of this market, it is evident that existing market under the 
conventional cocoa value chain is not helping farmers to earn better price for their 
cocoa. This study found that linkage to a new market is necessary to change the 
conditions which are not lifting farmers out of perpetuated condition.  
 
5.4.2 New Market under the Fermented Cocoa Value Chain 
Investigating market under the fermented cocoa value chain revealed that this new 
market channel is quite promising as it gives added value to the farmers. Unlike the 
conventional cocoa value chain with many intermediaries involved, a farmer under 
this fermented value chain market was linked with a buyer directly.   
 
This linkage encouraged farmers to have better understanding of this type of market. 
Farmers, through co-operatives, received information about product quality required 
and training on how to produce fermented beans rather than simply ordinary beans. In 
terms of measuring quality of the fermented beans produced, farmers through co-
operatives were familiar and knowledgeable on quality standards using bean count. 
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Moreover, they also applied the moisture tester for measuring moisture of the beans 
as a part of quality test, as a farmer said: 
All LEMS Co-operative beans are sold to PT. Core. Like our LEMS Co-
operative current delivery, it was 3 tons. Thanks God, I passed 100 per cent 
all quality testing. Bean count 100beans/100gram which is Quality A. Water 
content is 7 which is very good, no contaminated by insects or trash. It’s pride 
really. I don’t buy ordinary beans but only fermented beans from members 
(Cocoa farmers/Co-op board 39, 25/07/2012). 
 
The cocoa farmers interviewed revealed that in 2011 the fermentation program was 
successful as a large number of farmers joined the program by fermenting their beans 
and sold them through the co-operatives. They managed to produce the fermented 
beans in large quantities. This was confirmed in an interview with the main buyer, as 
said: 
90 per cent of our beans sourced from LEMS Co-operative farmers in all 
districts in Southeast Sulawesi Province. The rest 10 per cent sourced from 
other  farmers. Each LEMS Co-operative sell their beans to us varied from 
10 to 150 tons each season (Buyer 11, 25/07/2012). 
 
As farmers here acted as a group and in form of co-operative which is legally 
permitted, their beans were traded through Co-operative collective marketing. Co-
operatives traded to a buyer, PT. Core Exhibit Indonesia (CEI) which further supplied 
to a company, PT. Bumi Tangerang, a grinder producing chocolate powder or paste 
for domestic needs or export. The collected fermented beans were delivered to PT. 
CEI warehouse which was located in the capital of the Province.  
 
Co-operatives had capacity to negotiate price and contract with buyers. This is 
indicated by opting to sell their beans to another buyer. Most of the LEMS co-
operatives sell their fermented beans to PT CEI, however when they did not reach 
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agreement on price, LEMS co-operative was free to sell to another buyer such as in 
one or two cases of LEMS Iwoiminggura selling its beans to ADM as they found that 
ADM offered a higher price.  
 
Engagement with buyers was facilitated by the Southeast Sulawesi Government by 
signing a memorandum of commitment between a buyer, PT CEI, and LEMS co-
operatives. This memorandum, however, was not legally binding co-operatives to 
only sell their products to that buyer. LEMS co-operatives were given freedom to sell 
their fermented beans to any buyers offering better prices. This new market gave two 
benefits to farmers participating in the chain. The price earned was relatively higher 
and quality could be maintained and improved.  
 
Investigating further about this potential market to bring more value added to farmers, 
however, it was found that the price difference between conventional or ordinary 
beans and fermented beans has been a main driving factor for members to participate 
in this chain. Farmers felt they benefited from the price difference between 1 kg 
ordinary and fermented beans ranged from IDR 3,000 to 5,000 (GBP 0,21 to 0,35). 
However, when price difference between ordinary or conventional and fermented 
beans dropped to only  IDR 500 to 1,500 (GBP 0,03 to 0,10), farmers hesitated to 
participate in this chain, as illustrated by the decreased amount of fermented bean sold 
in this chain. As a trader said, 
Now, ordinary or conventional cocoa and fermented beans prices were only 
little difference. We don’t mind to pay higher for fermented but competitor 
also play tricky business by catching up with our price. Our farmers are so 
price concern, difference of only IDR 200 (GBP 0,002) could be a problem 
(Buyer 11, 25/07/2012). 
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It is evident that new markets, fermented bean chain, provide advantages: economic 
benefit and increasing knowledge. This study also found that the farmers are price 
sensitive and economic factors or higher prices are found to be a main consideration 
to join this chain in which will be discussed in Section 5.6 on Potential Benefit from 
Participation. 
 
5.4.3 New Market under the Certified Cocoa Value Chain 
Investigating the market under this certified cocoa value chain, this chain offers more 
advantages than the two previous chains. Firstly, farmers act as a group, have direct 
access to an exporter and do not need intermediaries. Secondly, farmers have better 
knowledge and understanding of this type of market as they received information and 
training on the market and quality of product required. 
 
Linking farmers with the certified buyers under this new chain had encouraged 
farmers to build their knowledge about permits and legal procedures to trade. As a 
form of co-operative, Amanah Co-operative has capacity to prepare all legal 
documents for trading and certifications compliance, as a board member said: 
Honestly, we learned a lot through this. We keep learning. Particularly when 
it comes to business, that’s totally different field to deal with, with papers, 
regulations and so on. Similarly to the documentations needed for the 
certification, it is a big thing but Thanks God so far we do the best we can and 
got certified (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012).  
 
With regard to its engagement with a trader, the co-operative board trained to have 
capacity to negotiate with buyers. A contract as a form of agreement had been signed 
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for both parties: the co-operative and buyer. The contract was perceived as fair by the 
co-operative. It was agreed that the co-operative would supply Armajaro according to 
the agreed amount. This figure was derived from a yearly assessment predicting how 
many tons farmer groups could produce in the year ahead. In the clausal contract, the 
co-operative managed to not restrict farmers to sell all their beans to Armajaro. The 
certified farmers were free to sell to other buyers whenever the other buyer offered 
better prices, as the NGO expressed: 
We do understand the limitation of co-operative to deal with trader, 
information, network and business management. We do interventions there, 
including negotiation with buyer. We worked together with co-operative as a 
team so that we can find win-win solution both for farmers and buyers. As I 
mentioned earlier, in the clausal of giving choice to farmers to sell other than 
Armajaro, communication, co-investment so that both benefits from this 
partnership (NGO worker 07, 07/09/2012).  
 
One aspect of building partnership with a buyer is communication. Therefore, a 
communication mechanism was set up. It allowed constant communication between 
the representative of the co-operative, VECO Indonesia, the NGO who assisted the 
co-operative, and the buyer, Armajaro. A complaint mechanism was also set up and 
discussed through regular meetings. With regard to certification and premiums, it was 
agreed that Armajaro financed certification costs and all associated costs. These costs 
are later reimbursed from the premiums as the premiums from Nestle were split into 
two: part went to the buyer and the other portion went to the co-operative. 
 
Further, delivering beans from gate to buyer had been always a challenge to arrange 
the logistics. Collecting members’ beans and storing in a warehouse was labour and 
time-consuming and costly. Addressing this challenge, Amanah set a new strategy to 
deal with the transportation issue. Amanah Co-operative did not have to collect its 
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members’ beans, store in a warehouse and delivered it to buyer like the LEMS Co-
operative did. Amanah Co-operative required members to deliver themselves to the 
buyer. Members were organised in smaller groups, arranged the bean collection and 
delivered them to Armajaro’s buyer station near their villages, as the NGO staff said: 
We convinced Armajaro that establishing buying station in our district will 
give benefit for both: we and Armajaro. Thanks God, the manager agreed and 
set up there (NGO Worker 07, 07/09/2012). 
 
The advantage of arranging in smaller bulk was that it fits most transportation means, 
small to medium-size of lorries, available in the region. The groups could arrange 3 to 
5 tons in one delivery which was the common way of delivering items by those 
lorries. In this way, the co-operative avoided financial risks that could occur in the 
process. Further, the co-operative managed to persuade Armajaro to set up its own 
buying station near the co-operative members. As delivery distance was cut by the 
establishment of a buying station near the farmers, the groups reduced the risk of 
financial loss. With regard to its relation with the buyer, Amanah Co-operative’s 
ability to make a deal with Armajaro to build a buying station within reach of the co-
operative members was an achievement.  
 
As literature (Santacoloma, 2007; Liu, 2009; Lyon, 2009; Basso et al., 2012) 
identified that participating in certification is costly and farmers had financial 
limitation to address this challenge, Amanah Co-operative addressed this by receiving 
assistance of NGO and buyer’s pre-financing mechanism.  
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5.5 External Support Availability 
Literature (Liu, 2009; Blackmore et al., 2012; Doherty and Tranchel, 2005; Smith, 
2011; Nelson et al., 2012; Borda-Rodriquez et al., 2015) has identified that external 
support should be in place in order to assist farmers to participate in certification. This 
‘External Support Availability’ variable of Enabling Conditions Analytical 
Framework is discussed with regard to how external agents assisted farmers to 
participate in new markets.  
 
5.5.1 Support Availability for the Conventional Cocoa Value Chain 
Farmer 
Support available to farmers under this conventional chain was only through the 
GERNAS program. This program provided some inputs and technical training for 
rejuvenating old trees through grafting technique. This support however is not 
sufficient to address the challenges faced by Indonesian farmers, as identified in the 
literature (Panlibuton and Meyer; 2004; Badcock et al., 2007; Nielson, 2007; 
Damardjati, 2006), that is the decline of production and quality. This is also iterated 
by interviews with government officials, NGOs, certification body issuers, buyers as 
illustrated by an NGO staff: 
In general, there are two challenges faced by Indonesian cocoa farmers: 
declining production and low quality. This is because of the two factors: 
technical and non-technical factors. Technical factors refer to controlling and 
addressing pest and diseases. Non-technical aspects refer to the condition in 
which farmers are not well organised (NGO Staff 05, 07/09/2012).  
 
Responding to this challenge, the Government of Indonesia, along with the Provincial 
Governments across the country, launched a program called GERNAS (Gerakan 
Nasional Peningkatan Produksi dan Mutu Kakao - National Movement to Improve 
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Cacao Productivity and Quality) (Ditjenbun, 2011). In its implementation, this study 
revealed that impacts of GERNAS varied from one place to another, from no 
significance to significant improvement as discussed in Section 5.2.3 Economic 
Dependency on Cocoa. In some areas, the implementation of GERNAS has not 
contributed to anything meanwhile in other places, farmers who conducted grafting as 
part of the program found it has started to work, bearing some fruits from the grafting. 
Further, the program did not intend to link farmers to a new market but was mainly 
for technical assistance. 
 
Presenting this support from the Government of Indonesia, it has to be noted however 
that the program did not exclusively target farmers under the conventional cocoa 
value chain but also includes farmers under fermented and certified chains. As evident 
from this study, it demonstrates that farmers under the conventional value chain, 
despite representing the majority of farmers in the country, only received that support, 
GERNAS program. Particular support for building their organisation and other 
support was less than that received by the farmers under different chains, fermented 
and certified, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
5.5.2 Support Availability for the Fermented Cocoa Value Chain Farmer 
This study revealed that farmers were able to participate in the new market, fermented 
cocoa value chain, due to the support of the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial 
Government (SSPG). This program was one of the provincial government action 
plans as designated in the RPJMD (Mid-Term Regional Development Plan). The 
SSPG initiated this project as it was aware that cacao sector was one of the important 
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products of the region, all managed by small-scale farmers. It understands that the 
farmers face challenges to improve their livelihoods. As expressed by the officer,  
The key challenges faced by our cocoa farmers are lack of human resources 
and weak farmer organisation. Thus this condition is not able to address 
issues they have been facing such as expensive production inputs, bad farming 
practices, less control over pest and diseases and a limited access to market 
(Government Official 03, 30/07/2012). 
 
Responding to the concern, the SSPG supported farmer group formation by assisting 
farmers to set up 45 independent co-operatives in each village. This includes 
providing assistance to set Article of Incorporation/Association (AD/ART) as legal 
document to obtain status of co-operative so that the farmer or producer group can 
function as a business enterprise.   
 
Further, the SSPG supported farmers to be facilitated with a buyer, a grinder and the 
Indonesian Bank’s CSR program. The collaboration was set up in a memorandum of 
commitment between the parties. The buyer supported the farmers by providing 
training and trading equipment: scaling, moisture tester, bean counting measurement. 
The Bank of Indonesia CSR program assisted the construction of warehouse in the 
village to store beans collected from farmers before delivering to the buyer, providing 
fermenting boxes and book keeping training.  
 
In terms of addressing capital barriers, financial assistance was provided by the SSPG 
for the co-operative start up. Thus, in order to improve farmers’ income which is not 
fairly rewarded under the conventional cocoa value chain, the SSPG bridged farmers 
to a big buyer. This was confirmed by the buyer who said, 
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Our company is in partnership with Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Agency of the SSPG and LEMS Co-operative. The main aim is to improve our 
cocoa quality as required by international standards. We still face challenges 
though such as our farmers are lack of knowledge, low income and less 
knowledge on cultivation (Buyer 04, 25/7/2012). 
 
Based on the examination of the four LEMS co-operatives from which this data was 
obtained, this study found that conceptually this program was able to address the 
problems faced by cocoa farmers in the province. It encouraged farmers to produce 
high quality beans and be rewarded fairly. In doing so, it created access to farmers 
who produced high quality beans by facilitating the farmers to connect with a buyer, a 
grinder and a financial institution. As considered beneficially, farmers through LEMS 
Co-operatives participated and showed their enthusiasm to carry out fermentation in 
2011. Not only members of the co-operatives but non-members also participated in 
the program. Although the fermentation project later experienced a decline in 2012 
due to less price differentiation from conventional beans, this project illustrates the 
feasibility of organising collective marketing by the cocoa farmers in the region.  
 
Having said that, it is fair to acknowledge as well that, as a typical government 
project, the project needs to provide more programs for farmers’ capacity building. 
Along with providing tools and equipment to function as a co-operative, farmers 
require continuous capacity building until a point where they are able to 
independently run the co-operative profitably and maintain a good relationship with 
buyers or markets. To this end, however, the SSPG has its own limitations due to 
availability of its’  agricultural extension agents. 
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5.5.3 Support Availability for the Certified Cocoa Value Chain Farmer 
External support availability has been considered an equally important factor to make 
certification take off for small-scale farmers (Liu, 2009; Blackmore et al., 2012) as 
they can strengthen farmer groups and facilitate collaboration with actors along the 
chain, including international partners (Doherty and Tranchel, 2005; Smith, 2011; 
Nelson et al., 2012; Beuchelt and Zeller, 2012; Borda-Rodriquez et al., 2015). 
  
The external support available under the certified cocoa value chain of this study is 
Vredeseilanden Country Office (VECO) Indonesia. VECO Indonesia was a Belgium-
based NGO working on the issue of sustainable agriculture chain development, 
advocacy and consumer awareness. It has been working in Indonesia for 30 years.  
 
Investigating what and how the NGO approached the cocoa farmers, there were a 
number of challenges faced: behaviour and mind-set changing and treating farming as 
a business. As VECO Indonesia staff said, 
The first and foremost challenge to work with farmers is about changing the 
mind-set and behaviour of our cocoa farmers. Indonesian cocoa farmers had 
been used to working in very simple way: harvesting the cocoa fruits, dry and 
sell without necessity of taking such notes or making records of their 
activities. But as they engage with certification, farmers have to make notes 
for documentation on how many kilograms they sell their beans, at what price, 
what kind of fertilisers and chemical inputs they used, when they applied  and 
so on. This is a big challenge. Making this a habit takes time (NGO Worker 
05, 23/08/2012).  
 
This was addressed by creating a new strategy in which records from the farmers are 
used as a basis to pay their premiums. Although this is quite tricky, as farmers were 
already entitled to the premiums when his/her cocoa was sold for the premium, this 
approach worked. Farmers made notes and records over their activities. 
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A similar tone of the challenge is expressed by an NGO staff working to link farmers 
in certification:  
The problem is farmers do not have very good formal education. They are not 
familiar with computers, making documentation of their activities very 
challenging, even more in terms of communicating in Bahasa Indonesia, let 
alone English with international certification issuers and international buyers, 
which is quite impossible in the meantime. Someone has to bridge them in 
finding international buyer. Well, it is the fact that engaging with certification 
is a lot hard work. Let me give you a very simple example. When we asked 
them about previous training on how to make simple records, they replied, 
what we know is parang (machete) and hoe not pen and paper. We think it is 
easy but not for them. And to make this as a habit? Very challenging. It takes 
time and continuous mentoring (NGO Worker 06, 29/08/2012). 
 
The second challenge is convincing farmers that cocoa farming is a business. As a 
business, farming is supposed to be profitable and, in achieving this, it requires 
financial resources, business skills and other knowledge on how to improve 
productivity, as explained by the NGO staff, 
Treating farming as a business is different from treating it as a usual matter. 
This involves clear records on how much expense is spent on agricultural 
inputs, labour, other expenses and yield harvested. This also involves 
consideration of how to manage healthy farms over time. When it comes to 
certification, it even involves more effort to ensure each farm under the 
scheme is in compliance with standards. Introducing standards to each group 
requires a lot of training. Setting up an ICS team is not that challenging but 
ensuring that ICS team controls and monitors standard compliance is very 
challenging (NGO Worker 05, 23/08/2012) .     
 
At the level of co-operative board and staff, it was found that capacity of business 
management is far from easy. The other main challenge faced by the NGO is how to 
empower its partner Amanah Co-operative in business management as it requires 
particular skills and capacity to run a co-operative to be profitable and managed well.  
This task needs financial resources, training and skilful staff. 
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It is evident that empowering or mentoring farmers to participate in certification is 
behaviour and mind-set changing. It requires time and process for organising farmers, 
preparing to build a trading relationship with a trader, introducing standards and 
ensuring compliance. Investigating how long the NGO worked with the co-operative, 
it was revealed that it took 4 years, as explained: 
Setting up ICS (Internal Control System) a mechanism alone by farmer 
groups, took one year for its administration and ensuring that it was 
implemented. It took another three years until it made first trading with an 
exporter. Prior to this though, we had already worked with the farmers 2 
years for technical capacity building  (NGO Worker 05, 23/08/2012).   
 
This capacity building program requires huge financial resources. VECO Indonesia 
received its financial source from its main VECO’s headquarters and other donors for 
this project.  Having discussed the experience of VECO Indonesia working to support 
the cocoa farmers co-operative, it is found that the empowering process requires time 
and requires a lot of resources to be in place.  
 
With regard to human resources, obtaining skilful staff is challenging. Given that 
small-scale farmers mostly lack of formal education, it is quite challenging to run a 
modern business model of a co-operative. Thus, recruiting staff from a professional 
background requires financial reward, meanwhile the co-operative Amanah co-
operative is still at the stage of managing to make the collective marketing profitable. 
To address this, VECO Indonesia built a partnership through the local NGO, Wasiat. 
Partnership with Wasiat as a local NGO demonstrates an effective approach to ensure 
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knowledge transfer is in place and thus could be sustained when VECO Indonesia 
ceased its project.   
 
It is evident from this study that Amanah Co-operative was able to participate in 
certification and linked with international buyer with assistance of an NGO, VECO 
Indonesia. 
 
5.6 Potential Benefits from Certification 
5.6.1 Benefits from GERNAS Program 
As identified in earlier sections: 5.3.1 Farmers’ Organisation under the Conventional 
Cocoa Value Chain and 5.4.1 Market under the Conventional Cocoa Value Chain, 
cocoa farmers under this chain experienced challenges to improve their cocoa, 
quantity and quality, as source of main income which eventually affect their 
livelihoods. This is exacerbated by the characteristics of the market of the chain in 
which poor conditions perpetuate. In particular 5.5.1 Support Availability for 
Conventional Cocoa Value Chain Farmer revealed that only GERNAS Program 
intervened in this chain. Investigating the GERNAS program, its impact widely varied 
from one farmer to another, from no significance to some degree of improvement. 
Since this program mainly intended to improve production of cocoa, rather than 
enabling farmers to enter a new market chain, it did not give impacts on access to new 
markets, marketing knowledge, business capacity of the farmer groups or 
organisational management. Therefore, the discussion on potential benefit from a new 
market or certification is not available. 
 
 141 
5.6.2 Potential Benefits under Fermented Cocoa Value Chain 
Under this fermented cocoa value chain, the question is do farmers gain benefits? In 
terms of benefitting from higher price, the answer cannot be straightforward. As 
demonstrated by Section 5.4.2 New Market under the Fermented Cocoa Value Chain, 
in 2011 when the price difference between conventional and fermented beans ranged 
between IDR 3,000 to IDR 5,000 per kg (GBP 0,21 to 0,35), farmers considered this 
beneficial. However, in 2012 when the price difference dropped to only IDR 500 to 
IDR 1,500 (GBP 0,03 to 0,10), farmers regarded that it did not give them benefit at 
all. This discouraged farmers to ferment all their beans. The hesitation to ferment their 
beans was explained by one of farmers who fermented all his beans in 2011 but 
hesitated to do the same in 2012, 
Fermenting beans took 4 to 5 days, there is work to do mixing it twice or three 
times until the beans were really fermented. I put it in one box to another or in 
a sack. You keep doing it. If I suppose to spend time in farm, but it became less 
because I have to care about the mixing. Let alone the smell sometimes, I 
don’t bother that but the amount of effort to ferment it. We should be rewarded 
for that. If there is no price difference, why bother to do so? (Farmer 37, 
13/07/2012).  
 
This study found that it is the potential to gain benefits from a new market that is a 
driving factor to participate in the chain. Confirming this finding, the researcher 
investigated the amount of fermented beans in 2011 and 2012 with the buyer, as said: 
Our expectation is to collect 10,000 tons this year like last year. However, to 
this point, it is only 200 tons we can get from farmers. I am very sceptical that 
we can reach even 1,000 tons this year given that the harvest time has just 
passed. As I mentioned earlier, the main challenge was the price 
differentiation in the level of farmers which was almost insignificant 
(25/07/2012).  
 
The sharp decline in the amount of fermented beans collected by the buyer, by and 
large, depicts the decline in participation to the new market due to dissatisfaction over 
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the price offered to the farmers. Furthermore, as there was no premium available in 
this chain, the only financial benefit can be received by farmers was potential higher 
price. However, when price of their fermented beans were just about the same with 
conventional ones, farmers were reluctant to participate as demonstrated by the 
amount of fermented beans collected from 10,000 tons as expected to be only 200 
tons. It is evident from the finding that higher price was a main consideration when 
farmers considered whether to participate in a chain. This program to improve the 
farmers’ beans tends to fail as fermenting beans was considered to be not profitable 
compared with conventional beans. Presenting the evidence above, potential benefit 
gain is an equally important enabling factor whether farmers would like to participate 
in a new chain. 
 
Apart from ‘higher price’ benefit, it is evident that the co-operatives have better 
knowledge of market. Unlike cocoa under the conventional cocoa value chain, the 
farmers under this fermented chain have much better knowledge about what a market 
needs and how to measure quality with tools rather than using full-sun dry methods 
which could be subject to lowering the price they are supposed to receive. Through 
their co-operatives, farmers were also introduced to different buyers and able to 
negotiate contracts which eventually increased their knowledge on marketing.  
 
As much supported by the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Government, buyer and 
Indonesian Bank CSR program, the farmers under this chain received various training 
from co-operative management to improving quality of their beans.  
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5.6.3 Potential Benefits under the Certified Cocoa Value Chain 
As literature (Giovanucci and Koekoek, 2003; Jena et al., 2012; Renard, 1999; 
Tallontire, 2007; Bacon, 2005; Jaffee, 2007) identified various potential benefits from 
participating in certification, economic, social and environmental, this study reveals 
its findings on the case studied here. With regard to economic benefits, compared 
with those two earlier chains, farmers under this certification chain received higher 
price. As a board member of the co-operative said, 
Compared with others, actually we are under certification bit lucky to receive 
the highest price. It is now IDR 22,850 (GBP 1,61). But a month ago it 
reached IDR 24,000 (GBP 1,70). We sold our certified beans using bean 
count. We all passed it well (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012).  
 
The highest price for the certified beans confirmed by other certified buyer saying that 
“The highest certified beans is IDR 24,000 (GBP 1,70) per kg (Buyer 13, 
08/08/2012). Having said that, a particular phenomenon appeared. In the place where 
the certification exists, there was price competition in which the price for certified and 
conventional beans were neck and neck. Even the local buyer, in order to secure their 
supply, often set an IDR1,000 (GBP0,07) higher than the certified price in that 
particular place. This competition to secure a supply of beans created higher price for 
beans, either conventional or certified, compared to places where certification did not 
exist. The higher price due to the competition in the district was not exclusively 
enjoyed by only certified farmers, however. Conventional farmers also positively 
enjoyed the price competition as their beans were rewarded better. Despite that 
condition, certified farmers interviewed kept selling their beans to the certified buyer, 
in this case Armajaro, as a farmer said, 
Even when the ordinary beans price is higher  IDR1,000 (GBP0,07) than our 
beans, but we opt to sell to Armajaro as we have commitment to work 
together. But if the difference is more than IDR 1,000 (GBP0,07), God forbids, 
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we will sell to the higher offered. Well, it’s fair to admit that also sometimes 
Armajaro’s price is also higher, IDR 500 to 1,000 (GBP 0,04 to 0,07) or more 
(Farmer 51, 10/09/2012).  
 
Due to price competition, it resulted in no significant difference between certified and 
conventional beans. A certified farmer asked,  
“If there is no price difference, what’s the point of being certified? A lot of 
work to be eligible to be certified” (Farmer 52, 10/09/2012).  
 
It is evident that farmers under this chain, like other farmers in other chains, were 
price sensitive. Price difference even to only IDR 500 to 1,000 (GBP 0,04 to 0,07) 
becomes one of the considerations on where to sell their beans. Even if when 
regionally, per Sulawesi Island, the certified farmers earned higher price for their 
beans, when they compared it with their peer farmers in the same village or district, 
they still questioned why the reward they received was just about the same with their 
peer farmers under the conventional cocoa chain who did not do the extra work.   
  
Apart from ‘higher price’ as benefit received under this chain, the only irrefutable 
financial benefit gained from participating in the certification is premiums. Premiums 
were rewarded IDR 1,200 (GBP 0,08) for every 1 kg certified beans. As the buyer 
was a certification-holder, a part of this premium, IDR 500 (GBP 0,03) went to the 
buyer and the rest, IDR 700 (GBP 0,05), went to Amanah Co-operative. The member 
of the board explained that, 
Last year we supplied 1,300 tons certified beans. We received our premium 
part, IDR 700 (GBP 0,05) per kg  amounting to total IDR 910,000,000 (GBP 
64,325). From the IDR 700 (GBP 0,05) per kg premium, we split into two: 
IDR 500 (GBP 0,035) went directly to farmers and IDR 200 (GBP 0,01) went 
to the co-operative as source of its income. So in total, IDR 650,000,000 
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(GBP, 45,946) goes directly to farmers and the rest, IDR 260,000,000 (GBP 
18,378) goes to our co-operative (Farmer 45, 07/09/2012). 
 
With regard to the premiums, UTZ sets in its standards:  
 
 The payment of premium is mandatory, but the amount depends on the 
negotiation between the buyer and the producer group (UTZ Guidance 
Document, accessed December 2016). 
 
Although the direct premium received by individual farmers was quite small, around 
IDR 600,00 (GBP 42) if a farmer sell 1,2 tons certified beans in a year, the certified 
farmers were encouraged to participate as this still gave them added value. Thus, a 
perception was built that the more they have yields, the more premiums they would 
earn. Apart from the economic benefit, there was an expectation that participating in 
the certification would give them more benefits in the future, as a farmer said: 
It’s good. Not so much but that money is something to us. If we keep 
harvesting better, we will receive the premium better as well. Thus, we might 
get other benefits in the future (Farmer 52, 10/09/2012). 
 
It is evident that participating in this certification, acting as a group, farmers have 
access to new market, a certified exporter, bypassing intermediary. The participation 
in certification has also increased farmers’ knowledge about the market, products 
required and marketing. With the experience of carrying out collective marketing, 
Amanah Co-operative has increased its capacity for organisational management, 
audits and compliance with standard by earning status of certified.   
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the findings on four enabling condition variables for 
certification uptake in Indonesia as the basis for answering the main research question 
of this thesis: Why has certification within cocoa sector in Indonesia not taken off? 
By presenting three different cocoa value chains, conventional, fermented and 
certified, this study examines what present and absent variables there are in each 
chain.   
 
It is evident that participating in certification requires a strong group or organisation 
to function as a socioeconomic agent.  The case of cocoa farmers of Amanah Co-
operative, and LEMS Co-operative as well, illustrate that when farmers act as a group 
they are able to engage with a certified buyer and benefit from economies of scales. 
Compared with LEMS Co-operative whose members ranged from 100 to 400 persons, 
Amanah Co-operative had around 1,600 members which enable the Co-operative to 
produce viable volumes to trade with an exporter. Participation in a new market, and 
certification scheme particularly, provided more opportunities to Amanah Co-
operative to build its capacity as a developmental organisation and business 
enterprise. 
 
From the three different cocoa value chains studied, it is seen that new markets under 
chains of fermented and certified enabled cocoa farmers to cut intermediaries and 
produce high quality beans, and were rewarded better than under conventional cocoa 
value chain. The farmers under the two chains, fermented and certified, have better 
understanding of the market, product quality and capability to negotiate price and 
contract.  
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Evidence from this study shows that availability of external support is pivotal to 
encourage cocoa farmers, who are limited on resources and capacity, to engage with 
new markets. LEMS Co-operative was supported by the Southeast Sulawesi 
Provincial Government and Amanah Co-operative received various support from 
NGOs to enable those co-operatives to access new markets. In the case of Amanah 
Co-operative, it took four years to prepare the co-operative to participate in the 
certification.  
 
Participating in new markets, with extra work to enter the markets, is expected to gain 
benefit. Both members of those co-operatives enjoyed ‘higher price’ on their products 
than their peer farmers under conventional chain. However, whenever ‘higher price’ 
is not significant, farmers’ participation decreases as illustrated by LEMS Co-
operative. All farmers in the chains are price sensitive and financial gain is the most 
significant driving factor whether to participate in a new market. Of the economic 
benefit, premiums become irrefutable benefits to be gained by certified farmers which 
can be an additional source of income for farmers and their co-operative. Participating 
in new markets gives opportunities to farmers to increase their knowledge of markets, 
organisational capacity and farm production. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WHY HAS CERTIFICATION WITHIN COCOA SECTOR 
IN INDONESIA NOT TAKEN OFF?  
 
6.1 Introduction  
Having presented the findings of this study in the previous chapter, Chapter 6 answers 
the main research question, ‘why has certification not taken off within cocoa sector in 
Indonesia’, by bringing together the evidence to identify the main reasons for the lack of 
certification in cocoa sector in Indonesia framed within the Enabling Conditions 
Analytical Framework.  
 
6.2 Farmers being Organised 
The main purpose of this question is to understand the feasibility of forming groups, 
identify what the enabling or impeding factors are and further look at the experience of 
some co-operatives in terms of how they were set up and run. This question is broken 
down into three sub-questions that are: 
1. What is the history and feasibility of forming groups or co-operatives in 
Indonesia particularly in the cocoa sector? 
2. What is government policy towards farmer organisation and co-operatives to 
enable or to impede the feasibility of forming groups? 
3. Apart from the policy factor, what other factors impede or enable 
cooperation? 
 
It is evident that forming a group among small-scale farmers, including cocoa farmers, 
in this study is feasible. This is demonstrated by the existence of various farmer groups 
at village level as discussed in Section 5.3 Farmers being Organised. The formation of 
groups, however, is mainly for implementation of projects, either projects from 
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government or from NGOs. When it comes to the functioning of farmer groups, in the 
form of a co-operative as an economic unit, however, farmer co-operatives face 
enormous challenges in terms of organising large numbers of members to have the 
product commercially viable. Evidence from Amanah Co-operative demonstrates that it 
has to organise thousands of members in order to collect significant bulk to trade. 
Amanah Co-operative in order to collect 1,300 metric tons had to organise around 1,600 
farmers from 124 smaller farmer groups. This means that each individual farmer on 
average had to collect or sell around 812 kg. The number is important to benefit from 
economies of scale. A trader is willing to trade with the co-operative when it is 
commercially feasible. 
 
Evidence from this study further found that forming and running farmer co-operatives is 
even more challenging. The study found that the co-operative business model has 
fundamental differences in principles, compared to individually-owned businesses. This 
has implications in terms of profit ownership gained from the business. The profit from 
an individually-owned business model is completely different from the co-operatives. 
Profits from an individually-owned business as source of income of the individuals can 
be used freely by the individuals but profits from a co-operative have to be allocated for 
the interest of the co-operative. The board of a co-operative would only be paid 
officially when the co-operative is really profitable as stated in most co-operatives’ 
Article of Incorporation. This is demonstrated by the evidence that both co-operatives 
studied mostly run on voluntary basis as they cannot book significant profits to pay all 
staff working for the co-operatives. 
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In the start-up period, the question would be how key members of staff could be 
expected to spend their full time in the whole process of setting up and running a co-
operative without earning a decent income. Further, expecting a co-operative in the 
start-up period to pay the key staff is hard to be realised as most farmers have limitation 
on getting investment and generate capital fund. Unless, the co-operative has sufficient 
capital fund as an investment to hire professional staff, that would be possible. A co-
operative among small-scale farmers differs from a private enterprise or an individually-
owned business which has more sufficient investment to pay staff and any start-up 
period cost. As most farmers’ co-operatives lacks funds, particularly in the start-up 
period, the only way to pay for staff is either by receiving external support or making 
the co-operative profitable. 
 
Making a co-operative profitable, as demonstrated by the evidence in this study, takes 
time and it is a trial and error process. The case of Amanah Co-operative took around 4 
consecutive years to be able to start a trading partnership with Armajaro and then earn 
income from premiums. Given this finding, the consequence of this difference alone 
between co-operatives and individually-own business models means that different 
approaches of managing a co-operative as a business unit are needed.  
 
Looking at the process of setting up and running a co-operative, if the key staff do not 
earn income from the co-operative, the subsequent question is for how long the key staff 
of a co-operative would keep voluntarily managing the co-operative while at the same 
time they have to earn money, as many of the staff  have families to support. This study 
found that, therefore, the support of NGOs is important. Key staff of a co-operative can 
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earn income from NGO projects, being hired as field staff, for example, as illustrated by 
the case of Amanah co-operative.  
 
Evidence from LEMS Co-operatives exemplified a consequence in the absence of 
external support supporting key individuals’ income. A chairperson of one of the LEMS 
co-operative, at the time data was collected, became a private contractor for a project to 
earn an income as the co-operative could not pay him despite spending his time for 
almost a year to lead the co-operative. Due to this absence of earning income from the 
co-operative, therefore, his time spent in running the LEMS co-operative was not 
maximal. The other board members of the LEMS co-operative became intermediaries to 
earn an income by trading beans of their members on behalf of co-operative. They 
bought beans from the co-operative members, sold them to a big buyer with higher price 
as individuals and earned the profits as their incomes.  
 
The inability of co-operatives to support their key staff is one of the most challenging 
factors in setting up and running a co-operative, particularly at the early stages. This 
condition has encouraged key staff to become intermediaries themselves but using the 
co-operative name. They profit on behalf of the co-operative. This is revealed by a staff 
of a certification body issuer,  
Theoretically, the co-operative should be a means to empower farmers as it 
deals with farmer organisation, resources allocation, transparency, 
accountability and so on. However, in reality, this is really challenging. Our 
people (Indonesian farmers), when it comes to money matter, the “I” is stronger 
than “we”. And as the certification was initiated by trader, all depends on the 
trader and the local buyers. They often exploit the co-operatives names to gain 
benefits.  As the market required the certification, they just make up the “co-
operatives” on behalf of the farmers (Certification body issuer 01, 15/06/2012). 
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Despite this more general comment on co-operatives and its relation to certification, the 
question of how co-operative key staff earned income while building a co-operative is 
important. This is partly because the case of this study, Amanah Co-operative, revealed 
a strategy of “co-hiring” in which the NGO paid the key staff partially while being hired 
both by the NGO and the co-operative. The next question is how do other co-operatives 
without NGO assistance and the “co-hiring” strategy work? Probing this question, an 
interview with a certified buyer staff under another certification scheme, not the case of 
this study, affirmed this finding, said: 
Actually the purchase from the co-operative in real terms does not meet the 
standards as our farmers are not yet capable of running a co-operative. The co-
operative is only a name of the other form of local intermediaries business form. 
The local intermediaries, due to the need from certification to form a group or 
co-operative, they just take the names and data of farmers they used to buy their 
beans and put it in a co-operative form (Buyer 15, 08/09/2012). 
 
This finding gives two implications. First of all, external support in supporting co-
operative operation particularly in the start-up period is essential as this period requires 
investment for staffing and other operational expenses. Secondly, in order to ensure a 
co-operative functions as an agent for empowerment and a business enterprise or a ‘real 
co-operative’, external support is needed to guide the co-operative and ensure 
participation of its members in controlling the running of the co-operative as 
demonstrated by the Amanah Co-operative.  
 
Although theoretically farmer groups or co-operatives under a certification network 
could function as a means for farmer empowerment and thus bring real benefits to 
farmers, the evidence revealed that it required huge efforts to achieve this. These 
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findings affirm that unless a co-operative is supported by an NGO or Government, the 
co-operative would become another type of intermediaries business unit.  
 
With regard to financial barrier, as identified in the literature (Santacoloma, 2007; 
Blackmore et al., 2012), a finding from LEMS co-operative, which is absent in Amanah 
Co-operative, revealed that addressing capital barrier is feasible by pooling fund 
resources from members. The experience of LEMS co-operative to set IDR1,000,000 
(BGP 70,68) membership fee to join the co-operative demonstrates that maximising 
potential financial resources from members is possible. LEMS co-operative members 
were able to do this by putting aside a particular amount of their beans, around 2 bags, 
as a payment for the fee membership.  
 
With regard to the policies toward co-operatives, the Government of Indonesia 
encourages the farmers to be organised by assisting them with various support such as 
providing tools of trade, and financial support as well as in the case of LEMS co-
operative. However, when it comes to empowerment in terms of building a strong and 
profitable co-operative, it takes more effort than simply providing free equipment or any 
in-kind support.  
 
In sum, organising farmers into groups is feasible but when it comes to function the 
groups as co-operatives is found challenging. LEMS and Amanah Co-operative 
experience illustrate various challenges as identified in the literature in terms of 
building organisational capacity, business capacity, technical know how and financial 
barriers. To some extent, the two co-operatives managed to address those challenges 
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and thus function as co-operatives: as an empowerment agent and in more particular as 
a business enterprise.  
 
6.3 Strong Links to New Markets 
This section draws on the findings on value chains in relation to the roles of buyers in 
encouraging farmer participation in the certified global value chain. The question is 
detailed by: 
1. What are the links between individual farmers and groups with different chain 
actors or players in the market? 
2. What are the challenges experienced by farmers in reaching new markets? 
3. Do the traders have a particular role in encouraging farmers to participate in 
certification? 
 
As evidence from this study, there are various cocoa value chains in Indonesia: 
conventional, fermented and certified cocoa value chains. It was found that 
conventional cocoa value chain has a lengthier chain than the other two chains. The 
implication of the long chain is that farmers earn a lower price for their cocoa compared 
with those two chains. In this conventional cocoa chain, intermediaries play a 
significant role in determining the price earned by the farmers. In other words, 
intermediaries contribute to the deduction of the price received by cocoa farmers. The 
majority of cocoa farmers in the places where this data obtain fall in this chain.  
 
Meanwhile, the other two cocoa value chains, fermented and certified chains, have the 
shortest chain as farmers act as groups and directly trade their beans with main buyers 
or exporters. In other words, there are no intermediaries in the chains. Those farmers 
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participating in these chains are better off than the conventional cocoa farmers in terms 
of price they earn.  
 
With regard to reaching new markets, fermented or certified, the main barrier is to set 
up and run a strong and profitable farmer group or co-operative. Acting as a group 
through collective marketing gives greater benefits than compared to individual farmers. 
Evidence from Amanah Co-operatives to reach a new market, the certified market, 
revealed that its ability for collective marketing is able to build a partnership with an 
exporter as the trader’s role is important to reach the market as well. It is even a 
decisive factor to link farmers to a certified market. Buyers, at the early stage, can share 
responsibility in terms of financing certification and all associated costs as small-scale 
farmers face limited financial resources. Further, sharing responsibility is also a process 
of building links and trust between farmers and buyers.  
 
The role of buyers in supporting farmers, however, has its limitations as well. It cannot 
replace the role of an NGO. First and foremost, the nature of handling a business was 
admittedly not quite the same when strengthening a co-operative. Working with farmers 
cannot be always merely a profit calculation activity. This is evidenced from one 
certification network, not the case of Amanah Co-operative. The absence of an NGO 
role is illustrated by a trader experience trying to organise a thousand farmers. The 
company hired 19 staff as an ICS team to organise 1,100 farmers. The interview with a 
manager of the company revealed that the firm was confronted with enormous 
difficulties in trying to organise the farmers, such as: organisational preparation, getting 
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the right system in place, introducing standards and compliance. As a consequence, they 
found it impossible to reach a target of collecting 500 tons of beans from the farmers. 
Eventually, the company turned to intermediaries, who registered themselves as farmer 
groups, to meet the expected amount of beans supply. Even so, it failed to reach its 
target to source certified beans by the time this data was collected.  
 
Given the limitation of a buyer role to organise farmers and put the system in place, 
therefore, the role of NGOs or Government, as discussed in the next section, becomes 
pivotal. Further, NGO is able to ensure a co-operative as a real co-operative owned by 
members rather than another form of intermediaries business. This gives a strong 
implication that the presence of NGO is crucial in organising farmers and assits them 
build their co-operative. 
 
Findings from this study show that it is evident that in order to have a strong link to a 
new market, farmers have to work with buyers. The buyer could provide information 
about what product is required by the market, training and, in case of Amanah Co-
operative, pre-finance the certification costs. Through this partnership building, farmers 
are able to negotiate with the buyer and get assistance for their produce market. It is also 
evident that cutting middleman or intermediarries bring benefits to farmers as their 
produce are relatively better rewarded than their peer farmers under the conventional 
cocoa value chain. 
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6.4 External Support Availability 
External support plays a pivotal role in encouraging farmers to participate in certified 
value chains. The question concerned with this topic is broken down into: 
1. Are there any NGOs, what kinds of NGOs and projects, working within the 
cocoa sector, which support farmers to be linked with new markets? 
2. How do the NGOs, if available, link farmers to certification? 
3. What kind of support has been provided by different levels of government? 
4. What agricultural extension support is available and how far does it support 
efforts that might enable farmers to engage with certification schemes? 
 
Examining the Indonesian cocoa sector and implementation of certification in 
Indonesia, it was evident that developmental NGOs working on linking farmers to a 
certified market were limited if not scarce. The importance of developmental NGOs 
existence is important for several reasons. Developmental NGOs have the capacity and 
attitude to be able to work with peasant farmers and can ensure a fair relationship 
between farmers and traders is in place. Further, NGOs have a wide network with other 
stakeholders and could become a catalyst to reach farmers. As illustrated by Amanah 
Co-operative case in this study, NGOs could fill the gap in terms of financial barriers in 
setting up and strengthening farmer organisation, entering certification schemes and 
building capacity of farmers to be equipped both as a developmental agent and a 
business enterprise. As mentioned earlier that buyers have limitations in assisting 
farmers for building strong groups or co-operatives, the role of NGOs or Government, 
therefore, is pivotal. In terms of setting up and running farmer organisations, for 
example, the NGO role is fundamental. Evidence from Amanah Co-operative case and 
to some extent LEMS Co-operatives provide examples of crucial importance of external 
support.  
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The approach to do so however should involve local partners as exemplified by VECO 
Indonesia in building a partnership with the local NGO, Wasiat. In this partnership, on 
one hand, VECO Indonesia was assisted by the labour of the hired Wasiat’s staff and on 
the other hand this gave opportunity for knowledge and skills transfer from VECO 
Indonesia to Wasiat staff. Hired Wasiat key staff had opportunity to build their co-
operative as well as be part of the project. The key staff do not need to be intermediaries 
to profit from the co-operative members as a source of their individual incomes but 
rather spent their full time in building the co-operative, aiming to make the co-operative 
earn income.  
 
Reflecting on the approach to engage with certification, further, it is found that the 
approach of opting to be under a buyer’s scheme rather than being a certification holder 
could be a safer choice and farmers are not so much exposed to potential financial loss. 
At least, this is potentially working particularly in the first year of being certified. This 
is partly because of the fact that being certified does not guarantee sales. The other 
reason is that being certified is very costly and without booking sales under 
certification, better price and premiums could not be earned and thus the investment 
during the process could be risky. Under this approach, the co-operative did not have to 
pay all the costs associated with certification as they were partially paid by the buyer, 
albeit premiums received later was split into two: half for trader and the other half went 
to co-operative. At this early stage in engaging with certification, the approach was 
found to be working for this case.  
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The argument for asserting that farmers should be a part of buyer certification on early 
stage, rather than directly being a certification owner, is exemplified by one case of a 
certified farmer co-operative of another commodity, cashew nut. The NGO working 
with cashew nut farmers has managed to obtain a certification. However, as being 
certified does not guarantee sales, finding and making a deal with a certified buyer 
under the same scheme is another altogether challenge. As the NGO staff said: 
Our farmer co-operative has managed to be obtain a certification in 2006. To 
this day, we managed one sale from a certified buyer. We sent the products to 
Bali. However, it did not run well partly because managing transportation from 
the remote village, you’ll see later as we are going to visit them, is one problem. 
But we managed to do so. But the problem did not stop there, when the cashew-
nut arrived in Bali, the product mostly rejected as the buyer said the quality 
specification didn’t meet. It was very frustrating and a lot money gone (NGO 
worker, (NGO Worker 06, 25/08/2012).  
 
It is evident that NGOs’ approach whether a farmer co-operative should opt to be 
directly a certification owner or being under a buyer’s certification, in the first year at 
least, can contribute to risk reduction investment strategy. Being a part or under a buyer 
certification scheme can minimise the risk and at the same time ensure sales with the 
buyer.  
 
The importance of being certified and booking a sale from a certified buyer is affirmed 
by a certifier staff:  
When farmers asked me how to apply for this certification, my reply to them is 
by asking a question, have you got any certified buyer? If their answer not yet, I 
suggest them to find it first. I know this way is not always being liked by my 
colleague. But judging from my experience, for many years now, it is so risky to 
encourage farmers to apply for a certification and do not find any buyer yet. 
What happened in the past is after a year not sales under certification, they 
complained spending much money and thus decertified. There are many cases 
like that (Certification body issuer 01, 15/06/2012). 
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.  
 
Having emphasised the pivotal role of NGOs and government in linking farmers to the 
certification network, it is also important to note that the existence of international 
NGOs has a potential drawback as most NGO projects are time-bound, too short to 
achieve their goals. Further, NGO assistance can  also create excessive dependency of 
farmers on them. This echoes what Nelson et al. (2012) advocate,  that NGOs should 
provide long-term projects but avoid creating dependency at the same time.   
 
As most NGO programs are time bound, this gives two implications when it comes to 
encouraging farmer participation in certified networks. First of all, if an NGO could 
secure only a one-year project, the support could be halted half-way along the intensive 
process. The experience of the NGOs in this study suggests that working with farmers 
to reach a certain level of sustained co-operative took at the very least 4 consecutive 
years as illustrated by case of Amanah Co-operative. Another NGO that also worked to 
support farmers to obtain another certification even took longer, more than 6 years.  It 
started to create unhealthy support as expressed by the manger of the NGO,  
We have been working here more than 6 years. It’s funny sometimes that the 
farmers still think that our work with them is an NGO program, it’s our interest 
rather than for themselves. They think it’s always a trial and error. 
Unfortunately, here there are a lot programs which are basically trial and error 
projects to be fair and we received the same perception (NGO Worker 06, 
25/08/2012).  
 
The case of VECO Indonesia and Wasiat partnership illustrated an interesting approach. 
When NGOs have non-local staff, when project ceased, they would either leave their 
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field posts or find another job. This would be different if a partnership with a local NGO 
was in place. The knowledge transfer could be carried out and stay as local NGO staff 
would remain in the area even when the partnership ended. Working with local NGOs 
would also enhance the capacity of the locals and could be used as a medium for scaling 
up.  
 
With regard to NGOs role in linking farmers to certification, evidence from this study 
revealed this is crucial. VECO Indonesia has a strategy to encourage farmers to be part 
of the buyer’s scheme as farmers do not bear the costs of certification as the certificate 
is held by the buyer.  
 
VECO Indonesia is aware that obtaining a certification is not a guarantee to have sales. 
This is in line with Blackmore et al.’s (2012) assertion that being certified does not 
guarantee sales.  Therefore, in spite of not being a certification holder at an early stage, 
Amanah Co-operative minimised financial risks and moreover managed to book sales 
under the buyer’s certification network. From this evidence, a working approach to 
engage with certification is fundamental particularly at the early stage of setting up and 
strengthening farmers’ co-operatives. Therefore, NGOs and Government role can be 
pivotal in encouraging participation into a network applying working approaches.  
 
6.5 Potential impact to address cocoa farmer challenges 
The question of potential benefits from participation is also a key issue in examining 
small-scale farmers’ participation. This question is broken down into:  
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1. What are the main challenges faced by Indonesian cocoa farmers? 
2. How are those challenges being addressed?  
3. How are these challenges linked to potential engagement with certification 
schemes? 
4. Could the new market under certification benefit farmers? 
 
Evidence from this study revealed that Indonesian cocoa farmers face enormous 
challenges in terms of quality, productivity and other non-technical factors. The 
intervention of the Government of Indonesia through GERNAS and the Southeast 
Sulawesi Provincial Government to some extent touch the fundamental issues, albeit 
they cannot address them comprehensively. Although there is no data on GERNAS 
implementation, the findings of this study revealed that farmers’ perceptions of 
GERNAS impacts are mixed: from being satisfied to not being satisfied. The GERNAS 
intervention is perceived as a token of the Government of Indonesia concern for cocoa 
farmers. In addition, creating policies by introducing National Standards for Cocoa is 
also found to be a step to encourage farmers to produce good quality beans. In its 
implementation, however, it is still a main issue as local collectors or intermediaries at 
the village level still use the drying-day standard, i.e. how many days beans are dried.  
 
Evidence on participation of farmers in certification, to some extent, gives an 
opportunity to address some issues faced by Indonesian cocoa farmers. As revealed by 
the case of Amanah Co-operative, farmers can be organised. They are able to carry out 
collective marketing and no longer use intermediaries. The price of their products is 
competitive and higher than the place where certification does not exist. Having said 
that, the question remains on the level of satisfaction of the benefits received from 
participating in certification. A question raised among certified farmers in one of the 
FGDs, was  
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“If the price we earned as certified farmers was not different from price earned 
by our peer non-certified farmers, what is the point of joining the certification? 
(Certified farmer, 08/11/2012)”  
 
This question is quite bold but has a point. The price of certified beans and conventional 
beans are not very much different. It is found that certifications have their own 
limitation when it comes to price as price is based on the market. As for cocoa, the price 
was determined by NYSE or London and so the price fluctuates. Having said that, it is 
fair to acknowledge that the price competition took place where certification exists. In 
other words, certified farmers earned better than the conventional farmers in other 
places. But when prices are compared between certified bean and non-certified bean at 
the local village, where certified farmers and non-certified farmers reside, the 
differences are not significant.  
 
The only strong and irrefutable benefit from certification is the premiums. The finding 
of this study, although premium is still debatable in terms of how it effectively 
contributes to improving individual farmers’ livelihoods, at the very least it gives an 
additional income to farmers and somehow encouraged them to produce more yield as 
the more yields, the more premiums they would receive. In case of Amanah Co-
operative, the premium became its main source of income which is quite significant 
compared with other average co-operative in Indonesia.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to answer the main research question, bringing together the 
evidence presented in Chapter 5 to identify the main challenges to the take-up of 
certification. It was found that participation in certified value chains was hampered by 
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the fact that Indonesian small-scale cocoa farmers lack resources to organise themselves 
into strong farmer groups or co-operatives. Running co-operative and in more particular 
when the co-operative intends to engage with certification, it requires strong 
organisational capacity, business skills, technical know how and financial resource. 
Given the limited resources of small-scale farmers, these challenges have hampered the 
farmers to run a co-operative and thus participate in certification. This coincided with a 
lack of external support from NGOs and government in the country to link farmers to 
the certified market chains. The case of LEMS Co-operative and Amanah Co-operative 
illustrate the possibility of running co-operatives with support from the NGO and the 
Southeast Sulawesi Province Government and thus managed to engage with new 
markets.  
 
Further, given the particular conditions attached to the cocoa commodity sector in the 
country particularly under the conventional cocoa value chain, farmers’s produce was 
poorly rewarded. The price of their beans has been low as as there were many 
intermediaries along the chain. Participating in certification, as the case of certified 
farmers of Amanah co-operative members, has not given  tangible benefits in terms of 
higher price benefit over their certified produce. Certification existance in the area 
however has created price competition between conventional and certified beans price 
which all enjoyed both by conventional and certified farmers. The only tangible and 
measured financial benefit received by participating from certification is premiums 
which exclusively rewarded to certified farmers, albeit the amount is relatively small. 
Certifications were not quite able to attract farmers to participate in the scheme. Higher 
price and better premiums offered by certification schemes have potential to attract 
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farmers to participate in certification. However, whenever it is not the case, 
participating in certification will be less attractive.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND RESEARCH 
FINDINGS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis examined enabling conditions for, and barriers to, the proliferation or 
adoption of PV-SCL in the Indonesian cocoa sector. Applying a case study approach, 
and framed within an Enabling Conditions Analytical Framework, this study sought 
to answer an important topic which has hitherto not been adequately investigated: 
why have certifications not taken off in the Indonesian cocoa small-scale farmers 
sector? To answer this research question, this study reviewed relevant literature on 
PV-SCL. An analytical framework emerged from literature which informed the 
formulation of the research question and sub-questions. Three value chains along with 
the actors in the chains were selected as cases for this study: Conventional Cocoa 
Value Chain (Unorganised farmers), Fermented cocoa value chain (LEMS Co-
operative) and Certified Cocoa Value Chain (Amanah Co-operative). This study 
includes traders as important chain actors and thus were participants in this study. 
External actors such as certification body issuers, NGOs, government, research 
institution, associations were also selected as participants for this study.  
 
This chapter presents the concluding chapter. As findings were discussed in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6 answered the research questions, this Chapter 7 concludes the study. It 
reflects on the literature discussed in Chapter 2, particularly concerning the enabling 
conditions. This chapter also reflects on how far the researcher is able to answer the 
research questions in terms of the methodology deployed in this study, contribution to 
the body of PV-SCL literature and identification of areas for further research. The 
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chapter is structured as follows: restatement of the research problem, summary of the 
findings, contribution to body of knowledge and theory, methodological implications, 
limitations of the study and areas for further research.  
 
7.2 Restatement of the Research Question 
The growing PV-SCL proliferation in the global agricultural sector has been rising 
which is indicated by the growing participation of the private sector and small-scale 
farmers in PV-SCL. The rise is also indicated by the growing market for the certified 
products (Potts et al., 2010). The rise of the PV-SCL, however, has been uneven, 
concentrated among a small number of countries and for particular products. In terms 
of geographical reach, South America and Africa are dominant regions where PV-
SCL is growing. Asia, and particularly Indonesian cocoa sector, demonstrates the 
uneven reach of the PV-SCL (Hutchen, 2011). Compared with the other two major 
cocoa producing countries, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, adoption of PV-SCL by the 
Indonesian small-scale farmers is the lowest despite Indonesia being the third major 
cocoa producer globally and the largest in Asia. Further, there is no single co-
operative of cocoa farmers in the country able to be a certification holder by the time 
of this study embarked. This circumstance is even more intriguing given certification 
in the country is not new as the coffee and forestry sectors have already seen the 
proliferation of certifications.  
 
Many studies have examined the rise of PV-SCL, its growing market, impacts and its 
influence on shaping global commodity and agro-food industry. However, when it 
comes to producers’ participation, less is known about why and how producers 
participate in the PV-SCL and what factors enable participation in the certifications 
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given the limitation of resources of small-scale farmers. Further, studies concerning 
Indonesian small-scale farmer participation, particularly cocoa farmers, in PV-SCL 
are very few if not rare. Given this perceived limitation of literature on PV-SCL 
adoption, this study proposes a research question with the expectation that it can 
contribute towards filling the gap in the literature of PV-SCL. The main research 
question is: Why has certification not taken off in Indonesian cocoa small-scale 
sector? This question is broken down into four main sub-questions: What factors 
enable co-operation set up, what are the chains of the market, what is the level of 
support availability and, finally, what are the main challenges of the cocoa farmers?  
A. Farmers being organized: 
1. What is the history and feasibility of forming group or co-operative in 
Indonesia particularly in cocoa sector? 
2. What is government policy towards farmer organisation and co-operatives to 
enable or to impede the feasibility of forming groups? 
3. Apart from the policy factor, what other factors impede or enable cooperation? 
B. Strong links to markets 
1. What are the links between individual farmers and groups with different chain 
actors or players in the market? 
2. What are the challenges experienced by farmers in reaching new markets? 
3. Do the traders have a particular role to encourage farmers to participate in 
certification? 
C. External support availability 
1. Are there any NGOs, what kinds of NGOs and projects, working within the 
cocoa sector and support farmers to be linked with new markets? 
2. How do the NGOs, if available, link farmers to certification? 
3. What kind of support has been provided by different levels of government? 
4. What agricultural extension support is available and how far does it support 
efforts that might enable farmers to engage with certification schemes? 
D. Potential impact to address cocoa farmer challenges 
1. What are the main challenges faced by Indonesian cocoa farmers? 
2. How are those challenges being addressed?  
3. How are these challenges linked to potential engagement with certification 
schemes? 
4. Could the new market under certification benefit farmers?   
 
 
 169 
7.3 Summary of the Findings 
The enabling conditions analytical framework emerged from a critical review of 
literature on the experience of agro-certification. The framework identifies four 
interdependent variables that enable small-scale farmers to participate in certification 
schemes. Reflecting on this framework, a summary of the findings are presented. This 
section also reflects on the theoretical accounts of PV-SCL literature.  
 
The first of the interdependent variables of the enabling conditions framework is the 
feasibility of forming groups among farmers. Literature emphasises the importance of 
building farmers’ capacity to set up and run a farmer organisation (Vasques-Leon, 
2010; Lyon, 2011; Milford, 2004). In consonance with this, evidence from this study 
revealed that it is feasible to form farmer groups. This is indicated by the existence of 
various groups at village level. These groups were set up either by government 
initiation or NGOs for implementing particular projects. However, this particular 
group formation is not sufficient to function as an economic agent partly because the 
groups are mostly project-based. This means that after a project ends, the groups are 
generally inactive and dissolve themselves. The other reason behind this is that the 
groups cannot function as business units. Legally it is required to have legal form, in a 
co-operative form, to carry out, for example, collective marketing. Therefore, forming 
groups in the literature should be translated into forming co-operatives in the 
Indonesian context.  
 
Forming and running a farmer co-operative, as this study found, however, is a 
challenge particularly when it comes to operating a co-operative as an economic 
enterprise. The cases of two co-operatives studied, LEMS, Amanah Co-operatives 
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illustrate challenges confronted by the small-scale farmers in running co-operatives. 
The most significant challenge is to make the co-operative profitable as a business 
agent. The importance of making the co-operatives profitable is critical. This has a 
number of dimensions: the ability to cover day-to-day operational costs, expand 
services to members and pay expenses for participation into certification as 
participation is costly. Therefore, dependency on other actors of a chain, buyers or 
traders, is pivotal.  
 
The second variable of the analytical framework is a strong link to market. Literature 
(Taylor, 2003; Liu, 2009; Smith, 2011; Nelson et al., 2012; Blackmore et al., 2012; 
emphasises the importance of buyers’ role in facilitating farmers’ products to enter 
into certified markets. This study revealed that traders’ roles in enabling farmers to 
participate depends on the type of certification adopted. Literature on Fairtrade 
discusses the need to obtain a certification by farmers’ organisations as a requirement 
to participate into the network. All actors in Fairtrade network including buyers, 
grinders and manufacturers, are also required to obtain separate certifications. At 
farmer level this means that both co-operative and trader have to obtain separate 
certifications.  
 
Meanwhile, different approaches by Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified allow 
farmers to not necessarily obtain a certification but be part of a buyers’ certification 
scheme as illustrated by the case of Amanah Co-operative. This circumstance also 
explains why only traders obtaining either Rainforest Alliance and UTZ certifications 
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operate in the Indonesian cocoa sector. The traders introduce and encourage farmers 
to participate in certification. Given this circumstance, traders’ role is very crucial.  
 
The implication of a co-operative and trader being under the same certification 
scheme is that a co-operative does not have to find a buyer or market their product as 
the existing buyer is already in place. This is supposed to mean that it enables more 
farmers to participate easier. As evident of this study, Amanah Co-operative has 
secured its own buyer by building a partnership with the buyer. 
 
The third variable of the framework is the external support availability. The two 
actors of a chain, farmer organisation and traders, as mentioned earlier, despite having 
interdependent needs, are different in terms of orientation or motives and limitations. 
Buyers or traders as business institutions place priority on a profit margin but they 
face limitations in how to empower farmer organisations. Co-operatives are business 
agents. Therefore, they aim to be profitable so that they have their own financial 
resources to provide more services to members. Given the challenges and lack of 
resources in place confronted by farmer organisations and the limitation of buyers to 
empower the farmer groups, external support then becomes pivotal. NGOs, 
government and other private agencies fundamentally can fill this gap: building strong 
and profitable co-operatives and bridging the co-operatives to market or buyers.  
 
The case of Amanah Co-operative supported by VECO Indonesia illustrates the 
fundamental role of an external support. VECO Indonesia functions not only to 
support the co-operative to be a strong and profitable co-operative but also assists to 
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negotiate about price, contracts and so on with buyers, Armajaro. The case of LEMS 
co-operative, which is supported by the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial government, 
also highlights the importance of external support. The government bridges LEMS 
co-operative with a buyer, PT. CEI. Despite this trader-co-operative partnership not 
being under any certification, farmers who fermented their beans have access to the 
market.  
 
Despite the pivotal role of external support, evidence from this study also 
demonstrates that different approaches of external support can lead to different 
consequences and implications. The VECO Indonesia approach of encouraging 
Amanah-Co-operative to be a part of buyer certification scheme, Armajaro, is found 
to be working and financially less risky. The farmers are not exposed to financial loss 
as farmers do not bear the costs of certification as the certificate is held by the buyer.  
 
Apart from NGOs, external support from government, in this case the Southeast 
Sulawesi Government supporting LEMS co-operatives, demonstrates the possibility 
of linking fermented cocoa beans farmers to a new market without exposing the 
farmers to financial risk. This new chain, however, does not provide much financial 
gain to the co-operative as the fermented beans buyer does not provide premiums. 
The ability of the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial government to encourage small-scale 
farmers to participate in fermented beans chain, implies that it also has the same 
potential to encourage small-scale farmers into a new chain: a certified chain.  
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The three chain cases of this study illustrate the important role in supporting farmers 
to participate into a new chain of market. The external support, however, is bound 
with a time frame. Even the government support has also limitations. Therefore, this 
study argues that ensuring a co-operative has sustained income from its business 
activities is very fundamental. This is based on evidence of this study revealing a 
common pattern drawing from expectation or motives of farmers to participate into a 
scheme. The common pattern is a need to gain real benefits from participating in a 
new scheme. The participating famers in the new schemes or chains expect to earn 
real benefits to have a better reward as they put extra effort to participate or otherwise 
it is pointless to participate. In this light, the next variable, potential benefits, is 
equally important to encourage farmers to participate in the certification network.  
 
The fourth variable of the framework is potential benefits from participation. 
Literature on potential benefits of participating from certification identifies various 
aspects of benefits such as farmer empowerment, environmental preservation, 
improving health and economic benefits. The evidence from this study revealed that 
cocoa farmers expect to gain more economic benefits.  
 
The potential economic benefits identified in this study can be earned from price 
differences between certified beans and conventional beans and premiums. In 
addition, improving yield of their cocoa can contribute to higher income earned by 
farmers. As discussed in Chapter 2 in terms of how certification relates to price 
setting, all the three certifications, Fairtrade, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified, 
have limitations on price setting. They base their price on the market. Fairtrade, 
 174 
however, sets a minimum price policy or known as Guaranteed Minimum Price 
(GMP). For conventional cocoa beans, it sets USD 1750/MT (FLO Standard for 
Cocoa Small Producer Organisation, accessed in January 2016) or USD 1.75/kg or 
around IDR 16,000/kg. Compared with the actual price received by farmers, it ranged 
from IDR 17,500 to 24,000 (Section 5.4.1). From this study, the actual price earned 
by farmers has been higher than the GMP. It has to be noted that however that under 
Fairtrade GMP, if the market price is below USD 1.75kg or IDR 16,000/kg, the buyer 
has to pay the GMP but whenever the market price is higher than GMP, the market 
price is paid plus a social premium.    
 
The other two certifications, Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified, do not have any 
mechanism to set prices but allow markets to determine the price to be earned by 
farmers. Comparing price between conventional and certified bean, where 
certification exists, it is evident that the price is neck and neck. Therefore, in terms of 
getting a higher price of the farmers’ cocoa as a result of participating in certification 
scheme, this not the case in this study. Having said that, the unexpected outcome of 
the existence of certification in a region, however, has created a price competition 
among buyers: conventional and certified buyers. This price competition resulting in a 
higher price has been enjoyed by the farmers regardless of their status: conventional 
or certified.  
 
The only possibility to earn real economic benefit is from premiums. Fairtrade and 
UTZ Certified oblige manufacturers to pay premiums to farmers, meanwhile under 
Rainforest Alliance scheme paying premium is optional. As the evidence from this 
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study shows, Amanah Co-operative demonstrates that it received premium which was 
quite a large of source of income, albeit it had to split with Armajaro as the owner of 
the certification. This is the most tangible economic benefit from participation 
resulting from certification. As revealed in section 5.4.3 New Market Under Certified 
Cocoa Value Chain, however, only half of the total amount of IDR1,560,000,000 
(GBP110,269) premiums goes to the co-operative. Furthermore, this premium is even 
split into two: to co-operative and individual farmers. In the end, the co-operative net 
income is IDR 260,000,000 (GBP 18,000) which is a modest income of a co-
operative in a year. Meanwhile an individual farmer with 600kg/year productivity 
earns the amount premium of IDR 350,000 (GBP24,7) per year. This evidence, albeit 
it is modest, can be considered as a real and tangible benefit from participation. This 
benefit, however, does not count the effort, in terms of labour and other spending to 
comply with standards. As this co-operative is in its early stage of development, this 
satisfies the board. 
 
The other potential benefit from participation identified by this study is yield increase. 
The Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified have guidelines on how to carry out good 
agricultural practices as part of the standards. But how participating in certification 
can improve their yields is not clear cut. Among certified farmers, the degree of 
increase in yield varies from modest to satisfying, from 700 kg/year to 1,000 kg/year. 
How certification standards directly contribute to yield improvement was not studied 
in depth but this study found that the certified farmers are more satisfied than those 
who are not certified in terms of yield.  
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The factors contributing to the small level of participation of Indonesian cocoa 
farmers in certification have been identified by this study. All variables are equally 
important to encourage farmers to participate or not to participate. Examining the 
variables, this study argues that giving consideration to these variables when 
introducing certifications among small-scale farmers may enable the farmers to get 
the most benefit from participation. Therefore, this study has at least two 
implications: reappraisal of approaches by stakeholders and certification body itself, 
and putting farmers’ interests as a main priority.  
 
The implication is that a trader or buyer, NGO and government approach to organise 
farmers into groups has to consider that a farmers’ group or co-operative can only 
function better as a social and economic agent when both organisational and business 
capacity are in place. Organisational capacity should not be limited to how to set up, 
run an organisation and comply with standards as a part of the farmers day-to-day 
practices. More than that, in terms of functioning as an economic unit, the main 
concern and effort should be focused on how to turn the co-operative into a profitable 
business unit so that the co-operative can be independent to cover its expenses, pay all 
costs associated with obtaining a certification, expand its services to members and 
sustain itself.  
 
A further implication is to determine an effective approach in enabling a farmer 
organisation to engage with certification particularly during the early stages of 
strengthening farmer organisation. As evidence from this study demonstrates, being 
part of the buyer’s certification scheme can be a choice at the initial stage of engaging 
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with certification. Exposing farmers to financial risk by obtaining a certification is 
deemed a risky approach as the farmers can suffer from financial loss, thus potential 
of decertification would be high. Based on the example of the co-operatives studied in 
the context of Indonesia, it is argued that it is very challenging for newly formed 
groups or co-operatives to gain certification. There are advantages to this process in 
having a partnership with a certified buyer.  
 
The implication of the existence of external support, particularly NGOs role, is 
pivotal in assisting farmers to build a strong and profitable co-operative and bridge 
the gap between farmers and buyers or traders. As revealed by this study, NGOs 
working in this field are quite few and mostly are international NGOs. Encouraging 
cooporation between international NGOs and local NGOs can be a working approach 
to make the initiative more sustainable as international NGOs are often limited by 
time-bound projects.  
 
As certification schemes have limitations in terms of benefits offered to farmers, they 
might need to prioritise tangible benefits such as financial reward to encourage 
farmers to participate in certification. The real benefits not only can bring significant 
impact to the participating farmers but also encourage non-participant farmers to 
participate in the scheme. In other words, scaling up farmer participation will be much 
possible. As certification has limitation to reward higher price to certified farmer 
produce, certified big player of chocolate industry can be encouraged to pay better 
premiums to farmers. The committment of major players of chocolate industry to 
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source certified cocoa would be much possible to achieve with the support of small-
scale farmers who produced more than 90 per cent of the produce.   
 
The intervention of certification has potentially altered value chain nodes and linkages 
of the commodity in Indonesia. The certification creates a new chain in which cocoa 
farmers are directly linked with international traders or exporter. This means that 
middlemen at various stages of a chain are cut out of the chain. In this study, 
middlemen are considered in mixed terms: as actors who are exacerbating the 
condition of small-scale farmers, but also as a source of help when farmers need 
credit, loans or agricultural inputs. An implication of the certification adoption, based 
on the evidence, expels the middlemen from the chain but does not replace the 
middlemen function of providing credit, loans and agricultural inputs. Other actors in 
the chain, such as traders even, cannot substitute this function as traders have 
limitations on their activity. NGOs and governments also cannot function as provider 
of credit, loans or agricultural inputs. Meanwhile, commercial banks are hard to 
access by small-scale farmers. The only chain actor to replace the function of the 
middlemen is the co-operative. Therefore, strengthening capacity and making co-
operatives profitable is the solution so that the alteration of structure of cocoa 
commodity in the country does not expose small-scale farmers to more vulnerable 
conditions. Ensuring that participating farmers and their co-operatives get the most 
benefits from participation and minimise vulnerability exposure would uplift their 
welfare. Certification cannot be a means for buyers or traders to merely secure supply 
from small-scale farmers. 
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Certification transmits information from market to farmers, encouraging access to 
credit and, to some extent, protects farmers from price fluctuation. Certification can 
be also a means to pool available resources to assist farmers directly instead of relying 
mainly on government assistance. In this light, certification can  also not only 
function as to fill the policy void or policy gap (Haufler, 2001) but as a catalyst 
bridging government, private actors, civil society and farmers, bringing them onto the 
same page to address the sustainable production of cocoa, ameliorate social, 
environmental problems and essentially improve farmers’ wellbeing (Ponte, 2008).  
 
7.4 Further Research Areas  
Having presented the findings and analysis of this study, areas of potential further 
research are identified. First of all, cross-country and cross-commodity case studies 
could be undertaken and, secondly, research could be carried out into scaling up. 
Cross-country case studies are important to test the enabling conditions as 
investigated in this study. The question is whether country context matters, what it is 
about country context that matters and how they matter. Further, whether the enabling 
conditions apply to other commodities such as coffee and other certified commodities 
could be investigated. The question is whether cocoa and other sectors have 
significant differences and how those differences can hamper or speed up 
proliferation of certification, as appropriate to local conditions and preferences  
 
As argued in this study, certification has its limitation in bringing impacts to small-
scale farmer wellbeing. This limitation is concerned with scaling up more farmers to 
participate. In other words, potential benefits received by farmers contribute directly 
to scaling up effort. Therefore, an effort to prioritise the benefits received by farmers 
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is an important key when an agency or organisation introduces certification among 
farmers. If a group of farmers benefit from participating in certification, this will 
speed up other non-participant farmers to participate. In the Indonesian context, it was 
discussed how motives and knowledge are transferred; the observations affirms that a 
set of successful stories of a group of farmers can be easily transmitted to other 
farmers. Traditional network can be enhanced by the certification network. Having 
said that, this study found that better price is still the main motive to move small-scale 
farmers. This is quite a dilemma as certification has its limitation in deciding or 
dictating price. The price earned by farmers is based on the market mechanism.  
 
Given the limitation of certification particularly in determining a higher price of 
certified beans of the farmers, another way out is only possible by collabaration 
among private sectors, government, NGOs and other cocoa stakeholders so that 
certification directly contributes to farmers’ wellbeing improvement which is not 
necessarily translated into higher price. The increasing yield, for instance, can be seen 
as a positive contribution. Secondly, significant premiums can also contribute when 
they are managed for a common purpose by co-operatives.  
  
The findings of this study contribute to the body of knowledge on PV-SCL literature. 
It explains the reasons behind the limited participation of small-scale farmers in the 
certified networks and thus scaling-up bears paramount challenges. The rise of PV-
SCL cannot be necessarily translated into the rise of small-scale producers’ 
participation into the PV-SCL and increasing their welfare. Producers’ participation is 
hampered by embedded or existing incapability of the small-scale farmers as 
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discussed in this study. The rise of PV-SCL in consumer countries can only be 
balanced by the increase in participation of producers in producing countries when 
adequate conditions are in place as exemplified by the cocoa sector. Further, the 
number of participating farmers cannot be a main indicator to measure the success of 
the rise of PV-SCL. It should be seen as one of the many success indicators.  The 
main indicator should be positive and real improvement on their household well-being 
as certification is a means to an end. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Participants of the Study 
Activity	   Participants	   Category	   Coding	   No.	  
Attendant	  
Location	   Sub-­‐District	  
and	  District,	  
Province	  
Province	  
Interview	   Nurwanto	   Certification	  Body	  Issuer	   01	   1	   Bandung	   West	  Java	   West	  Java	  
Interview	   and	   Field	  
Visit	  
Asbuma,	   SP	   and	  
Khairiyah	  
Cocoa	  Research	   01,	  02	   2	   Konda	   	  	   Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   Field	  
Visit	  
Erlan,	   Zainal,	  
Burhanuddin,	  
Usman	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   01,	   02,	  
03,	  04	  
4	   Asinua	  Jaya	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Yakub,	   Erlan,	  
Zainal,	  
Burhanuddin,	  
Usman	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   05,	   06,	  
07,	   08,	  
09	  
5	   Asinua	  Jaya	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Purminto	   and	  
Nasriani	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   10,	  11	   2	   Asinua	  Jaya	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Nasran	   Local	  Collector	   01	   	  	   Asinua	  Jaya	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Ahmad	   and	  
Wartin	  
Local	  Collector	   02,	  03	   	  	   Asinua	  Jaya	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	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Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Jawas	   Cocoa	  Farmer	   12	   1	   Ambodia	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Labonda	   Cocoa	  Farmer	   13	   1	   Ambodia	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Ibu	  Gona	   Cocoa	  Farmer	   14	   1	   Ambodia	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Arman	   Cocoa	  Farmer	   15	   1	   Ambodia	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Rusli,	   Halus	   dan	  
Aswami	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   16,	   17,	  
18	  
3	   UPT	  Lasao	   Asinua,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Marjuni	  Ma'mir	   Government	  Official	   01	   	  	   Unaha	   Konawe	   Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Makmur,	  
Muhammad	   Ali,	  
Ali	   Murdin,	  
Wacong	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   19,	   20,	  
21,	  22	  
4	   Barowila	   Tongauna'a,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Dedi	  Mansur	   Government	  Official	   02	   	  	   Unaha	   Konawe	   Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
FGD	   Saharuddin,	  
Izhan,	   Sardi,	  
Ibrahim,	   Samsu	  
Alam,	   Fadrah,	  
Sariah	  	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   23,	   24,	  
25,	   26,	  
27,	   28,	  
29,	  30	  
7	   Wonuahoa	   Lambuya,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Mustakin	   Cocoa	  Farmer	   31	   1	   Lawonua	   Besulutu,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	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Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Gusti	   Made	  
Kusuma	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   32	   1	   Welala	   Ladongi,	  
Kolaka	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   H.	  Darwis	   Local	  Buyer	   04	   	  	   Ladongi	   Ladongi,	  
Kolaka	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Gusti	  Nyoman	  Ari	   Local	  Collector	   05	   	  	   Ladongi	   Ladongi,	  
Kolaka	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Mahyuddin,	  Rusli,	  
Senawar,	  
Sarifuddin	  
Cocoa	  Farmer	   33,	   34,	  
35,	  36	  
4	   Wande	   Ladongi,	  
Kolaka	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Ramli,	   Amd.	  
Asnawir	  
Local	  Collector	   06,	  07	   2	   Lembah	  Subur	   	  	   Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Hj	   Hasna,	   H.	   M.	  
Jufri	  
Local	  Collector	   08,	  09	   	  	   Aere	   Lambandia,	  
Kolaka	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Asdar	  Pahalangi	   Local	  Collector	   10	   	  	   Aere	   Lambandia,	  
Kolaka	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Bading,	  Rianto	   Cocoa	  Farmer	   37,	  38	   2	   Iwoimenggura	   Lambandia,	  
Kolaka	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Eric	  Nugraha	   Certification	  Body	  Issuer	   02	   	  	   Kendari	   ICRAF	   Kendari	  
Office	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   and	   field	  
visit	  
Sumandar	   Cocoa	  Farmer	   39	   1	   Andromesinggo	   Besulut,	  
Konawe	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Ir.	  Ahmad	  AS	   Fermented	  Bean	  Buyer	   11	   1	   Kendari	   Southeast	   Southeast	  Sulawesi	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Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Bambang	   Government	  Official	   03	   1	   Kendari	   Southeast	  
Sulawesi	  
Southeast	  Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Agung	   Alit	   dan	  
Adi	  
FAIR	   TRADE	  
Organization	  
01,	  02	   2	   	  	   	  	   Bali	  
Interview	   Kadek	   Lisa	  
Ismiandewi	  
FAIR	  TRADE	  Association	   03,	  04	   1	   	  	   	  	   Bali	  
Interview	   Imam	  Suharto	   NGO	   05	   1	   	  	   	  	   Bali	  
Interview	   Benedictus,	  Dewa	  
Ayu	   Gede	   Rai	  
Setiawati	  
Certification	  Body	  Issuer	   03,	  04,	  	   2	   	  	   	  	   Bali	  
Interview	   Mercedes	  Chaves	   Certification	  Body	  Issuer	   05	   1	   	  	   	  	   Bali	  
Interview	   Ettih	   NGO	   05	   1	   	  	   	  	   Nusa	   Tenggara	  
Timur	  
Interview	   Maria	   Patrisia	  
Wata	  Beribe	  
NGO	   06	   1	   	  	   	  	   Nusa	   Tenggara	  
Timur	  
Interview	   Umar	  Utina	  dan	  	   Cocoa	  Association	   01	   2	   	  	   	  	   Nusa	   Tenggara	  
Timur	  
Interview	   Gabriel	   Belawa	  
Maran	  
CO-­‐OPERATIVE	  BOARD	   39	   1	   	  	   	  	   Nusa	   Tenggara	  
Timur	  
Interview	   Plasidus	   Nebon	  
Aren,	   Silvester	  
Non-­‐cocoa	  Farmer	   01,	   02,	   4	   	  	   	  	   Nusa	   Tenggara	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Bisu	   Koten,	  
Alfonsus	   Nabas	  
Koten	  
03	   Timur	  
Interview	   Stephanus	   CO-­‐OPERATIVE	  BOARD	   40	   1	   	  	   	  	   Nusa	   Tenggara	  
Timur	  
Interview	   Usman	   Buyer	   12	   1	   	  	   	  	   Makassar,	   South	  
Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Erni	   ASSOCIATION	   02	   2	   	  	   	  	   Makassar,	   South	  
Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Khairuddin	   CERTIFICATION	   BODY	  
ISSUERS	  
06	   1	   	  	   	  	   Makassar,	   South	  
Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Suharman	   NGO	   07	   2	   	  	   	  	   Makassar,	   South	  
Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Peni	  dan	  Rauf	   CO-­‐OPERATIVE	   BOARD	  
AND	  NGO	  
40,	  07	   2	   	  	   	  	   Makassar,	   South	  
Sulawesi	  
Interview	   Muhammad	  
Kamil.	  
Buyer	   13	   1	   	  	   	  	   Makassar,	   South	  
Sulawesi	  
FGD	  and	  Field	  Visit	   	  	   Certified	  Cocoa	  Farmer	   41,	   42,	  
43,	   44,	  
45,	   46,	  
47,	   48,	  
49,	   50,	  
51,	  52	  
12	   	  	   	  	   West	  Sulawesi	  
Summary of the Participants of the Study 
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CERTIFICATION	  ACTOR	  CHAIN	   Number	  of	  Participant	  
Certified	  cocoa	  farmers	   13	  
Certified	  non-­‐cocoa	  farmers	   6	  
Under	  certification	  cocoa	  co-­‐operative	   1	  
Under	  certification/certified	  non-­‐cocoa	  farmers	   1	  
Certified	  buyers	   2	  
Certification	  body	  issuers	   6	  
	   	  
NON	  CERTIFICATION	  ACTOR	  CHAIN	   	  
Cocoa	  farmers	  without	  a	  scheme	   35	  
Cocoa	  farmers	  with	  a	  scheme	   7	  
Non-­‐cocoa	  farmers	   5	  
Co-­‐operative	  with	  a	  scheme	   4	  
Co-­‐operative	  with	  a	  certification	   	  
Buyer	  with	  a	  scheme	   1	  
	   	  
SUPPORTS	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NGO	   5	  
Government	  Officials	   3	  
Association	   2	  
Cocoa	  Research	   2	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Appendix 2: Interview Questions 
 
University of Birmingham 
International Development Department 
 
Semi-structured Interview 
 
Fair Trade and other certification schemes on Indonesian cocoa sector: Examining the 
Enabling Factors 
  
Informed consent 
Participating in this research is voluntary 
Participants have the right to opt out at any point in time during the research process 
All personal information will be strictly confidential following the data protection Act 
(1998) 
Data provided in this questionnaire will be collated with other participant’s data and 
the results will be used to investigate different gender’s attitudes and beliefs that 
determines good life 
This research does not intend to inflate harm to any participant 
This research is conducted as a fulfilment of the requirement of the interviewer’s 
M.Phil. Thesis in IDD, University of Birmingham 
 
 
I, the researcher, assure that the data collected will be strictly confidential following 
the data protection Act (1998) 
 
Signature: ...................................................................................................... 
 
Date: ............................................................................................................. 
 
I, the participant, agree to take part in this research process and will remain 
anonymous. 
 
Signature: ...................................................................................................... 
 
Date: ............................................................................................................. 
 
Interview Questions Code 1A: 
Cocoa Farmers 
 
 
No: __________ 
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Interview Questions Code 1A: Cocoa Farmers 
 
Topics questions:  
Cocoa Farming 
Main/part-time job and main source of income 
o Is cocoa farming your main job?  
o Other than cocoa farming, what else do you do for living?  
o How many hectares of cocoa farm do you have?  
o Is it your own or a rent from others? If rent from others, what is the 
concession/agreement between you and the farm owner?  
o Do you know roughly the yield per year of your farm?  
o What do you think your main challenges? 
Cocoa Prices 
o How much are your cocoa beans paid per kg? 
o Do you produce different qualities? (Grade 1, 2, or 3) Is there any difference 
in price? If yes, what are they?  
o Where do you sell your cocoa beans? Local traders or someone from cities or 
companies?  
o In terms of price setting, are you satisfied with the price offered by the buyers? 
If yes, why and if no, why?  
o Do you have any special relationship with the buyers? Do you receive any 
loans, credit or any things from the buyers?    
Quality 
o Have you ever been informed what quality of the beans required from you?  
o If yes, are you able to manage to meet the quality? If yes, how? If no, why?  
o If you are able to meet the quality, is there any incentive in price? 
o Farming technique/knowledge 
o Where do you know about farming technique? Peer farmers, friends, relatives, 
or?  
o Do you receive any training from formal institutions (NGOs, Universities, 
Extension agents, etc.)?  
o If you do, how do you receive it? Do you attend a special training or they talk 
to you through informal way?  
o What do you think your main problems are? 
 
 
Enabling Factor 1: Co-operative/Farming Group 
Membership of a farmer group 
o Are you a member of any farmer group? If yes, what are they? If no, go to 
question 5b 
o Do you feel any benefit of being member of the group? What are they?  
o Do you feel any disadvantages of being member of the group? What are they?  
o Over all, do you think being a member of group is a good thing? 
o Are you willing to be a member of any farmer groups? Why?  
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o What do you think the benefits and disadvantages about being a membership 
of a farmer group? (Repetitive)  
o If you are asked to form a group as a requirement for marketing your cocoa 
beans, do you want to do it? Why? 
Membership of non-farmer group 
o Other than being or not being a member of a farmer group, are you a member 
of any community/societal/religious/ethnic-based group? What are they?  
o What are the benefits and disadvantages of being membership of that group?  
o What is your role in that group? 
 
Enabling Factor 2: Linking with Buyers/Markets 
o Do you always have market to sell your beans? Or in other words, do you 
always have buyers of your beans? Who/what are they?  
o Do you have them whenever you want them to buy your beans? Or is there 
any particular time to sell your beans, for instance, every certain of the day of 
the week/bi-weekly/monthly of market day? 
o Do you sell your beans alone or together with other farmers? 
 
Enabling Factor 3: External Support 
o Do you receive any support from NGOs, Government/Extension agent, and 
Universities/Research institutions or from any others? 
o What are they (the supports)? 
o How often do you receive the support? 
 
General questions 
o Do you read/write? 
o Do you have any formal education? 
o Do you think your cocoa farming is able to support your family? Sending your 
children to school, pay healthcare? 
o Do you think it is good thing to pass your cocoa farming to your children? Or, 
do you think it is a good thing if your children become cocoa farmers as well? 
Why? 
o What else do you know about your beans and your cocoa farming? 
 
Certifications 
o Do you know about certification? If yes, continue with following sub-
questions, if no, go to number 19 
o What are they?  
o What do you know about it (them)?  
o Do you think it is feasible to adopt it? Why? What are the feasibility to do so 
or challenges? 
Explain briefly about certification. Certification is a way that your farming practices 
and subsequently your cocoa beans are guaranteed produced in a certain way required 
by the certification standards. Thus, you can sell it through particular channel of the 
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certification and might earn higher prices and receive some supports. However, 
certification is also not free but farmers have to pay certain amount of money to cover 
the certification costs and regular inspections fee. 
o What do you think about it? Are you interested in joining any certification 
scheme? Why?  
o What the challenges might prevent you from joining it? 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION  
 
 
If you wish to know the results or contact the researcher for further inquiries please do 
so at dxw026@bham.ac.uk or through number: +62 813 1608 2253 
 
